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ABSTRACT

This study proposes a new way of measuring brevity in the American short story.
Since Edgar Allan Poe's 1847 definition of the tale, literary criticism has looked to
various structural features within the text to define the elements that distinguish the short
story from other prose genres like the novel. I argue that brevity is an essential feature of
storytelling and suggest that its perception is molded and shaped by several historical
factors. The phrase "wise economy" offers two ways of thinking about the conciseness
of the form: it evokes a history of rhetorical economy central to the formation of a
distinctly American English and, more broadly, the exchange that takes place between a
storyteller and his/her audience in the narrative act. These meanings work at crosspurposes: rhetorical economy results in the disappearance of the storyteller whose
presence is the most visible marker o f exchange. I trace how the general elision o f the
narrative act shapes the reader's perception of the meaning in a text in four different
modes of storytelling (romanticism, realism, modernism, and minimalism) by proposing
an interpretive model grounded in speech-act theoiy. This model is in turn applied to
works by Washington Irving, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, Rebecca Harding
Davis, Sarah Ome Jewett, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemingway,
Djuna Barnes, Richard Wright, Bobbie Ann Mason, and Raymond Carver.

v

INTRODUCTION
THE ECONOMICS OF BREVITY

"We feed on short stories like living ducks," writes John Barth. "Take a breath,
take the plunge, take our tidbit, and soon surface" (72). The simile evokes a variety of
sensory impressions: the tightening of the lungs, the sound of the splash, the taste of
retrieved treasure, the sight of sunlight refracted through the lapping water. Perhaps most
impressive is its compactness: so much effect achieved by so few words, the economy
creating the very experience that it describes. Barth illustrates here the intertwining of
brevity and desire, how the condensation of experience inspires a reciprocal longing. The
idiosyncrasy of the simile cannot be exhausted in a glance. Each re-reading is carried by
the current of the syntax, cresting like the life of a wave, leaving us washed ashore,
waiting to wade out and ride the next crown. Any event or action can be brief, of course,
and whether a punch or a kiss, what remains is the sting or the salt, the aftereffect that
kindles memory. In the case of a narrative, as Barth suggests, brevity is a particularly
profound experience. All storytellers employ some principle o f economy; incorporating
every potential detail of a story into the narrative act is impossible. What is left out in the
moment of telling, the "minimalizing" of the text, is frequently what invites the audience
to risk another plunge.
A reader less tolerant of lyricism might complain that Barth merely says the most
obvious thing conceivable about a short story: it is short. What constitutes brevity is not
easy to determine, however. In his 1847 review of Hawthorne's Twice-told Tales, Poe
claims that the well-wrought tale (the phrase "short story" would come into fashion after
his death) is the highest achievement possible in prose, far exceeding the novel, which
commits the "one unpardonable sin" that literature can: it is too long. His preference for
shorter writing is, in part, a reaction to a critical bias that survives in our own time:
"There has long existed in literature a fatal and unfounded prejudice, which it will be the
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office of this age to overthrow—the idea that the mere bulk of a work must enter largely
into our estimate of its interest" (446). In America, bigger has always been advertised as
better, at least until the fall of Donald Trump and the reorganization of General Motors.
The history of literary criticism reverberates with calls fora national literature that does
justice to the vastness o f the country, with vast measuring geographic dimension, not
cultural diversity. I Implicit in the very idea of the "great American novel" is a
formidable text that occupies more than its fair space on a shelf. In Poe's time, novels (as
with most books) were customarily divided into separate volumes to enhance their market
value. Even works that were too short to bind profitably by halves or thirds were
published with multiple title pages, as if to foster the illusion of a more impressive mass.
The multi-volume format has long since proved commercially unfeasible, yet big books
continue to demand attention if only for the sheer obstinacy of their presence. Reviewers
of Norman Mailer's 1,310-page Harlot's Ghost (1990) are invariably impressed with its
weight and bulk, as if the author had delivered the world's fattest baby. In such cases,
they reward what Poe calls the "sustained effort," not recognizing that "perseverance is
one thing and genius quite another." By comparison, authors whose talents are better
suited to shorter contexts may suffer critical disappointment. The careers of Sarah Ome
Jewett and Raymond Carver, for example, share two similarities: a marked preference for
the short story over the novel and a histoiy of critical commentary lamenting the artistic
cowardice of avoiding Big Themes in Big Spaces. If, as Barth's metaphor suggests,
eating is a valid metaphor for reading, American literary appetites hunger for the
smorgasbord of the novel. The short stoiy, by contrast, is a snack.
Poe himself was a victim of this bias. In late 1833, he submitted a collection of
short fictions called Tales o f the Folio Club to Carey & Lea; the Philadelphia publishing
house waited an entire year before recommending that he sell them piecemeal on the
periodical market, where they were more likely to turn a profit. Three years later, another
publisher, Harper and Brothers, assured him that American audiences preferred books "in
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which a single and connected story occupies the whole volume" (qtd. in Silverman 133).
Only after producing a longer narrative, The Narrative o f Arthur Gordon Pym (1838), did
he publish a volume of tales. Whatever personal stake Poe had in establishing brevity as
the criterion par excellence for literary achievement, his review of Hawthorne makes a
valiant effort to overturn the aristocracy of genres. "As the novel cannot be read at one
sitting, it cannot avail itself of the immense benefit of totality," he writes. "Worldly
interests, intervening during the pauses of perusal, modify, counteract and annul the
impressions intended.... In the brief tale, however, the author is enabled to carry out his
full design without interruption. During the hour of perusal, the soul of the reader is at
the writer's control" (448). The argument has formed the cornerstone of most shortstory theories. Brevity gives the tale a potential "unity of effect" or intensity absent in
longer works. It is an ethic of efficiency to which a good storyteller adheres: eveiy
narrative element contributes to the culmination of this "single effect" or "thesis." But
Poe hints at another effect. The reader is the site where brevity is realized because s/he
experiences the "true unity" of a tale in a "single sitting" of thirty minutes to two hours.
In the first case, brevity is a structural component fixed wholly within the text, but in the
second, it is grounded in the reception of the story. Brevity itself is an experience
inscribed within the act of telling.
This implicit aspect of Poe's theory illustrates the need for an historical approach
to brevity. There are numerous histories of the short story, of course, beginning with
Fred Lewis Pattee in 1923 and culminating recently with a multi-volume series from
Twayne, edited by William Peden, himself author of a valuable book on the subject. But
these studies, instructive as they are, track the development of the genre according to the
careers of individual authors and concern themselves only tangentially with questions of
definition. 2 As for establishing a theoretical perspective, it may not take genius to claim
that what was brief in 1847 might, in 1993, strike some as tedious. Yet short-story
theory (the counterpart of historical criticism) is preoccupied with defining brevity
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according to formal properties, without reference to cultural conditions. E. M. Forster
distinguished the novel from the short story according to word count; in the past few
years, however, publishers have grown fond of novels that run little more than one
hundred pages, roughly the same length as Henry James's "The Lesson of the Master."
Other theories of brevity apply standards that are only a little less arbitrary. One of the
most influential short-story theorists, Norman Friedman, dismisses length to substitute
another structural criterion, scope. "We will not argue... about length in strictly
quantitative terms," he says. Instead, scope refers to content, allowing him to measure
brevity according to plot dimension. A story's "action" may be "inherently small,"
ranging from a single speech (Dorothy Parker's "A Telephone Call") to a scene (Ernest
Hemingway's "Hills Like White Elephants") to an episode or sequence of scenes
(Hemingway's "Ten Indians"). Or a story may contain a number of episodes (a plot) that
must be cut down to size; a writer makes it "short in the telling." By linking a story's
length to its subject matter, Friedman resists the pitfalls of quantitative analysis, yet his
qualitative categories are equally restrictive. Their obvious limitation (if we take the
application beyond the abstract classification of constituent parts into speeches, scenes,
and episodes) is that brevity can be analyzed only according to composition history. Such
an approach is not fruitless, of course; an author's manuscript revisions offer vital insight
into the creative process. 3 Yet the end result is a limited critical purview: the shortness
of a story is always manifest in structural features and needs little relation to its cultural
milieu to be understood.
The most recent attempt to address the question of brevity is a collection of essays
edited by Susan Lohafer and Jo Ellyn Clarey, Short Story Theory at a Crossroads (1989).
The book offers an intriguing array of models and metaphors for conceptualizing the
differences between prose genres, as well as thoughtful commentary on the difficulties of
defining them. What strikes me as telling is the prevalence of structuralist descriptions: a
story is the product of tensions between "the force of a shaping form and the resistance of

5

the shaped materials," or a "debunking rhythm...that depends on a special use of
antithesis" to project closure and give the reader a teleological sense of development. The
most striking essay, by William O'Rourke, offers a triptych of metaphors for
differentiating a short story from a novel. The first is zoological: the novel is endoskeletal while the short story is exoskeletal. The novel has an interior vertebrae, a bone
structure hidden under the flesh of text. In short fiction, however, structure and text are
one, and like a lobster or an oyster, size is limited by shape. With disarming ease,
O’Rourke interweaves zoology with space-time physics and microeconomics to conclude
that, during the 1980s, the short story became fashionable if not popular because it is "a
piece of literature of which a good example can be produced by accident—or by an
amateur" (203). (This attitude will be explored more fully in the last chapter). It is a
bravura performance, yet, as with Barth's "feeding duck" image, the exoskeletal
metaphor is more provocative than substantive. Its crustacean shell covers a guiding
interpretive truism: a short story is structurally concise. Again, a universal standard of
size delimits the genre.
I am not questioning the relevance of these essays or the value of formalist
readings; as a glance through my chapters reveals, my argument depends on close
scrutiny of textual nuances. What I find frustrating throughout short-story theory is the
absorption with form. Locating brevity in structure turns texts into objects, a tendency
that may express a critical desire to make the short story an artifact comparable to the
novel. Our understanding of a novel can be influenced by its status as a concrete thing:
packaging strives to be totemic of aesthetic value. But the idea of a short story as an
object is more abstract, simply because one rarely exists as an isolated, self-contained
text. Its membranes pass intertextual meanings either from the editorial content of the
periodicals in which it appears or other stories gathered in the same collection. What goes
missing in the emphasis on form is the key word in Poe's theory: the effect. Is there a
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way to define brevity not as an expression of length or structure but as an effect? And can
this effect be related to the historical development of the American short story?
This study is an experiment in answering those questions. My title comes from an
1851 essay on Hawthorne by Henry T. Tuckerman, who describes the tale as a "wise
economy of resources." He borrows heavily from Poe in championing the concise over
the prolix:

. .the choicest gems of writing are often the most terse; as a perfect lyric or

sonnet outweighs in value a mediocre epic or tragedy, so a carefully worked and richly
conceived sketch, tale or essay is worth scores of diffuse novels." Yet, as the word
"terse" suggests, the essays differ on one important point. For Poe, brevity is a
structural feature, a distillation o f dramatic components into a single plot. Tuckerman, on
the other hand, defines it as an expression of style: "it is a characteristic of standard
literature, both ancient and modem, thus to condense the elements of thought and
style...it gives us the essence, the flower, the vital spirit of mental enterprise" (344).
What makes a story short is rhetorical economy. By invoking "the essence, the flower,
[and] the vital spirit of mental enterprise," Tuckerman implicitly grounds his argument in
a rhetorical tradition that challenges the "bigger-is-better" prejudices of aesthetic criticism:
the idea that less is more. Richard Bridgman was one of the first critics to gauge the
influence of this tradition on American prose. He traces the "colloquial" styles of Twain,
Stein, and Hemingway to the post-colonial cultivation of an "indigenous" American
English that valued a "greater concreteness of diction and simplicity in syntax" than
British prose styles allowed. 4 Rhetorical brevity was not invented in the new world, of
course. The plain or vernacular style has advocates as as old as Aristotle; Tuckerman's
imagery even echoes the "common-sense" rhetoric of Hugh Blair, which, imported from
Scotland, was the predominant influence on 19th-century American compositional
pedagogy. Still, the myth that American English is rooted in an egalitarian popular speech
creates a suspicion of big words and "highfalutin"' phraseology. The influence of
rhetorical brevity is deeply embedded in the development of narrative technique,
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especially in the transformation from digressive narrators who tell stories to omniscient
narrators who render them. Percy Lubbock, one of the earliest critics to promote
narratorial reticence, describes the transition in Henry James as an American rebellion
against Englishmen like Thackeray (156-87). More recently, Cecelia Tichi has linked the
early 20th-century "efficiency movement" (also known as Taylorism, after Samuel
Taylor) to the imagistic styles of Pound and Hemingway (15-96). By defining brevity
within this rhetorical tradition, Tuckerman points to an historical matrix in which the
measure of shortness will vary according to the cultural temper.
"Economy" has a second meaning vital to my approach. It also evokes trade, a
circulation of goods and services, and it reminds us that narratives are first and foremost
currency in a transaction between a storyteller and an audience, Walter Benjamin employs
this metaphor when he describes storytelling as "an ability to exchange experiences" that
establishes community. Shorter narratives are social events: a storyteller "takes what he
tells from experience—his own or that reported by others. And he in turn makes it the
experience of those who are listening to his tale" (87). "The Storyteller" is a nostalgic,
often bitter dirge for the passing of this communal intimacy in the face of industrial
alienation, which the novel embodies. According to Benjamin, the novel precludes
exchange because its length forces attention to subject matter. Packed with information
and explanation, it allows little opportunity for the audience to reflect and assimilate the
narrative within its own experience. In this way, a longer narrative destroys a reader's
talent for listening. Nor is the audience inspired to circulate stories; when the covers
close, a novel is over and we reach for another. For Benjamin, "storytelling is always the
art of repeating stories, and this art is lost when the stories are no longer retained" (91).
The communal value of experience diminishes as audiences are transformed into solitary
consumers who "destroy" and "swallow up" texts like "the fire devours logs in the fire
place" (100). Simpler stories, by contrast, are the broken bread of experience. Though
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passed from lip to lip, they are never fully consumed but always replenish themselves
through the solemn, social gesture of sharing.
It is fairly easy to dismiss the arbitrary dichotomies that Benjamin establishes in
order to write the storyteller's obituary: a preference for the oral over the written, for the
rural over the industrial, for the village tiller and journeyman over the consumer
bourgeoisie. However nostalgic his notion of storytelling, his emphasis on community
and counsel has inspired criticism to refocus on the interpersonal function of narrative
after decades of asserting textual autonomy. 5 Peter Brooks has written a persuasive
defense of "The Storyteller" in which he suggests that Benjamin’s nostalgia is only a
"strategic" device: it "points the way less to an impossible return to the past than to a new
attention directed toward the most subtle signs of context in the most highly elaborated
texts, those that are the most self-conscious about their communicative situation and
status" ("Tale" 290). As evidence of this self-consciousness, he refers to narrative
frames that evoke specific storytelling situations, and though his examples are French, his
argument is perfectly applicable to American works. James stages The Turn o f the
Screw, for example, as the oral recitation of a written text. The preface enhances the
ghostly quality of the story proper by dramatizing its effect on a specific audience.
Obviously, stoiytelling frames are not unheard of in the novel, but the short story may
claim an authentic affinity with oral communication, precisely because its folkloric roots
predate the industrial rattle and hum that spawns the novel. Early attempts at defining the
genre explicitly link its popularity to oral traditions. Mark Twain claims to speak only of
narration "by word of mouth" in "How to Tell a Story" (156); yet the advice that he
offers (feigned naivete, casual indifference to the punch line or "snapper," smart use of
pauses) is so characteristic of his own short stories, which make abundant use of
storytelling frames, that medium is a moot point. Bret Harte stresses the oral roots even
more emphatically when he links the story's rise to the tall tale and joke telling: "It was at
first noticeable in the anecdote or 'story,' and, after the fashion of such beginnings, was
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orally transmitted. It was common in the bar-rooms, the gatherings in the country store,
and finally at public meetings in the mouths o f ’stump orators.' Arguments were clinched
and political principles illustrated by a Tunny stoiy.' It invaded even the camp meeting
and pulpit" (201).
Economy offers both a definition of brevity as a rhetorical effect and a metaphor
for reading the short story as a social act. What is the relationship between these two
meanings? To a certain extent, they work at cross-purposes and create an internal tension
in the development of the genre. Rhetorical economy in fiction, as Wayne C. Booth first
detailed more than thirty years ago, is manifest in an aesthetic homogenization of
representational techniques, best summarized as a movement away from telling (diegesis
or description) to showing (mimesis or imitation). 6 This change results in the gradual
elision of the narratorial function: whereas an early 19th-century storyteller might openly
comment upon his or her own performance, narrators in realist or modernist periods are
less likely to address their audience. As for contemporary literature, it is debatable
whether mimesis remains the "dogma" it was when Booth's work was first published.
The celebrated self-reflexivity o f postmodern styles, as Brooks suggests, may "propose a
dialogue with the reader, [asking] for the reader's response in exchange for counsel
given" ("Tale" 291). And in criticism, deconstruction long ago proved that imitation is a
form of description and mimesis merely a more idealized (and unattainable) type of
diegesis. 7 Yet a random scan of writing guides suggests that rhetorical economy still
means deleting words and expressions that are overly expressive of a writer's presence.
However theoretically fashionable it is to point out the impurity of mimesis, aesthetic
criticism nonetheless prefers realistic works that reflect "the way that we live now." 8
Derogatory terms like "digression" and "intrusion," which imply that a narrator interrupts
the real stoiy, continue to be mainstays of our critical vocabulary.
Because it typically leads to the deletion of references to narrative performance,
rhetorical economy is complicit in creating the illusion of textual autonomy. The
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storyteller, responsible for establishing a community with the audience, evaporates from
the text, and signs of address become less and less obvious. Distance distills the "living
immediacy" that Benjamin claimed was the heart and soul of the storyteller's craft (even
when the storyteller was only a typographic cipher). 9 It should be noted, however, that
no story is completely bereft of narratorial presence. Critics have long been fond of citing
Hemingway's "The Killers" as an example of impersonal, unmediated writing. The style
is so pared down, so dependent on dialogue between the characters, that many (including
Booth) claim that it is a story without a storyteller. Yet there are subtle clues that our
access to events passes through an intermediary perception. A simple sentence like "In
their tight overcoats and derby hats [the killers] looked like a vaudeville team" reveals an
evaluative presence texturing the story; someone is responsible for this analogy. As
Susan Snaider Lanser remarks, the fact that subtle "asides" like this do not break with the
overall tone of reticence suggests the presence of an "invisible eyewitness" rather than a
"wholly effaced recorder of words and deeds" (Narrative Act 269). In an "invisible"
narrative stance, signs of address are embedded in linguistic rather than direct, dramatic
gestures: modals, tense, forms for attributing speech to characters. What disappears is a
specific cultural context in which these gestures indicate a relative degree of control over
the meaning taking shape.
Mention of control brings me to the middle terms in my subtitle, "narrative
authority." Before outlining more specifically what follows in each chapter, I must clarify
my own approach to the dynamics of textual interaction and relate it to brevity and
storytelling. To date, most inquiries into narrative authority have been of a decidedly
taxonomic bent, with Gerard Genette's Narrative Discourse setting the standard. The
result is a diverse, international grammar of descriptive poetics that catalogues types of
narrators and readers but pays little attention to the rhetorical exchange between them. 10
More recently, narratology has borrowed from other disciplines in an effort to emphasize
the transactive nature of storytelling. O f these disciplines, psychoanalysis has proved the
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most popular. In his essay on Benjamin, Brooks invokes Freudian transference as a
model for "all that is deployed by modem narrative to signal, to underline, to dramatize
the reception and the transmission of the narrated, and of narrative itse lf ("Tale" 291).
His position is not surprising since he authored one of the most controversial (if not
influential) psychoanalytic analyses of narrative, Reading for the Plot (1984). For
Brooks, transference is a story "repeated from the past, acted out as if it were present,"
whose repressed meaning is manifest in repetitions, redundancies, and omissions. Like
an analyst, a reader listens "for the design of the story [narration] would tell" (235); we
"'intervene' by the very act o f reading, interpreting the text, handling it, shaping it to our
own ends, making it accessible to our therapies" (234). If "design" suggests formalism,
Brooks (in still another essay) insists that the structure of the text is a map of the
narrator's unconscious and that, to gain access to these psychic processes, we must
"[become] more formalistic" ("Idea" 10). Focusing on the structure of the text, a reader
makes him/herself complicit in the transference, and the act of reading generates another
story: "Meaning in this view is not simply 'in the text,' nor wholly the fabrication of a
reader (or a community of readers), but in the dialogic struggle and collaboration of the
two, in the activation of textual possibilities in the process of reading" ("Idea" 16).
Obviously, any attempt to gauge narrative authority will require close attention to
the text; in this sense, the focus should be "textual and rhetorical" ("Idea" 6). Yet when
Brooks describes the narrative transaction as ”tak[ing] place in a special 'artificial'
medium, obeying its own rules" (Reading 234), he fails to acknowledge that this
"dialogue" also takes place in a cultural medium that obeys codes of social interaction.
J. L. Austin describes these codes or norms as "conventional procedures," contexts or
situations in which the words of a speaker or listener are accorded greater authority
because of social status (1 4 //). Brooks' own equation of the reader with the analyst
illustrates the relevance of conventional procedures. In a transference model, the reader
pays little attention to the social status of either the narrator or author because
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interpretation takes place under clinical conditions. The text is a patient that we "[make]
accessible to our own therapies." But to cany the analogy to an extreme, the
reader/analyst can only practice these therapeutic techniques once s/he has been licensed
by a more authoritative regulatory body. Brooks posits an ideal reader who is a
professional, one who must go to school, earn a degree, and pass state boards; whether
such rigorous training is characteristic of most audiences is doubtful. To a hazard another
generalization, 1 would suggest that many (non-academic) readers automatically defer to
an author, precisely because publication itself confers social status. A publisher's
imprimatur implies that someone, somewhere has decided that these words are worthy of
circulation. Even in oral performances, conventional procedures emphasize the speaker's
possession of the "floor," subordinating the audience’s response: ministers wear robes
and stand in pulpits, politicians grip podiums phalanxed by bodyguards, comedians pace
stages holding microphones. 11
Conventional procedures are only norms, however, and they can be violated. A
heckler inspires the thrill of anarchy when confronting a politician blathering platitudes;
similarly, a reader has the power to close the book or to avoid even picking it up. An
author need only discover his or her work in a bargain bin to know that social status is
tenuous at best. What these possible responses illustrate is the dynamic nature of
narrative authority and the inherent instability of the reading act itself. In Brooks' model,
form develops according to the rhythm of narrative syntax; I would argue that conven
tional procedures alter the tempo as reading is complicated by constant identification and
differentiation on the part of the audience. 12 To do justice to this dynamic, one must
admit the influence of sociological variables (gender, race, and class, to name but three)
on the construction of narrative authority. 13 My own approach then is to locate the
storytelling exchange within a cultural context by following the general outline of a
methodology that Steven Mailloux calls "rhetorical hermeneutics": reconstructing
interpretive processes to uncover the "historical sets of topics, arguments, tropes,

13

ideologies, and so forth which determine how texts are established as meaningful through
rhetorical exchanges" (15). To illustrate how rhetorical economy affects narrative
exchange, I must show how the elision of the narrative function transforms addresses
(whether direct or embedded) in the short story. To do so, I borrow interpretive models
from a diverse body of speech-act theory and discourse analysis. These models allow me
to characterize the dynamic nature of narrative authority as a drama of "turn-taking"
relations (Pratt Speech Act 113). Narrative conventions signal a storyteller's willingness
or unwillingness to relinquish control over the meaning taking shape.
To emphasize the historical origins of this tension between stylistic brevity and
storytelling, I organize my chapters around four prominent "modes of writing" that
develop between the early 19th century and the 1980s: romanticism, realism, modernism,
and minimalism. 14 In each chapter, I focus on a specific narrative convention that is
either endemic or inimical to the storytelling styles. The stories discussed were selected
for their stylistic features as well as thematic relevance to a particular rhetorical debate
embedded in the modes. In the first chapter, I explore how tensions between orality and
writing influence the stoiytelling frames of three tales: Irving's "The Legend of Sleepy
Hollow," Hawthorne's "Wakefield," and Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener." These
tensions, I argue, are indicative of an emerging 19th-century sensibility in which writing
is a pedagogical tool charged with disseminating moral instruction. This imperative is
manifest in morals and maxims attached to stories that explicate the "lessons" that they
illustrate. As a result, interpretive strategies cast the reading act as the type of con
sumption that Benjamin saw as destructive of community. As writing assumes a greater
cultural authority, orality is devalued as ephemeral and specious, the discourse of
legends, rumors, and other untruths. To different degrees, Irving, Hawthorne, and
Melville react against this perception; evoking oral discourse allows them to undermine
the authority conferred to the written word.
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Chapter Two focuses on the relationship between direct addresses and gender in
the realist era. The stories discussed, Rebecca Harding Davis's "Life in the Iron Mills,”
Sarah Ome Jewett’s "A White Heron," and Charlotte Perkins Gilman's ’T h e Yellow
Wallpaper," illustrate different reactions to the growing realist imperative of objectivity.
Objectivity increasingly precluded the negotiation of narrative authority through emotional
appeals to the reader; brevity, in this case, refers to the emotive timbre of the storyteller's
performance. I relate this critical prejudice to the phenomenon of professionalization in
the latter 19th century and suggest that narrative strategies that stressed the interpersonal
function of storytelling were associated with feminine communication styles.
My third chapter relates brevity to the representation of speech and thought in the
modernist short story. Modernism typically obscures the figure of the storyteller in order
to immerse the reader in a polyphonic panorama of voices; nairation moves from a
"teller" function to an "author" function. Figural voices may echo in indirect speech (as in
Gertrude Stein's "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene"), or seem more audible in direct dialogue
(as in Hemingway's "Hills Like White Elephants"); more complex yet, they may
combine with the narrative voice in free indirect speech (as in Djuna Barnes's "Run Girls,
Run" and Richard Wright's "Almos' a Man"). I explore what happens when these
representational techniques become mannerisms expressing an authorial ethos or public
identity. I suggest that literary celebrity (always a preoccupation with modernists) links
prose style and public persona so that storytelling techniques become personal property.
As a result, the authorial voice speaks louder in the reading act, even while remaining a
relative whisper in the text.
The final part of the book deals with the influence of the present tense on narrative
authority in minimalist stories by Bobbie Ann Mason and Raymond Carver. Critics, until
recently, have attacked minimalism, complaining that it does away with depth and craft,
offering only a "catatonic" or nihilistic perspective on contemporary life (Wilde 143). I
argue that minimalism foregrounds the oral stand that Irving, Hawthorne, and Melville
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employed more surreptitiously in the tale; Mason and Carver often delete drama in favor
of narration, creating an ambiance of secular confession. The present tense, I suggest, is
a metalinguistic form of address: it closes the temporal gap that traditionally separates a
stoiy and its telling and substitutes perception for retrospection, radically redefining
narration. The lack of a backward glance capable of reconstructing events in a
chronology or causal chain influences narrative structure: the typical evaluative process
by which a storyteller decides what information is most important (what linguists call
"grounding") is deferred to the audience.
Some readers will be astonished to find little discussion of writers traditionally
associated with the short story: Poe, Rose Terry Cooke, James, Constance Fenimore
Woolson, Twain, Crane, Chopin, Wharton, Cather, Anderson, Fitzgerald, Ellen
Glasgow, Caroline Gordon, Toomer, Porter, Dorothy Parker, Faulkner, Eudora Welty,
O’Connor, Updike, Paule Marshall, Alice W alker—my only justification for these
exclusions is that I have combined texts to ensure thematic consistency in each chapter.
In choosing individual works, my intent has been to offer new readings of canonical
stories like "Bartleby" and "Hills Like White Elephants" while including less celebrated
pieces like "Life in the Iron Mills" and "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene." Twelve tales is too
small a sample to claim that the heterogeneity of the American short story is fully repre
sented. What follows aims to be more illustrative than comprehensive. It surveys the
protean forms that storytelling has assumed over the last two centuries.

N otes
1Ruland's The Native Muse offers a convenient potpourri of this attitude,
beginning roughly two-thirds through the first volume with excerpts from DeTouqeville,
Emerson, and Melville. Even more important, the selections illustrate the prevalence of
the rhetorical economy tradition, stretching back long before Franklin. For a bizarre
recent example of "bigger is better," see Wolfe, who offers his own novel, The Bonfire
o f the Vanities, as a model for capturing the American panorama.
2Pattee's work may be the earliest "history"; Lieberman's 1912 study covers the
post-Civil W ar local color writers. Williams’s 1920 book focuses on "living or at least
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contemporary writers," though her definition of "contemporary" is ambiguous. She
excludes James but includes Richard Harding Davis (both died in the same year). Other
historical surveys include O'Brien and Voss. West focuses on the 20th century; Peden's
book, by far the best of the lot, covers 1940-63. Four of the Twayne volumes deal with
the American short story: Volume One (Current-Garcia) covers the colonial era up to
1850. Volume Two, edited by Crowley, covers 1850-1990. Volume Three, edited by
Stevick, covers 1900-1945, and the final volume, 1945-1980, is edited by Weaver.
Strictly theoretical discussions include Rohberger and Bums, Lohafer, and Gerlach. One
of the few calls for an historical approach to brevity is Pratt's "The Short Story."
3An excellent example is Beegel's study; the book details how Hemingway
arrived at strategic omissions in stories like "Fifty Grand" and "A Natural History of the
Dead."
4 I quote the word "indigenous" fully recognizing that Bridgman uses it without
irony; a more contemporary study would have to account for the influence of ethnic
cultures (whether Native-, Afro-, Chinese-, or Chicano/a-American) on "American
English."
5Kroeber eloquently shows how criticism favors universal and "metacultural"
aesthetics that transcend specific social practices thanks to the "intellectual heritage of
modernism." Retelling/Rereading makes a convincing case for viewing stories as
"phenomena so profoundly cultural that all explanatory analogues to natural processes,
including those emphasized in Freudian psychology, are destructively misleading. Until
we give up Causaubon-like faith in a single, universal (because organically founded,
"natural") plot as the key to all storytelling we undervalue not merely the diversity of
stories in themselves but also the significance of the diversity of response that stories call
forth" (9).
6Booth's first three chapters detail the standard arguments for eliminating the
narrative context; he offers an exacting critique of their inconsistencies that is still valid.
As he suggests, "Everything [that] shows will serve to tell; the line between showing
[mimesis] and telling [diegesis] is always to some degree an arbitrary one... the author’s
judgment is always present, always evident to anyone who knows how to look for it"
( 20 ).
7The quintessential statement is Derrida's "Economimesis."
8See, for example, Hills, who, as fiction editor at Esquire, is responsible for
rejecting thousands of manuscripts in any given year. He encourages amateur storytellers
not to be too "talky." For an example of aesthetic criticism, see Aldridge.
^Formalist critics tend to misunderstand the function of narrative interventions.
Rohberger and Bums, for example, recognize the elision of the storyteller is a defining
feature of the form. 1 differ with them on the effect of this disappearance, however: "As
the form evolves.. .the reader is increasingly required to participate in a kinship relation
with the author that is even more active than the one Poe suggests. The underlying line of
development is evident not only in the evolution of the narrator's role, but also in the
transformation of plot into pattern, and consequently in the total transformation of the
'real' into the world of dream" (4). As "more active" implies, the authors assume that
direct addresses pacify the reader by telling him/her how to respond; for an alternative
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position, see Kroeber, who argues that narrative interventions mark a narrator's
willingness to negotiate his/her authority by connecting diverse audiences (99).
10A note on terminology: throughout this study, "reader” refers to the fictional
audience, whether dramatized or implicit, addressed by the storyteller. I use the word in
place of "narratee," or the several types of fictional audiences that Phelan distinguishes (520). "Audience," by contrast, refers to the real-life consumer of the story. This dis
tinction was prevalent in the 19th-century and offers, 1 think, a fairly simple scheme for
distinguishing fictional and actual addressees.
11 For a discussion of conventional procedures in shaping author-audience
relations, see Pratt, Towards a Speech Act Theory o f Literature (120). Though he does
not mention her work, Rabinowitz applies a similar argument to reading conventions to
illustrate the influences shaping a reader's perception of narrative authority even before
s/he opens a book.
12 My definition of reading is comparable to the definition o f authority that
Holzner and Robertson establish: a "social structure [that] emerges as an interaction and
reflexive phenomenon from identifications and differentiations" (20).
t3 While gender, class, and race have preoccupied literary critics for nearly
twenty-five years now, with the turn away from New Criticism in the late 1960s towards
sociocultural interpretive schools like feminist, Marxist, and New Historicist criticism,
narrative studies remained relatively isolated until the mid-1980s. When the introduction
to Lanser's Fictions o f Authority was published in Style in 1986, traditional narratologists
decried the intervention of non-descriptive models, arguing that feminist criticism
appropriated narrative studies for political (and therefore suspect) ends. The first chapter
of Warhol's Gendered Interventions traces resistance to sociocultural narrative models,
including, surprisingly enough, the work of feminist critics like Susan Suleiman, Sandra
Gilbert and Susan Gubar, and even Lanser's The Narrative Act (1981). See 3-24.
i4The term "modes of writing" comes from Annette Lavers and Colin Smith's
translation of Barthes' Le Degre Zero de L'Ecriture: "A language and a style are blind
forces; a mode of writing is an act of historical solidarity. A language and style are
objects; a mode of writing is a function: it is the relationship between creation and
society, the literary language transformed by its social finality, form considered as a
human intention and thus linked to the great crises of History" (14).

CHAPTER 1
BACHELOR AMBIVALENCES:
ORALITY AND WRITING IN THE TALE,
1819-1853

"Washington Irving," as an early biographer adroitly commented, lived "always a
little in the past tense" (Warner Irving, 184). Suspicious of the business class to which
his family aspired, fearful that his temperament was antipathetic to the responsibilities of a
profession, he sought escape from the "common place realities of the present" by
celebrating the simplicity of pre-revolutionary America. His nostalgia often surfaces in a
curious bias against writing: books are the province of the pedantic political elite that
manipulates print to maintain its self-serving authority. Speech, by contrast, is the
medium o f honest human contact, conveying intimacy and fellow-feeling while creating a
comforting sense o f community. Early burlesques like Salmagundi (1807; co-authored
by his brother William and James Kirke Paulding) and A History o f New TwA: (1809)
parody writing as a satanic apple that tempts an Edenic new world. The later sketches and
tales manifest a more subtle and intriguing ambivalence toward print culture, especially
his masterpiece, The Sketch Book o f Geoffrey Crayon, Gent. (1819-20). Fore
shadowing Benjamin's "The Storyteller," the sentimental, nostalgic Geoffrey Crayon
laments the loss of community fostered by oral narrative and associates "the art of bookmaking" with impersonal commerce. In one selection, Crayon is ejected from the British
museum's reading room for not carrying an admission card: "At first I did not compre
hend. ..but I soon found that the library was a kind of literary 'preserve,' subject to game
laws, and that no one must presume to hunt there without special license and permission"
(814). Elsewhere, he complains to a musty old Renaissance quarto (which has
mysteriously come to life) that "the inventions of paper and the press...have made every
one a writer...the stream of literature has swoln into a torrent—augmented into a r iv e r-
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expanded into a sea" (861). The smug quarto, speaking in "intolerably antiquated terms,"
confirms Crayon's suspicion that print cannot accommodate the changes that time subjects
upon language. In "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow" (putatively narrated by Diedrich
Knickerbocker, the persona of the New York history), Irving contrasts the supernatural
tales of the Tarry Town residents to the witchcraft stories that Ichabod Crane recites from
an edition of Cotton Mather. While the villagers enjoy the legends as entertainments,
Crane assumes that his ghost stories must be true if they have been printed, his credulity
allowing the Headless Horseman to scare him from the valley. Significantly, Crane
disappears from Tarry Town without his books, which his landlord promptly bums
because "he never knew any good come of this same reading and writing" (1086).
In parodying print culture, Irving ignores a rather obvious fact: he writes books.
Indeed, not only was he the literary celebrity of his generation, but he manipulated the
"book-making" industry with a deftness that only a handful of successors would emulate.
Before the establishment of international laws that curtailed commonplace literary piracy,
Irving secured copyrights in both America and England. At a time when authors were
routinely robbed by publishers, Irving oversaw the production of his works, inde
pendently contracting (through his ever supportive brothers) printers, distributors, and
booksellers. The Sketch Book first appeared in America as a series of seven pamphlets
costing an inflated seventy cents a piece. It is a credit to Irving's diffident persona that his
price gouging generated little backlash: each edition sold out within a month of its
appearance. 1 But his most impressive achievement was establishing a secondary market
for short narratives. Formerly circulated in penny papers and periodicals, they could now
be packaged in book form as "twice-told tales" (as Hawthorne would dub his 1837
collection). As intellectual property with a profit potential comparable to the novel, the
tale enjoyed a newfound popularity. Unfortunately, the status was short-lived.
Imitations soon diluted the novelty o f The Sketch Bookiorm so that, by the mid-1830s, a
Crayon-like unifying device no longer guaranteed publication. Neither Poe's Tales o f the
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Folio Club nor Hawthorne's The Story Teller, both probably modelled on The Sketch
Book, were published in collected form. Still, as briefly as Irving set literary fashion, his
influence on the "book-making" business was profound. Despite what his biographer
might claim, he lived very much in the present tense of his times. The question remains:
why lampoon his own industry? Upon closer inspection, a certain superficiality even
permeates his nostalgia for pre-print culture. While parodic allusions, lavish descriptive
passages, and epic catalogues allude to the oral tradition of the tale, the style is far from
vernacular. In what minimal dialogue there is, characters speak the same impeccable
Addisonian prose as the storyteller, without the dialectical variation or regional
neologisms ("Americanisms" as they were called) with which Irving's contemporaries
hoped to establish a national language distinct from British English. One need only
compare the Crayon/Knickerbocker voice to the narrators of "The Tell-Tale Heart" or
"The Black Cat" (where extemporaneous speech is evoked by ellipses and dashes) to
recognize that orality is more a thematic than stylistic issue in The Sketch Book.
Irving's adherence to an old-world, "composed" style led R. H. Dana, Sr. to
describe the prose as "feminine, dressy, elegant, and languid," an assessment that only
partly conveys the era's gendered assumptions toward print and orality (348). Like many
readers, Dana overlooked the editorial apparatus that explains the transcription of "Sleepy
Hollow" into that style: a brief parenthesis, presumably affixed by Crayon, notes that the
legend was "found among the papers of the late Diedrich Knickerbocker," followed by an
epigraph, again the signature o f Crayon, who introduces each Sketch Book selection with
a fragment of poetry. A postscript also "found in the handwriting o f Mr. Knickerbocker"
describes how the historian first heard of Ichabod Crane: "The preceding Tale is given,
almost in the precise words in which I heard it related at a corporation meeting of the
ancient city of Manhattoes.. ..The narrator was a pleasant, shabby, gentlemanly old
fellow., .whom I strongly suspected of being poor, he made such efforts to be
entertaining" (1087). Simply put, "Sleepy Hollow" is a thrice -told tale. Casting it as a
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verbal performance transcribed into print, Irving implicitly justifies the absence of "oral
residue" in his style. 2
As a rhetorical fiction, transcription resolves cultural tensions between orality and
writing that shape narrative authority in antebellum fiction. As distinct from the later short
story, the tale is defined by the prominence of its "enunciative posture" or storytelling
frame. The narrator typically exhibits a level of "interested language" or rhetorical
presence through which s/he can "suggest how the reader is to take things" (Penn 23435). Because the frame is so foregrounded, the storyteller's social authority is vital to
establishing an interpersonal dynamic with the audience; the particular medium associated
with that authority (speech or print) places different emphases on the method of
presentation. Oral traditions chronicle family genealogy and community history. Tall
tales may exaggerate the features and feats of a single body, with the individual (John
Henry or Paul Bunyon) often literally larger than his or her surroundings, but the
narrative itself concerns a fairly circumscribed community. Print, as mass
communication, serves broader interests by making that self a synecdoche for larger
social welfare. Individuals are valued for the exemplum that they might represent, so the
message carries more authority than the speaker. What Michael Warner writes of the
post-colonial era held true in Irving's time: "the republican ideology of print arranged the
values of generality over those of the personal. In this cognitive vocabulary the social
diffusion of printed artifacts took on the investment of the disinterested virtues of the
public orientation, as opposed to the corrupting interests and passions of particular and
local persons" ("Textuality and Legitimacy" 74). 3 As evidence of this "public
orientation" in the tale, one need only look at the morals and maxims typically affixed to
it. Generalizing the experience of a fictional hero or heroine into a universally applicable
ethical lesson was perhaps the only avenue for legitimating the social value of the tale as it
became one of the most popular but least respected forms of public discourse. 4
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As Warner implies, the investment of "disinterested virtue" in writing confers to it
a stability and reason denied oral discourse. This presumed stability led to a profusion of
diverse forms of textuality in the first half of the century. Pedagogical books like
dictionaries and grammars are only the most obvious incarnation; land deeds and even the
institution of the gold standard (a subtext of Poe's "The Gold Bug") likewise suggest
how extensively paper authority symbolized permanence and durability, though the
artificiality of these semiotic systems is obvious from the rigorous government controls
imposed to regulate their value. The authority invested in writing devalues discourses of
questionable truth (legends, rumor, gossip, and fiction) and presupposes strict stylistic
guidelines on language use. In The Influence o f Literature Upon Society, a popular
polemic from its first American publication in 1813, Germaine de Stael associates literary
language with oratorical deception, undoubtedly because public speakers, from
evangelists to political "stumpers," were returning to a self-consciously imaginative
eloquence after decades of rational argumentation. If the new country is to be a true
democracy, de Stael argues, its writers should avoid this literary style in favor of a
"manly eloquence" in which "simple truths and pure sentiments" are expressed without
ornament, as injudicial declaration (13,68).

Whether Irving was familiar with de

Stael's argument is unclear, but his response is not unimaginable given a welldocumented disdain for barristers. (He wrote A History o f New York during a tedious
nine-year stint as a Philadelphia law clerk, a career he gladly abandoned). The strictures
of public writing offered storytellers little leeway in establishing their cultural authority:
they could either abide the compulsory didacticism of print culture or be recognized as
"stoiy-book" writers. As Hawthorne's custom-house colleague puts it, "What kind of
business in life, what mode of glorifying God, or being serviceable to mankind in his day
and generation?" (CE 1 ,10). At the height of the popularity of The Sketch Book, Irving
struck self-deprecating poses all the way to the bank. Even to ardent admirers, he spoke
of his talents as "merely literary" {Letters 520) and his writings as "light and trifling"
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(Brevoort II, 87). But when his third miscellany (Tales o f a Traveller [ 1824]) proved a
critical and commercial failure, he opted for more prestigious prose genres like history
and biography. Significantly, his later works reveal a growing suspicion of the
imagination. 6 Hawthorne alternated between Irving's early diffidence and an outright
disdain for the literary market. He wrote his last tale in 1852 C'Feathertop"), hoping that
the romance would afford both more creativity and remuneration. Melville, by contrast,
composed short stories only when his longer works were misunderstood, ridiculed, or
otherwise ignored. Though he hotly protested any restrictions placed upon him by book
publishers, his periodical pieces reveal a sudden willingness to tailor his style to editorial
tastes. What "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow," "Wakefield," and "Bartleby, the
Scrivener" share is the subtle evocation of the spoken word as an antidote to the authority
conferred to writing. If print promises a mechanical reproduction of meaning, the oral
strand marks what Benjamin calls the aesthetic "aura," the "unique presence [of the work]
at the place where it happens to be" (220). It offers a subversive, interpersonal alternative
to the public orientation of print culture. Even when maxims do appear (as in
Hawthorne's tales), resonances of speech dramatize the subjectivity of perception,
redirecting attention away from the propagation of universal virtues toward the
recognition of personal significance and meaning.
The locus of tensions between orality and writing is a rhetorical stance personified
by the bachelor narrator. For all three authors, of course, bachelorhood carries important
biographical resonances. 7 The bachelor is also a popular figure in pre-Civil War tales,
epitomized in Reveries o f a Bachelor by Ik Marvell, the pen name of Donald G. Mitchell,
the co-editor of Harper's responsible for publishing many of Melville's short stories.
Ann Douglas describes these personae as "teases, loiterers, given to disappearing around
comers, gently dodging shadows of their own making, men with a vanishing act. Their
evaporation complex seems a sign of self-effacement... it is also a covert and selfcongratulatory manifesto of irresponsibility" (238). The irresponsibility extends beyond
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domestic and professional commitments to the very act of authorship itself, resulting in a
smoke-and-mirrors construction of narrative authority whose ambivalence is a particularly
masculine privilege. Writing fora public audience becomes one more self-made shadow
to dodge. The bachelor may announce, for example, that his narrative is not an original
composition but a retelling, a strategy meant to excuse him from the didactic respon
sibilities imposed by print culture. (Only the lawyer-narrator in "Bartleby" insists on the
veracity of his tale). The influence of gender on narrative authority is manifest as well in
the storytelling frames. In many Sketch Z?£w&-styled collections by women writers,
narratives are cast in private modes of written communication. While Irving embeds his
oral tale with editorial apparatuses associated with publishing, authors like Alice Cary,
Eliza Leslie, and Lydia Sigourney employ the diary and epistolary form. Unlike Geoffrey
Crayon, who self-consciously addresses an anonymous mass audience, many women
narrators are a priori excluded from public discourse. Writing and orality for them are
both media of personal communication. 8 Like Benjamin's storyteller, the bachelor
narrator's self-dramatization provides the transitional link between the scene of
performance and his fictional world. But unlike the oral performer, the bachelor narrator
has no community. The distance that public writing imposes on the rhetorical situation
fosters a suspicion of the reader, whose demands are projected in the greedy appetite of
Ichabod Crane, the wifely devotion of the abandoned Mrs. Wakefield, or the bafflingly
indifferent responses of Bartleby. Lamenting their alienation and then using it as an
excuse to deviate from the perceived limitations of audience expectations, these narrators
take refuge in their outsider status. The bachelor metaphor thus suggests choice and
condition, both a self-conscious exile and a matter of circumstance.
Different rhetorical strategies embody the contradictions in this stance. In "Sleepy
Hollow," the transcription implied by the editorial frames points to the embedding of
multiple scenes of narration: the written is superimposed upon the oral. Each scene bears
traces of its speaker's "frame of reference," the spatial perspective that indicates a relative
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distance from the reader. The resulting modulations effect a spatial displacement on the
audience. In "Wakefield/' Hawthorne plays metafictional rather than metatextual games.
While explicitly referring to his private scene of writing, he addresses his reader in a style
popularized by oral performers during the 1830s. If Irving superimposes the written
upon the oracular, Hawthorne juxtaposes them. The oral strand offers an alternative
context for interpreting the concluding moral, which, in a written rhetorical situation,
seems to flaunt its own insufficiency.
Rather than locate tensions between orality and writing in narrative performance,
Melville embeds them in the surrounding social context. The narrator is a lawyer whose
entire belief system is rooted in the authority of the written word, embodied by the law.
He draws his inteipretive authority from the social authority conferred to him. Once
confronted with the bizarre recalcitrance of his newest scrivener, however, he finds his
faith irrevocably challenged. A possible cause of Bartleby’s indifference is discovered
only through a rumor whose truth or meaning cannot be verified. In this way, the
scrivener himself embodies the oral strand. The narrator's subtle puns on legal
terminology dramatize Bartleby’s effect on his own attitude toward print culture. Just as
the scrivener undermines the professional authority of his employer, the narrator invites
the audience to undenmine his and circulate its own rumors regarding the meaning(s) of
the story. In all three texts, the chatty, grandiloquent self-dramatization so typical of early
tale writers is a deceptive strategy. Beneath the straightforward presentation is an anxious
attempt to overcome the impersonality of address inherent in writing for an anonymous
audience.

Irving's "Sleepy Hollow" and the American Reader
Few stories in The Sketch Book, "Rip Van Winkle" and "Sleepy Hollow" most
famously, draw upon American materials, but those that do manifest a preoccupation with
the identity of his native audience. The correspondence that post-dates his 1815 exile to
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Europe reveals a muted but self-conscious rebellion against American literary standards,
in particular to the pragmatic ends of didactic fiction. He dismisses the plot of "Sleepy
Hollow," for example, as "a mere whimsical band to connect descriptions of scenery,
customs, manners, & co." (Letters 570). A miscellany of observations, narration fails to
coalesce into a template of universal virtue. As Fred Lewis Pattee suggests, the word
"sketch" itself conveys the disorganization and randomness of "first impressions...col
lected for work" but not meant to stand as "the work itself" {Development 6). Crayon is a
writer, but his writing is forever unfinished business, unfit for anything other than diver
sion. By emphasizing the spontaneity of insight and observation, Irving contrasts sharply
to the predominant written rhetorical stance of the age, personified by Benjamin Franklin,
whose Autobiography, reprinted in America in a popular 1818 edition, rivaled the sales of
The Sketch Book. Franklin was a printer, o f course; his model of self-making, replete
with all-purpose maxims and a chart of essential virtues, both literally and figuratively
embodies print ideology as the textuality of life and life of textuality intertwine. The
pressure of measuring up to Franklinian standards creates something of an intertextual
headache for Crayon, who begs forgiveness repeatedly for his lack of polish and
perfection. Other allusions to Franklin are less apologetic. Rip Van Winkle, who feels an
"insuperable aversion to profitable labour," is a colonial couch potato, his twenty-year
nap the very antithesis of industrious self-perfection. Indeed, Rip only becomes a
productive member of the community when he assumes the role of village storyteller.
Print ideology reverberates in the postscript of "Sleepy Hollow" when an
incredulous old man puts a halt to the "laughter and approbation" by challenging the
storyteller to account for the morality of his tale. "He was one of your wary men, who
never laugh but upon good grounds," Knickerbocker w rites,"—when they have reason
and the law on their side" (1087). Unlike the deputy aldermen who can enjoy the story
despite dozing off through large portions of it, the old man has listened intensely, his face
"grave and rather severe," often "looking down upon the floor, as if turning a doubt over
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in his mind.11 Intense introspection characterizes the reader who, incapable of laughing
because of a bookish, pedantic mind, only appreciates the didactic value of a narrative.
Pressed to provide a sententious moral, the storyteller obliges with an absurd syllogism
whose intellectual pretension mocks his audience's high seriousness:
The cautious old gentleman knit his brows tenfold closer after this
explanation, being sorely puzzled by the ratiocination of the syllogism; while
methought the one in pepper and salt eyed him with something of a triumphant
leer. At length he observed, that all this was very well, but he still thought the
stoty a little on the extravagant—there were one or two points on which he had
his doubts.
"Faith, sir," replied the story teller, "as to that matter, I don't believe it
one half myself." (1088)

The narrator summarily dismisses truth (and, by implication, its moral import) as a
criterion for good fiction. Moral conclusions turn stories into commerce, making them
consumable goods that discourage dreaming and even laughing. As a minor character,
the old man is little more than a foil for the punch line. Irving creates a far more complex
portrait of print ideology in Ichabod Crane, the pedagogue and would-be entrepreneur. <J
As a Yankee sent to the Hudson Valley as a "pioneer of the mind," Crane
symbolizes the dangers of an imagination interiorized by reading. He studies his volume
of Mather's supernatural lore, alone, "until the dusk of evening made the printed page a
mere mist before his eyes." Even when he participates in the local storytelling sessions,
recounting his "anecdotes of witchcraft," he is distinguished by metaphors of textuality.
The villagers think of him as a "traveling gazette," a local newspaper, "carrying the whole
budget of local gossip from house to house." He memorizes epitaphs from the local
tombstones to woo the county damsels, scribbles romantic verse on foolscap, and even
repeats Franklinian maxims like "spare the rod and spoil the child" to his students. He
mixes his "direful omens" with science, terrifying the villagers with "speculations upon
comets and shooting stars, and with the alarming fact that the world did absolutely turn
around, and they were half the time topsy-turvey!" (1065). "Fact" is a strategic word
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choice here; one can assume that the schoolmaster learned these "speculations" from his
books, accepting them as truths, much as he accepts the witchcraft stories as fact. What
finally makes Crane susceptible to the Headless Horseman legend is the simple belief that
stories never lie. As a reader, he draws his interpretive authority from Mather's social
authority as an author. Though described as "a perfect master” of the text, Crane is, in
fact, mastered by the book. When Brom Bones and his gang of rough riders break into
his elaborately secured schoolhouse, turning it "topsy-turvy," the schoolmaster never
wonders whether he is the victim of a practical joke. He simply concludes that "all the
witches in the country held their meetings there" (1071-72).
Crane is more than a one-dimensional dupe, however. His bookishness manifests
a maliciousness destructive to community, symbolized nicely by his voracious appetite:
"No tale was too gross or monstrous for his capacious swallow" (1064). Irving's image
is by no means original, of course. Eating as a metaphor for reading dates back at least to
the Scriptures. In 19th-centuiy America, it served a pedagogical function: consuming
books meant that the moral was "taken in," absorbed, and digested. 10 Irving twists the
trope to symbolize greed. In Crane's "devouring mind's eye," the village is a feast
awaiting consumption. He cannot see a pig without imagining "a pudding in his belly,
and an apple in his mouth...in the porkers he saw carved out the future sleek side of
bacon" (1067). Weaned on books, his imagination serves no one but himself as he plots
to win the affections of Katrina Van Tassel and populate her father’s spacious farm land
with "shingle palaces."
If Crane represents a readership ill-equipped to accept fiction as entertainment, the
villagers symbolize Irving's ideal audience. Most important, they act as a community:
Baltus Van Tassel hosts a "merry making" (where the schoolmaster plans to conquer the
coquette), sharing the spoils of his fortune in a sumptuous banquet. Crane arrives
"chuckling with the possibility that he might one day be lord of all this scene of almost
unimaginable luxury and splendour" (1076). While Van Tassel welcomes his guests with
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a loud, boisterous laugh, Ichabod keeps his greedy giggles to himself. Even his rival for
Katrina Van Tassel's affections exudes communal mirth and gamesmanship: Brom
Bones has "more mischief than ill will in his composition; and with all his overbearing
roughness, there was a strong dash of waggish good humour at bottom" (1069). He is a
consummate storyteller, able to perform a "thrice marvellous adventure," as Crane leams
when talk on the Van Tassel piazza turns to the headless Hessian. The storytelling scene
reveals just what an outsider he is. While his hunger is linked to print, the Dutch
community comes to life through analogies to oral discourse. The townsfolk "gossip"
about the past, "drawling out long stories," freely tailoring their narratives: "Just
sufficient time had elapsed [since the Revolutionary War, which provides the setting for
most of the stories] to enable each story teller to dress up his tale with a little becoming
fiction, and in the indistinctness of his recollections, to make himself the hero o f every
exploit" (1077-78). On Van Tassel's piazza, truth and fiction are indistinct. Stories of
the White Plains, where the British were defeated, and the hanging of Major Andre, a
conspirator of Benedict Arnold, exist only in villages that resist the commercial
progressivism that Crane represents: "There is no encouragement for ghosts in most of
our villages, for they have scarce had time to finish their first nap, and turn themselves in
their graves, before their surviving friends have travelled away from the neighbourhood,
so that when they turn out of a night to walk the rounds, they have no acquaintances to
call upon. This is perhaps the reason why we so seldom hear of ghosts except in our
long established Dutch communities" (1078). Community is vital to the preservation of
legends. Swapping stories on Baltus Van Tassel's piazza, the villagers do not fashion
anything as pretentious as history; they merely share a sense of place and identity. When
the merry making concludes, they return home, "their light hearted laughter mingling with
the clatter of hoofs, echoed along the silent woodlands, sounding fainter and fainter until
they gradually died away." Crane, by contrast, is too haunted to laugh: the legends have
"sunk deep" in his mind. After his disastrous interview with Van Tassel’s daughter, the
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schoolmaster ventures home, but "all the stories of ghosts and goblins that he had heard
in the afternoon, now came crowding upon his recollection" (1081). Needless to say, the
Headless Horseman has little difficulty terrifying the hapless schoolmaster back to the
city. Whether the pumpkin that pelts Crane at the conclusion of the chase scene rattles his
faith in writing is less clear. The "unfortunate pedagogue" apparently returns to a career
in the bureaucracy that paper authority creates, first as a lawyer, then as a journalist, and
finally as a justice in the small-claims court. What is clear is that the life of print textuality
that he represents is transformed back into oral discourse: the villagers know of his fate
only through rumors.
Both greedy and gullible, Crane parodies Franklin’s common reader, that
anonymous symbol of a mass audience constituted not by religion, class, or geographical
proximity but by the power of technology to disseminate information. If print
depersonalizes discourse by homogenizing its readership, Irving foregrounds the issue of
interpersonal address by peopling his story with an audience that (ostensibly) appreciates
imaginative literature as much as the villagers: the Manhattoe aldermen. Their presence is
not limited to the postscript. The ingenuity of the Knickerbocker/Crayon framing device
rests in its ambiguity. Because the "authentic historian" transcribes the story "almost in
the precise words" in which he heard it told, we have no way of determining the identity
of the narrating "I." Critics routinely attribute the narration to Knickerbocker, arguing
that Crayon merely "includes" the tale in his portfolio, while ignoring the salt-and-pepper
storyteller completely. 11 This is a vast oversimplification, however. The "I" who
announces that "many years have elapsed since I trod down the drowsy shades of Sleepy
Hollow" might be Knickerbocker, but it just as easily might be Knickerbocker
transcribing the words of the oral storyteller. The frame places the issue of attribution in a
mise-en-abyme. One word, "almost," highlights the ambiguous difference within
repetition that makes each storytelling event a singular experience.
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The frame is part of a self-reflexive narrative strategy that calls its own credibility
into question. There are several more obvious signs o f what Haskell Springer calls the
"imaginative reality" that the storytellers) creates (17). Irving’s original audience, for
example, would have been struck by the sight of New York City municipal officials
trading tales. Predominantly merchants, the aldermen were caricatured throughout the
early 19th century as humorless, greedy, uneducated, the very antithesis of literary
culture; Irving himself had already satirized them as "tinkers" who fuss endlessly with
self-serving statutes. 12 By portraying them as cheerful, lazy, and appreciative of
storytelling, he transforms the same class that threatened his identity as an American
writer into an ideal readership. The portrait of Sleepy Hollow, with its land-before-time
ambiance, also flouts verisimilitude. The description of its "customs, scenes, and
manners" conveys a faint exaggeration that, as the old man in the postscript complains,
inspires doubt. In both cases, the word "legend" emphasizes the "could-be" ambivalence
of the narrative stance. Whether this story is "real" or "make-believe" is a decision that
the audience must make. But Irving's title also houses a pun that more specifically
highlights the effect of transcription on interpretation. A legend is a key or title on a map
that allows a reader to locate him/herself in symbolic space. Transcription, by
superimposing the written upon the oral, makes the narrative addresses exceedingly
difficult to fix in space and time: it leaves us wondering where the narrative voice is
coming from —literally. The presence of two addressees (the original storyteller's oral
audience and Knickerbocker’s more anonymous readership) creates a conflicting sense of
proximity to the scene(s) of storytelling. The resulting spatial displacement effected on
the audience precludes any effort to assume the role of a common reader.
These reader roles are distinguished most obviously by their relative distance from
the storytellers), a distance figured into each narrator's "frame of reference," a matrix of
prepositions and adverbs that creates a particular spatial relationship between a speaker
and an audience. £mile Benveniste calls these spatial markers "indicateurs" (commonly
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translated as "shifters") because they indicate or index certain words whose meaning
depends upon a point of reference implicit in the conversational context (258-66). If, for
example, I say "Please turn right," you may need to ask "My right or yours?" to know
which direction I mean. In oral (face-to-face) conversation, an ambiguous "indicateur" is
easy to clarify, simply because the possible realm of reference is constricted. In a written
medium, however, a frame may cross oceans and continents to unite author and addressee
in an imagined community or "shared domain." According to Emanuel A. Schegloff, a
frame of reference centers upon a "common sense geography" in which a speaker's
formulation of place names functions as map coordinates. How s/he refers to a specific
location reveals where s/he assumes we are located (85). Place names also indicate how
the speaker identifies an audience: the more specific the geographical proximity, the more
likelihood that both share membership in a particular ethnic or religious group. If the
ethnic make up of the New York municipal government is any indication, the oral
stoiyteller and the aldermen are descendants of the New Amsterdam Dutch. How the
storyteller describes the area will reveal assumptions about their mutual knowledge of
Dutch folklore. Knickerbocker, addressing a more hetereogeneous readership, will
presumably explain or contextualize the stories. 13
The first sentence demonstrates how "shifters" place us in spatial proximity to the
narrator(s): "In the bosom of one of those spacious coves which indent the eastern shore
of the Hudson, at that broad expansion of the river denominated by the ancient Dutch
navigators the Tappaan Zee, and where they always prudently shortened sail, and
implored the protection of St. Nicholas when they crossed, there lies a small market town
or rural port, which by some is called Greensburg, but which is more generally and
properly known by the name of Tarry Town" (1058). Two pronouns in particular
suggest a storyteller who presumes a reader already familiar with the landscape: both
"one of those spacious coves" and "at that broad expansion of the river" assert rather than
introduce a shared geography. As relational terms, those and that are meaningful only to
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someone who knows the relative value of "spacious" or can pinpoint the river expansion
on a map. Phrases like these, according to Schegloff, evoke "landmarks... object[s]
recognizable from description ... [that are] capable of being seen" from memory (100).
The references to Dutch folklore likewise presuppose familiarity. Why the ancient sailors
were "prudent" to drop their sails and pray to St. Nicholas is a question only a specific,
limited readership could answer. Tappaan Zee serves here as a "course of action place":
it defines a region by the particular activities that take place within it (101). The speaker
addresses a reader who has seen the Hudson River and who knows the history and myths
surrounding its settlement. This is still a general acquaintance, however, for the main
clause defines what the reader does not know: the specific village in which the tale will
take place.
The difference is conveyed by the more general frame of reference that appears:
"Not far from this village, perhaps about two miles, there is a little valley, or rather lap of
land among high hills, which is one of the quietest places in the whole world. A small
brook glides through it, with just murmur enough to lull one to repose" (1058; emphasis
added). The difference between one o f those spacious coves and a little valley or a small
brook helps reconstruct the storyteller’s frame. Though both phrases define a shared
space, those does so from the speaker's perspective, because it presumes foreknowledge.
The indefinite article, on the other hand, defines the relationship from the reader's
perspective because it introduces the valley and brook as unfamiliar territory.
But an even more general image of the reader shortly appears: "I mention this
peaceful spot with all possible laud; for it is in such little retired Dutch valleys, found here
and there embosomed in the great state of New York, that population, manners, and
customs, remain fixed, while the great torrent of migration and improvement, which is
making such incessant changes in other parts of this restless country, sweeps by
unobserved. They are like those little nooks o f still water, which border a rapid stream,
where we may see the straw and bubble riding quietly at anchor, or slowly revolving in
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their mimic harbour, undisturbed by the rush of the passing current" (1060). This
peaceful spot maintains the spatial relationship established in the first paragraph. In the
sentences that follow, however, the assumptions about the reader's knowledge change.
The frame becomes more general, using the village as an example o f the region's
characteristics. Such little retired valleys introduces a contrast between the villages and
the rest of the nation; this restless country is the referential anchor. The simile used to
illustrate the contrast (those little nooks o f still water, which border a rapid stream ) does
not pinpoint the Hudson River area (which would make it a "landmark"); instead, it is
generic, its resonance depending on the reader's ability to imagine any nook and stream,
not just one in the Hudson Valley.
Numerous "shifters" convey an uncertainty about the audience's identity. They
appear most frequently within clauses that clarify or elaborate upon the region's
peculiarities. Describing Crane's habit of lodging week-by-week with different families,
"according to country custom in those parts," the narratoifs) adds: "That all this might
not be too onerous on the purses of his rustic patrons, who are apt to consider the costs of
schooling a grievous burthen, and schoolmasters as mere drones, he had various ways of
rendering himself both useful and agreeable" (1062). Here the article imposes an odd
spatial distance from the region. "These parts" would better convey the territorial
familiarity that the speaker claims by placing the reader in the region. Yet the distance
from Tarry Town implied by that those justifies inclusion o f the details about the rustic
patrons: the prejudices that the Dutchmen hold against Crane need to be articulated, else
we miss the conniving nature of the schoolmaster's plan to dupe them.
Equally indicative of this general reader are passages that lecture or pontificate,
running the risk of telling the audience what it already knows. While describing Crane's
status in the village, for example, the storyteller identifies the reader with a new, alien
membership: "The schoolmaster is generally a man of some importance in the female
circle of a rural neighbourhood, being considered a kind of idle gentleman like personage,
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of vastly superior taste and accomplishments to the rough country swains, and, indeed,
inferior in learning only to the parson" (1063). A rural neighbourhood, as opposed to
one o f these rural villages, redefines the frame of reference: the reader is no longer even
familiar with rural customs on the universal or abstract scale that made one o f those little
nooks o f still water an appropriate simile. The speaker assumes an urban readership that
not only needs specific information about Tarry Town but all rustic life in general.
These reader-oriented frames of reference are far more abundant than the speakeroriented shifters. Yet there are indications o f the oral audience in the phrases that evoke a
closer proximity to the Hudson River Valley. The Van Tassel farm is "situated in one o f
those green, sheltered, fertile nooks, in which Dutch farmers are so fond of nestling"
(1066). Both those and so fond intensify the assumption that the audience is familiar with
the area and the community's affection for it. Van Tassel’s home is "one of those
spacious farm houses, with high ridged, but lowly sloping roofs, built in the style handed
down from the first Dutch settlers" (1067-68). As with one o f those spacious coves in
the opening sentence, the description presupposes a reader able to draw up from memory
the prototypic Dutch farm house. Even more obvious traces of a specific audience cluster
around the unelaborated references to Dutch myth and culture that speak little to
contemporary readers: St. Nicholas, Yost Van Houten, the architect of Crane's rickety
schoolhouse, the sloop seemingly suspended in air on the Tappaan Zee that Crane sees on
the path to the merry making (a vague allusion, perhaps, to Hendrick Hudson's mythical
ship, which plays an important part in "Rip Van Winkle"). As Schegloff writes, "name
dropping" is inevitable in discourse; if a speaker assumes his audience will be unfamiliar
with the term, s/he supplies further attributes (93). Such is the case when Dutch slang is
defined, or when a reference to Saint Vitus is amended with "that blessed patron of the
dance" (1077). But folklore often goes unexplained, suggesting a smaller membership
category: an audience that already knows Dutch mythology. Obviously, this ethnic
folklore is not as broadly recognizable as the "knight-errant" analogies that surround
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Crane with the "the true spirit of romantic story." References to Greek myth are
presumably recognizable to a larger membership group (Western civilization) and
therefore need no further explanation. But the absence of more information on these
obscure references limits the reader role that the audience can assume to the aldermen.
In many cases, determining what frame of reference surfaces is impossible. A
synchronous, dual address occurs. One of the more curious use of names, for example,
occurs in the stoiytelling scene on the Van Tassel piazza: "There was the story of Doffue
Martling, a large, blue bearded Dutchman...And there was an old gentleman who shall be
nameless, being too rich a mynheer to be lightly mentioned, who in the battle of
Whiteplains, being an excellent master of defence, parried a musket of ball with a small
sword, insomuch that he absolutely felt it whiz round the blade, and glance off at the hilt"
(1078). Why can the speaker afford to mention Doffue Martling by name but not the old
gentleman? He implies that this "rich mynheer" is too influential to impugn the veracity of
his story. To suggest that he has made himself the hero of this exploit by "the
indistinctness of his recollection" is to provoke some immediate consequence. Could the
old gentleman be present in the salt-and-pepper storyteller's audience? Venturing an
answer is highly speculative, of course, but the speaker's unwillingness to "lightly
mention" the name heightens our sense of immediacy. By evoking the repercussions of
storytelling, the narrator "places" the audience nearer to the action.
Subsequent "shifters" likewise suggest a dual address: "This neighbourhood, at
the time of which I am speaking, was one of those highly favoured places which abound
with chronicle and great men" (1077). One o f those highly favoured places can be read
from spatial perspective of either the speaker or hearer. The "one of those" construction
has previously signified a speaker-centered frame, as in "one of those spacious coves."
Places may refer to places in Northern New York or it may refer to a broader geographical
area, as this restless country did. In both cases, the reader is presumed to be familiar with
a similar area that abounds with legendary chronicles. Using a "course-of-action place"
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formulation in an exceedingly ambiguous manner, the storyteller relocates that place out
of topographic reality into an imaginary realm where the audience decides the relevance of
"one of those."
A few years after returning to America, Irving revised the frame of "Sleepy
Hollow" in a sketch printed in Knickerbocker Magazine in May 1839. Geoffrey Crayon
recalls traveling to Tarry Town with Knickerbocker and hearing, for the first time, the
legend in a "goblin-looking mill" from an "African sage" and an old woman at a spinning
wheel, both of whom possessed "that invaluable kind of information, never to be
acquired from books": "I verily believe it was to his conference with [them] that we are
indebted for the surprising though true history of 'Ichabod Crane and the Headless
Horseman"' (Biographies 434). There is no mention of the salt-and-pepper storyteller or
the aldermen, no effort to justify or excuse the claims made in the original frame. The
fiction takes shape without regard for the reality it previously portrayed.
By ignoring his original ideal readership, Irving admits the loss of the audience
that he hoped to cultivate. He also dramatizes the public reorientation of his own fiction
by allegorizing his return to America. Crayon is shocked to discover that Tarry Town is
no longer a rural village but a burgeoning commerce center. Gone is the Dutch
architecture, replaced by "Grecian and Gothic styles"; the town has been organized into
parcelled lots with a fancy hotel as its centerpiece. Worse yet, the villagers are now
wealthy merchants, the farmers having abandoned their fields to become "bank directors
[who] drink claret and champagne." The "slumber of ages" has ended: Irving allows his
Edenic village to fall into history, "the trill of the Italian opera [succeeding] the nasal
quaver of Ichabod Crane" (438-39). (What he does not admit is that the changes wrought
upon Sleepy Hollow are nothing less than Crane's own entrepreneurial schemes). But
more important, the final sentence finds him placing his work in a new genre: "the
antiquarian visitor to the Hollow may pronounce all that I have recorded of that once
spell-bound region a fable." The distinction is important. A legend courts credulity,
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requiring only belief to be true. A fable, however, makes no pretense toward truth. It is
a moral fiction, exactly the type of narrative that the salt-and-pepper narrator denounces in
the original frame.

"Food for Thought" in Hawthorne's "Wakefield"
Like Irving, Hawthorne used metatextual devices to distance his private and public
selves. Before 1837, his tales were printed in magazines and gift-books without
attribution, frequently at his insistence; as rumors of his authorship began circulating
through hometown Salem, he denied them, creating an elaborate web of lies. When the
first edition of Twice-told Tales was published, his anonymity was so profound that the
Boston Courier wondered "whether ["Nathaniel Hawthorne" was] a true or fictitious
name, we know not—probably the latter" (qtd. in C E IX, 513). Like many of his
contemporaries, he assumed various pseudonyms in periodicals: "The Devil in
Manuscript" (1835) was ascribed to "Ashley A. Royce," and the "Rev. A. A. Royce"
took credit for "John Inglefield's Thanksgiving" (1840). Perhaps the closest that he
comes to the complexity of Irving's Knickerbocker/Crayon frame is the preface to
"Rappacini's Daughter" (1844), which stages the story as a translation from the works of
"M. de l'Aubepine," author of Contes deux fois racontees. One need not speak French
(aubepine is a species of hawthorn tree) to recognize the ironic self-characterization of a
writer who, unlike "the great body of pen-and-ink men," is incapable of "addressing] the
intellect and sympathies of the multitude."
This preface is a rarity, however. Hawthorne more frequently opts for metafictional ruses to convey his ambivalences toward stoi^telling. "Wakefield," for example,
at once embraces and disappoints the expectations for a didactic tale. The storyteller spins
fiction from a printed source, as if oblivious to the doubts a reader like the old man in
Knickerbocker's postscript might voice: "In some old magazine or newspaper I recollect
a story, told as truth, of a man—let us call him Wakefield—who absented himself for a
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long time from his wife" (130). The appeal of this germinal anecdote (discovered not in a
magazine or newspaper but in William King's Anecdotes Personal and Political [ 1818]) is
its utter credibility: Wakefield's story is a "fact," "the strangest incident on record," a
narrative "of the purest originality unexampled, and probably never to be repeated," so
unique and original, in fact, that "it has often recurred, always exciting wonder, but with
a sense that Tit] must be true" (91). However compelling its vraisamblance, the storyteller
freely invents details, expressing little concern about violating the spirit of this "abstractly
stated" kernel: "We are free to shape out our own idea |o f Wakefield's character], and
call it by his name" (91). What licenses this creative freedom? "Whenever any subject so
forcibly affects the mind, time is well spent thinking of it," he declares. "Thought has
always its efficacy, and every striking incident its moral." Accordingly, "there will be a
pervading spirit and a moral, even should we fail to find them, done up neatly, and
condensed into the final sentence" (91). Irving dismissed truth and morality, lampooning
his reader's expectations. Hawthorne's narrator claims them as the motive for his project:
fiction is a vehicle to arrive at a sententious, comforting aphorism.
Or does he? The bizarre assurance that a moral will be delivered "even should we
fail to find [one]" exposes a teleological compulsion that makes the story anything but a
"ramble," As the vagrant husband enters his home for the first time in twenty years, the
narrator declares that "we will not follow our friend across the threshold" and pronounces
judgment on the meaning of his "whimwham": "Amid the seeming confusion of our
mysterious world, individuals are so nicely adjusted to a system, and systems to one
another, and to a whole, that by stepping aside for a moment a man exposes himself to a
fearful risk of losing his place forever. Like Wakefield, he may become, as it were, the
outcast of the universe" (99). Those hoping to glimpse Mrs. Wakefield's reaction will be
disappointed. Hardly the "meditation" originally proposed, the conclusion stops short of
answering why Wakefield’s absence might "appeal to the general sympathies of mankind"
(91). So abrupt, so at odds with the investigative vigor of the opening paragraphs, the

40

moral implies that simply pondering Wakefield's perverse self-absorption risks exile from
the system. With its placebo-like invitation to complacency and conformity, the
conclusion functions as a good maxim does: it assures the audience that complexities can
be distilled into simple grammar, that palatable answers never stale when refrigerated in
the gnomic present tense. If the beginning of the story tempts us with the opiate of
imagination, the conclusion insists that we "just say no."
This is not the most egregious inconsistency in his narrative stance, however.
Throughout the story, one feels slightly manipulated, coerced even, by the contract that he
offers at the outset: "If the reader choose, let him do his own meditation. Or if he prefer
to ramble with me through the twenty years of Wakefield's vagary, I bid him welcome."
The drama is staged as a collaborative effort: "we must hurry after him," "we find him
comfortably established by the fireside of a small apartment," "we may suppose
him ...buying a new wig of reddish hair." At two key moments, however, he drops the
pretense of co-authorship to dramatize his private performance: "Poor Wakefield! Little
knowest thou thine own insignificance in this great world! No mortal eye but mine has
traced thee!" Later he halts the story to lament restrictions on his creativity: "Would that I
had a folio to write, instead of an article of a dozen pages! Then I might exemplify how
an influence beyond our control lays its strong hand on every deed which we do" (96;
emphasis added). Not only is "we" a presumptuous fiction; by wishing that he could
write a book rather than an article, he implies that the narrative is shaped as much by
market exigencies as any "pervading spirit [or] moral." The confession is even more
startling in the original periodical version, which reads "a brief article in the NewEngland!" (The tale first appeared in the New-EnglandMagazine). By admitting the
pressures of writing for publication, he presents "Wakefield" as a tale-in-progress. It was
this metafictional quality of Hawthorne's writing that led Emerson to complain that he
"invites the reader too much into his study, opens the process before them. As if the
confectioner should say to his customers Now let us make the cake" (405).
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Rhetorical cookery continues to confound many Hawthorne critics, who debate
whether "Wakefield" is properly a sketch, a tale, or an essay. 14 Structurally, it
resembles yet another popular form that evokes oral performance: the New England
sermon. It begins with a brief recitation of the text (the anecdote), followed by a
"proposition" or statement of purpose (the invitation to "ramble"), an illustration (the
narrative body), and a peroration (the moral). By the 1830s, this structure, the standard
for more than a hundred years, had grown less rigid with the incorporation of poetic
devices that blurred the line previously distinguishing homiletics from secular oratory.
Still, the basic four parts predominated, even as ministers addressed non-Scriptural
subjects. Stock phrases like "let us now ..." marked the transition from section to sec
tion. 15 Hawthome did not attend church regularly (as he admits in "Sunday at Home"),
but he was fascinated by reform oratory, which found the sermon an eminently suitable
means to its ends as preaching reached beyond the pulpit to the "stump." As biographers
note, he cultivated a fascination with the reformer and the power of oratory to sway a
large crowd. A journal entry dated September 1835 (four months after "Wakefield" was
published) finds him proposing "a sketch of a modem reformer...[who] goes about the
streets haranguing most eloquently," only to be confronted by the keeper of the sanitarium
from which he has escaped. For Hawthome, the orator was a case study in the bosom
serpent of egotism: Dimmesdale, Pyncheon, Hollingsworth, and Westerveldt all mes
merize audiences (and often themselves) into a moral hypnosis. 16
The link with the sermon becomes even clearer when we recall that "Wakefield"
was written for inclusion in The Story Teller, Hawthorne's unpublished narrative cycle.17
Its introductory sketches (abridged as "Passages from a Relinquished Work" in Mosses
from an Old Manse) contrast the appeal of oral storytelling to two contemporary preaching
styles, one that was quickly falling out of fashion and another that was quite popular:
Biblical exegesis (Hawthome calls it "pounding and expounding") and Romantic
theology. The narrator (who, had The Story Teller been published as intended, would be

the "I" in "Wakefield") grows up under the patronage of Parson Thumpcushion, a
dogmatist who preaches as though he holds "some Unitarian infidel at bay." For
conservative Protestant sects, Unitarians were "infidels" in part because their eloquence
replaced "moral instruction [with] moral impression" (Walker 7). That is, they
substituted the Word o f God with words of feeling meant to inspire, as humanly possible,
divine sublimity. The storyteller abandons the "old Pilgrim" because he feels an affinity
with "wandering orators and poets"; like them, he cultivates a "narrative faculty" or "flow
of fancy [whose] indulgence [becomes] its own reward." He soon meets an itinerant
minister, Eliakim Abbott, a pious but exceedingly inept orator. Though his denomination
is ambiguous, Rev. Abbott is a parody of the Romantic theologian: while wholly sincere
in his evangelical mission, his poetic sensibility renders him a figure of derision among
the tavem-goers who crowd to hear the storyteller. 18 Eliakim is so sensitive that the
sound of his own voice embarrasses him. While his "address [to] sinners on the welfare
of their immortal souls" draws a crowd of "about fifteen...mostly females," the
storyteller's performance solicits "bursts of merriment" from a high-spirited, overflow
audience. His success is as immense as the preacher's failure. The sketch echoes
Knickerbocker's postscript in celebrating imaginative stories over didactic literature, but
with one important difference: the storyteller re-evaluates his triumph. Writing later in
life as a "bitter moralizer." he views the scene as "the meed of what our better nature
blushes at...how much bestowed on mistaken principles." He wonders whether his
words have redeeming moral value, as Eliakim's would were he better at appealing to his
audience. This concern undoubtedly informs his earlier pledge to "write the book \The
Story Teller itself] for the sake of its moral, which many a dreaming youth may profit by.
though it is the experience of a wandering story teller" (CE X, 408). Reading
"Wakefield" in light of Hawthorne's "relinquished" project, one can plausibly suggest
that the baroque eloquence of the maxims and moral represents the storyteller's effort to
fuse the "two such different errands" that separate him and Eliakim as oral performers.
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The King James style ("Little knowest thou thine own insignificance in this great world!")
voices the aphorisms in the imaginative language of those "wandering orators and poets"
who inspire him to abandon Thumpcushion. 19
Reconstructing this frame suggests just how indebted The Story Teller would
have been to Irving's Sketch Book model. If "Sleepy Hollow" is an oral tale transcribed
into writing, "Wakefield" is a tale written as the storyteller wishes that he would have
performed it. If Irving superimposes the written upon the oral with editorial frames,
Hawthome juxtaposes them with a metafictional twist, though admittedly at a far less
obvious level. Still, the formality of the eloquence should clue us that Hawthome aims
for something other than the conversational style o f sketches like "Little Annie's Ramble"
and "A Rill from the Town-Pump," between which he placed "Wakefield" in Twice-told
Tales. Recognizing the sermonic language as an ersatz oral strand allows us to sidestep
the question of authorial sincerity or irony (the focus o f much extant criticism) and
explore the rhetorical effect. The evocative eloquence is meant to excite us to poetic
revery: like much 1830s oratory, its purpose is to elevate sentiment into insight by
mingling ethics and aesthetics. Interpreting the moral literally makes reading an exegetical
act, turning readers intoThumpcushions, dogmatists who "pound" and as they
"expound." David Leverenz has suggested that Hawthome often tricks his audience into
this posture "by inducing an acute desire for premature interpretation," a desire explicitly
invoked in "Wakefield" when the storyteller, at the outset, promises a moral "done up
neatly" and "condensed." Intimating that a graspable secret lies just beneath the surface,
Hawthome (according to Leverenz) then parodies the same "aggressive...self-revealing
gaze" that he encourages: "As detectives sniff and snoop through the underbrush of his
tales, he lures them into the open, then humiliates them with their own intellectual
prurience." To assume a secret, inscribed meaning is to run the risk of feeling "vaguely
like a rapist" (231-32). The violent imagery is Hawthorne's own, drawn from the preface
to The House o f Seven Gables, where he complains o f readers who want him to
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"relentlessly...impale the story with its moral...as by sticking a pin through a butterfly—
...causing it to stiffen in an ungainly and unnatural attitude" (C E XII, xvii). Hawthorne's
ambivalence toward the antebellum "ideology of manhood," with its joint emphasis on
economic and ethical industry, shapes the storyteller's stance, though, in the case o f
"Wakefield," it is the character, not the reader, whose intellectual prurience is parodied.
Again, "Passages" illuminates the gender preoccupations that inform the stance.
The vagabond narrator approaches his craft like the very entrepreneurs whom he disdains,
practicing and selling himself "with the firmness and energy of a man" (416). Eliakim
labors "with tears, to convince [him] of the guilt and madness of [his] life," but the
storyteller sees piety as effete: "I never knew a person, not even a woman, so unfit to
roam the world in solitude, as he was" (415). Yet entrepreneurial storytelling can be an
oddly androgynous enterprise. As he prepares to deliver his tale ("Mr. Higginbotham's
Catastrophe"), the narrator focuses on a fellow performer, a "young person of doubtful
sex" named, provocatively enough, "Little Pickle": "If a gentleman, how could he have
performed the singing-girl, the night before, in No Song No Supper? Or if a lady, why
did she enact Young Norval, and now wear a green coat and white pantaloons...in either
case, the dress was pretty" (419). The real source of his anxiety, however, is old
Thumpcushion, whom he imagines appearing "with the gentleness o f sorrow, softening
his authority with love, as a father might, and even bending his venerable head, as if to
say, that my errors had an apology in his own mistaken discipline" (421). The storyteller
longs to be addressed by the old man "in a style of paternal wisdom." He knows that
Thumpcushion is incapable of distinguishing his ecclesiastical authority from his paternal
affection, and he promptly bums a letter from the old man.
As ministers, Thumpcushion and Abbott thus offer two gendered extremes that
the narrator must negotiate in his storytelling: paternal and "feminized" authority. The
polarities surface in the presentation o f "Wakefield." Critics often read the husband as a
projection of the storyteller himself: just as Wakefield presumes to observe his wife from
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an invisible vantage point, so the narrator observes him. In hypothesizing about
Wakefield's motives, he makes narration an act of empathy. 20 Yet there is a vast
difference between the spectatorial stances that Wakefield and the narrator assume that
centers on social authority. At first, the husband's craft is an idleness even more
unproductive than the storyteller’s own in "Passages”: his "mind occupied itself in long
and lazy musings that tended to no purpose...his thought were seldom so energetic as to
seize hold of words" (91). Even after Wakefield resolves to perplex his wife by
disappearing, he fails to articulate what he hopes to accomplish: "Such are his loose and
rambling modes of thought that he has taken this very singular step with the
consciousness of a purpose, indeed, but without being able to define it sufficiently for his
own contemplation" (93). But as he grows obsessed with knowing how his absence
affects her, he transforms into an exegetical interpreter, trying to find meaning in signs:
"he detects a portent of evil entering the house, in the guise of an apothecary. Next day,
the knocker is muffled. Towards night-fall, comes the chariot of a physician, and
deposits its big-wigged and solemn burthen at Wakefield's door...perchance the herald of
a funeral" (136). The ultimate scene of his self-centered reading occurs one cold night as
he stares into his wife's parlor windows: "On the ceiling, appears a grotesque shadow of
good Mrs. Wakefield. The cap, the nose and chin, and the broad waist, form an
admirable caricature, which dances, moreover, with the up-flickering and down-sinking
blaze, almost too merrily for the shade of an elderly window." Wakefield ignores the
hints that his wife has adjusted to her widowhood and reclaims his place as the head of
the household. Why? A simple answer is that he is cold; an even simpler reason is
because he can. The storyteller's disdain for paternal authority surfaces as he describes
the husband’s assumption that his wife "will run to fetch the gray coat and small-clothes,
which, doubtless, she has kept carefully in the closet of their bed-chamber" (139). The
reassertion of domestic authority reveals that the self-infatuation of Wakefield's
craftiness, much like Ichabod Crane's, is rooted in a social status that only he recognizes.
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As much as her husband, Mrs. Wakefield is an enigmatic character. While
Wakefield is incapable of pinpointing his motives, she recognizes in him "a quiet
selfishness that had rusted into his inactive mind—of a peculiar sort of vanity...of a
disposition to craft, which had seldom produced more positive effects than the keeping of
petty secrets hardly worth revealing" (91-92). While the storyteller never clarifies just
how Mrs. Wakefield is affected by her husband's disappearance, he does imply that her
imagination is keener: during the years that she is "more widow than wife," she sees his
smile flickering "across all her reminiscences of Wakefield's visage...she surrounds the
original smile with a multitude of fantasies, which make it strange and awful." Whether
in a coffin or in heaven, he wears this "quiet and crafty smile"; the persistence of the
image leads her to doubt "whether she is a widow." It is fancy, the images inspired by
daydreaming, that leads her to the truth of the situation.
But for Wakefield, the imagination is opaque and impenetrable. Early in his
adventure he passes by his abandoned home, anxious to see how he is missed yet afraid
to be spotted. "He gathers courage to pause and look homeward, but is perplexed with a
sense of change about the familiar edifice, such as affects us all, when, after a separation
of months or years, we again see some hill or lake, or work of art, with which we were
friends, of old." According to the storyteller, what effects this change is "the comparison
and contrast between our imperfect reminiscences and the reality," a difference that
Wakefield fails to perceive: it is "a secret from himself." By distinguishing "us all" from
Wakefield, of course, the storyteller neatly presumes to speak for everyone but the
husband. Significantly, the same comparison between memory and reality appears in
"Passages," just after the narrator abandons Thumpcushion's patronage. He gazes back,
but his home strikes him as "more memory than reality. 1 would have imagined that years
had already passed, and I was far away, contemplating that dim picture of my native
place" (C E X , 410). This "singular...visionaiy" moment creates a "delicious
excitement," confirming the richness of his sensibility and encouraging him to take to the
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road as a vagabond performer. Side by side, the three daydream scenes hint at what he
means by "imagination, in the proper sense of the word": an "exciting [of the] wonder."
Both the storyteller and Mrs. Wakefield allow the imagination to "forcibly affect [the]
mind," but all Wakefield can cultivate is "something like the energy of feeling."
Allowing fancy to overshadow "reality" is a conventional romantic past time, of
course; yet the implicit identification between the narrator and Mrs. Wakefield (which
would have been more apparent in the context of The Story Teller) implies a regard for
the reader absent on the dramatic level. If Wakefield's craft is employed to rig an effect
on his captive audience, the storyteller suggests that his reader must share in the
imagining. (This, apparently, is what Eliakim fails to inspire). Again, staging the
narrative as an inspirational oration allows him to incorporate the reader into the fictionmaking with recognizable conventions like the "let us now ..." transitions. Alexander
Gelley points to one particular sentence to show how syntax positions "us" vis-a-vis the
dramatic scene. In a sentence like "amid the throng of a London street we distinguish a
m a n ," "amid" may modify either "we" or "man": "a situational determination of the
reader in relation to the scene is both implied and blocked" (169). Just as Irving's
prepositional and adverbial "indicators" evoke an uncertain spatial distance from the
scene(s) of storytelling, Hawthorne’s syntax creates an ambiguous perspective upon the
fiction. For Gelley, syntax is but one "form of access" to the drama that parallels the
structure of fantasy that psychoanalysis posits, the meconnaissance in which the gaze is
reflected back upon itself, radically undermining the autonomy of the viewer. What he
does not suggest is that the ambiguity of "amid" would not occur were the storyteller not
striving for formal eloquence. The resulting stylistic structures dramatize the effect of the
imagination on the characters. The varying syntactic slots in which noun phrases appear
play different functions or roles according to the action or state expressed by the verb.
That is, these noun phrases signal a relative degree of agency or passivity. Action verbs
imply volition, while stative verbs convey a more experiential, affective quality. 21 The
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poetic devices employed by the storyteller (metaphor, passive voice) transform the
volition implied by action verbs into the affectivity projected by stative verbs, or vice
versa. The collaboration that the stoiyteller calls for, in fact, relies on evoking a mixture
of the two qualities.
Much of the humor concocted at Wakefield's expense rests in the dramatization of
his "convulsive effort": the husband does not merely think, he "sifts his ideas." Mental
activity is transformed by metaphor into a physical activity; in substituting an active verb
for a stative one, he dramatizes Wakefield's search for some volitional excuse for his
actions. More often than not, however, his convoluted thinking becomes a separate force
that acts upon him, creating an odd alienability between mind and body. Wakefield is not
simply curious, he "finds himself curious" (94). He does not simply return to his new
home but "finds himself by the coal fire of his lodgings" (95). Reflexives here dramatize
both his self-preoccupation (how the experience of looking inward turns him into the
thing looked at) and his passivity: his imagination acts upon him. The reflexives
syntactically convey the meconmissance of the spectacle that Gelley describes. The
image of Wakefield "finding him self captures the tautology of his self-absorbed gaze.
In some cases, the alienable quality of Wakefield's imagination is conveyed by a
corporeal synecdoche: "he is aroused by the scraping of his foot upon the step." The
passive voice heightens Wakefield's separation from his own body. His foot scrapes, but
he is only aware of the motion of the limb, not of instigating it. This is the psychological
dismemberment of meconmissance, a wedge between consciousness and the body that
Poe more grotesquely exploits when Psyche Zenobia’s freshly decapitated head describes
her body in "How to Write a Blackwood Article." But the storyteller also portrays the
split from the other perspective, the body aware that it is acted upon by psychological
traits: "Habit...takes him by the hand and guides him, wholly unaware, to his own door"
(94). Or "ideas.. .render him indistinctly conscious that an almost impassable gulf divides
his hired apartment from his former home" (96). Passive voice constructions also mark
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the split: he "is perplexed with a sense of change" (94). The source of the perplexity
would normally be indicated with a "by" clause ("perplexed by a sense of change"), but
change is transformed into a quality or trait that he possesses. His concentration is
directed not at the whims that drive him, but at their effect.
The syntactic complexity that conveys Wakefield's self-absorption is absent in the
characterization of the narrator and reader. Instead, a more ambiguous blend of active and
stative verbs convey the collaborative effort. Describing his recollection of the "outline"
and evaluating the appeal of Wakefield's "incident," the storyteller evokes the affectivity
of imagining: "I recollect," "I remember," "I think." But as he instigates the narrative, he
assumes more agency; "I bid [the reader] welcome." More complexly constructed
sentences reveal how imagination affects the subject: "To my own contemplations, at
least, it [Wakefield's "frolic"] has often recurred, always exciting wonder, but with a
sense that the story must be true." Function here is a product of interpretation. The
preposition "to" typically marks the direction or goal toward which something moves, as
in "He hurries to his lodgings," but this makes little sense here. Instead, the sentence
reads "recurred in" establishing imagination as a location or place. The statement is the
first inkling of the storyteller’s own meconnaissance. Just as Wakefield perceived
different parts of his body acting upon him, the reflexive "himself1marking his identity as
subject and object of his gaze, the narrator's contemplations are detached, oddly separate
from his consciousness as an agency. Imagination, though "in" us, is an alienable force,
thereby impugning claims to that agency. "To" further implies an "acting-upon" that
makes him the object of the imagination: "It happens to my thoughts." Reflexivity, the
act of trying to access thought, is a strangely disembodying practice.
He continues, when speaking in the first person, to dramatize storytelling as a
volitional activity: if he only had more space, he might "exemplify" how our actions are
determined by the "iron tissue of necessity." Typically, "exemplify" conveys
characteristics, not volition. In the case of a sentence like "He exemplifies stupidity,"
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Vhe" would presumably not choose to embody that standard. Yet the narrator uses the
word as a metaphor for "describe" or "detail," thus assuming agency. Later, he
announces that he "conceive[s]" that Wakefield would hardly be aware that two decades
have passed, the function is likewise ambiguous. "To conceive" means, most obviously,
"to think," but it also implies agency. In declaring "I conceive," the storyteller creates his
text. Conceive has connotations of birth-giving wholly appropriate to his actions; his
imagination is a womb for engendering the story's specifics. Again, the metaphorical use
of the word allows him to assume an agency without losing the affectivity that it conveys. 22
The reader, meanwhile, is limited to experiential verbs: "We know .. .that none of
us would perpetrate such a folly..." (91). When we are allowed more volition, it is only
in the conditional tense: "If the reader choose.. .or if he prefer." Throughout the text,
"we" may experience or even possess a vision, but we do not create it. As Wakefield
steps into his home, we "have a parting glimpse of his visage"; as a result we "recognize
[his] crafty smile" (98). We "find" Wakefield in his lodgings, but the word refers less to
discovery than to witnessing. We experience the sight of Wakefield in his hermitage; we
do not conceive it. Even the "let us now" phrases hedge agency in two ways. First, they
are always actions on the verge of taking place: we do not follow, but are asked to
follow. These constructions are properly imperatives, their subjects implied: "You let us
now." Imperatives appear as well in an important section of the story when we glimpse
Wakefield ten years into his whimwham. Again, agency is located with the narrator:
"Now for a scene!" he announces, and "we distinguish" Wakefield, experiencing the
sight of him, the object of a glance:
He bends his head and moves with an indescribable obliquity of gait,
as if unwilling to display his full front to the world. Watch him long
enough to see what we have described, and you will allow that
circumstances—which often produce remarkable men from nature's
ordinary handiwork—have produced one such here. Next, leaving him
to sidle along the footwalk, cast your eyes in the opposite direction,
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where a portly female considerably in the wane of life, with a prayerbook in her hand, is proceeding to yonder church. (96)

Imperatives are typically interpreted according to tone: they are commands, requests,
entreaties. The response that they provoke depends upon how one feels about being told
to act. Here the storyteller has an agenda, so he tells us where to look, where to focus
our perception so the salient details will not be missed. As a direct address, imperatives
can alienate an audience by being too directive; as I argue in the next chapter on narrative
interjections, imperatives often signal a superior stance, a talking-down to the addressee.
But the interpersonal function obscures an important point about predicates in imperatives:
they are generally action verbs rather than stative verbs. Imperatives do not tell someone
to enter a "state," but to do whatever is necessary to enter that state. Despite the
sometimes uncomfortable tone of their address, they convey agency rather than
affectivity. This is obvious in the passage above. "Watch," unlike "see" or "observe,"
implies volition. "Allow" and "cast" more obviously project agency; "casting" even
dramatizes the separation of consciousness and body.
Imperatives further mark an important connection between the reader and
Wakefield. Shortly after the "whimwham" commences, the narrator interjects one of his
more baroque statements: "Poor Wakefield!.. .Go quietly to thy bed, foolish man; and,
on the morrow, if thou wilt be wise, get thee home to good Mrs. Wakefield, and tell her
the truth. Remove not thyself, even for a little week, from thy place in her chaste bosom"
(93). Significantly, this is the one passage where the narrator conceives of Wakefield
solely as an agent. The imperative thus offers a grammatical correlate of Gelley's gaze
structure: as the narrator addresses Wakefield, telling him what to do, he projects what he
desires to see onto the man, volition. By extension, the imperatives addressed to the
reader not only "stage" the scene but project his own desire for an active, collaborative
audience, one that participates in the fictional process.
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The doubling nature of speaker-addressee relations in the imperative is even more
pronounced in the "let us now" constructions. C. L. Hamblin argues that "let us"
imperatives are two-faced: they refer to the "proposed joint action" o f / and you. But
because let us "represents a commitment on the part of the speaker to cooperate, it is
more like a first-person imperative of the let me quality" (60). When a speaker says "let
us now," he does not necessarily ask permission or invite us to jointly act but begs the
audience not to interfere: let us means don't stop me now. An ambiguous transfer of
agency is traceable because imperatives require an active rather than stative verb; yet
underneath this transfer is the maintenance of the storyteller’s own agency as a distinct,
separate force. If imperatives provide a frame or aperture into the text, they are two-way
mirrors: the audience sees its actions performed but suspects an invisible presence on the
other side, manipulating the vision. Narrative agency is complicated by the veiy desire
for it, for the power to control the text. Like Irving, Hawthorne offers multiple reader
roles grounded in different rhetorical contexts, but, far from overspecifying or
overgeneralizing their identity, he refrains from articulating them. Instead, the audience
finds itself stranded between volition and affectivity, caught in the act of staging the
spectacle.
Again, the interpretive ambiguity of this stance was far more indicative of oratory
than print in the 1830s. The performing or staging of a sermon foregrounded the
interpersonal function of language, connecting speaker and addressee in a viable
community whose differences were most visible in the fruition of multiple responses
(which are explicitly dramatized in "Passages from a Relinquished Work" in the contrast
between the storyteller’s and Eliakim's performances). The evocation of this oral strand
offers a new interpretive context for the concluding moral. Though one of Hawthorne's
most quoted passages, its assertive tone often overshadows its introduction: "[Wakefield]
has left us much food for thought, a portion o f which shall lend its wisdom to a moral;
and be shaped into a figure" (140; emphasis added). Unlike Ichabod Crane, who
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"swallows" tales whole, Hawthorne's storyteller leaves much "food for thought"
unspoken. Its leftovers furnish an infinite number of feasts for subsequent rereadings.

Melville and the Rumor about Bartleby
Echoes of oral storytelling add an interpretive uncertainty to the tales of Irving and
Hawthorne, undermining the endless dissemination of content that print promises. At
first glance, Melville's "Bartleby" focuses solely on this mechanical reproduction. The
narrator is an "unambitious" lawyer "who never addresses a jury, or in any way draws
down public applause," preferring to do "a snug business among rich men's bonds and
mortgages and title-deeds" as a "conveyancer and title hunter, and drawer-up of recondite
documents" (14,19). As a scrivener hired to copy the lawyer's documents, Bartleby,
too, is associated exclusively with the written word. The meaning of his bizarre
abjuration is delivered in a postscript: once a clerk at the Dead Letter Office in
Washington, Bartleby was responsible for burning undelivered correspondence. "Dead
letters! does it not sound like dead men?" the narrator asks, and then as now, the Dead
Letter Office is a powerful metaphor for the desires that go disappointed in commun
ication, for the significance that somehow fails to circulate as hoped. Bartleby’s life is a
dead letter because no one read his message of despair. The narrator recognizes in that
miscommunication the secret of his own life. Just as Bartleby was dismissed from his
clerkship "by a change in the administration," he, too, has been displaced: "I must be
permitted to be rash here and declare, that I consider the sudden and violent abrogation of
the office of the Master of Chancery, by the new Constitution, as a —premature act;
inasmuch as I had counted upon a life-Iease of profits, whereas I only received those o f a
few short years" (14). The "fraternal melancholy" that the narrator shares with Bartleby,
quite simply, is a life lost in the mail.
Circulating letters evoke circulating stories. Significantly, "Bartleby" marks
Melville's anxious entry into the periodical market, the first of fifteen short stories
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published between late 1853 and 1856 in Harper's and Putnam's and collected as The
Piazza Tales (1856). The abundant metaphors of textuality, coupled with Melville's
precarious emotional health in the wake of the critical and financial disaster of Pierre
(1852), have led many critics to read "Bartleby" as an allegoiy of frustrated authorship.
Lawrence R. Schehr, for example, claims that Melville "writes 'Bartleby1as the stoiy of
the truth of writing: he is not sure o f being read, but only of having written," implying
that language is "wholly dead if the senders and receivers are absent" (103). For Michael
T. Gilmore, "dead letters" suggest more than an unreceptive audience: they bespeak
Melville's desire to reject the reader before he can be rejected. Rather than "achieve
immediacy by putting the inner workings of the text on display.. .he positions himself vis
it-vis the reader much as Bartleby stands with respect to the law yer as an absence, an
inscrutable blank wall" (145). Both arguments undoubtedly capture Melville's suspicions
of the American mass audience, yet they overlook the fact that he willingly catered to the
periodical market by scaling back what a reviewer of Pierre called his "maniacal" style,
the "mowing, gibbering, screaming" that evoked an "incurable Bedlamite" (qtd. in Leyda
477). Indeed, by effacing the authorial persona that he had cultivated since his earliest
novels, Melville reveals his awareness of the conventions that, within the decade, would
distinguish the short story from the tale: in particular, the observer-narrator who
delineates plot with a minimum of exhortative commentary. Hiding his "inner workings,"
Melville does not change his storytelling strategy so much as he embeds its dramatic
tensions in the social context of his Wall Street setting.
These tensions center on a subtle oral strand that is manifest at the stylistic level.
Dan McCall has pointed out the "profoundly spoken quality" of the narration, especially
comments that reveal the narrator organizing and revising the direction of the story: "it is
fit I make some mention," "I should have stated before," "here it must be said" (116120). The lawyer also describes his narration as a "meagre recital," the latter word
evoking the lyccum. Perhaps most important, the story of Bartleby’s employment at the
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dead letter office comes "to [his] ear a few months after the scrivener's decease" in the
form of a rumor (45). Like Ichabod Crane, whose fate is known only by the Terry Town
villagers through gossip, an explanation for the scrivener’s behavior is voiced in a
socially devalued discourse. I would add, however, that at other points, the lawyer does
resort to a written rather than spoken style meant to suggest legal documentation: "The
conclusion of this whole business was, that it soon became a fixed fact of my chambers,
that a pale young scrivener, by the name of Bartleby, had a desk there; that he copied for
me at the usual rate of four cents a folio (one hundred words)" (25).
An explanation for this stylistic confusion rests within the American legal reform
that prompts the lawyer's dismissal. Several critics have identified the "new
Constitution" as an understated reference to the 1848 New York Field Code, which
incorporated common law and the chancejy into one legal system, making the Master of
Chancery an obsolete office. The code took its name from David Dudley Field, a
prominent New York attorney who chaired the committee charged with implementing the
state's judicial reform. Besides being an important figure in legal history, Field is noted
for his influence on American literature: he hosted the Berkshircs party where Melville
first met Hawthorne in August 1850. 23 Before the Field Code reform, common law and
Chancery courts (also known as equity) operated concomitantly. Common law derived
its authority from written precedent, while equity courts ajudicated gaps in that precedent
through the oral arguments of contesting parties. The distinction between the two broke
down almost immediately, however, as the courts presided over so many cases that
decisions were transcribed into written precedent. 24 The Master symbolizes this
compromise. Taking testimony, certifying transcripts, storing court records, he
proliferates the authority of the written word.
The distinction between common law and equity is analogous to J. L. Austin's
theory of performative and constative language. In each, the question of the referent, the
thing that the word names, is similar. A performative utterance, one in which the
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"issuing. ..is the performing of an action," contains its own referent (7). It does not
describe an existing situation but enacts or at least creates the impetus for an effect, which
Austin calls its "illocutionary force." In the same way, Chancery, at least in its ideal state,
refers not to pre-existing documentation, but enacts or creates law through the
performance of pleading and judgment. In a constative utterance, the referent predates the
utterance so the locution describes or refers back to the anterior condition, just as common
law refers back to existing legal documents. Like common law, constative utterances
represent or describe a reality that (supposedly) exists independent of language. 25
The illocutionary force of a performative utterance depends upon "an accepted
conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect" (25); its power is
circumscribed by the social distribution of authority. Conventional authority may seem
obvious in the case of a minister, who has no inherent right to "pronounce" a couple
husband and w-ife. Yet the authority of law is traditionally grounded in ontological rather
than organic right. For many, the mythology of truth, "the letter of the law," exerts a
strict (and often comforting) literalness that delineates right from wrong. 26 Bartleby’s
prefer not to demonstrates what happens when language operates outside the constraints
of this conventional procedure. What Austin calls a "misapplication" ("the p ro ced u reuttering certain words, & c.—was O.K. and accepted, but the circumstances in which it
was invoked or the persons who invoked it were wrong" [28]) influences how the
narrator chooses to tell Bartleby's incomplete biography. The lawyer, emblematic of
social authority conferred by paper authority, recognizes the scrivener as a type of
figurative language that speaks outside the confines of the letter. 27
What the lawyer admits about his character reveals a susceptibility to Bartleby. At
first, he never questions the origin of his authority. When Turkey claps a ginger cake on
a mortgage, he merely rolls his eyes at the eccentricity of his employee, not recognizing
that a ginger-cake is just as arbitrary a symbol as an "official" seal (19). Yet he does not
zealously covet his position. His other clerk, Nippers, manifests "a certain impatience
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with the duties of a mere copyist" and frequently indulges in "an unwarrantable
usurpation of strictly professional affairs, such as the original drawing up of legal
documents" (16). Nipper's documents are an "unwarrantable usurpation" only because,
unlike the narrator, he has not been granted the authority to produce them. But the lawyer
tolerates this usurpation; in doing so, he undermines his own authority. By admitting that
Nipper's documents possess illocutionary force, he inadvertently acknowledges that the
procedure engendering the pragmatic effect of his own documents is conventional, not
natural.
Bartleby’s employment is precipitated by the conferring of the Master's seal:
"Now my original business...was considerably increased by receiving the master's
office. There was now great work for scriveners" (19). This work consists of copying
texts, of using language solely in its constative function. In his first days on the job,
Bartleby works without complaint. Indeed, his productivity is so efficient that the lawyer
is highly impressed. Unlike Turkey and Nippers, who suffer digestive irregularities on a
regular basis, Bartleby "gorges" himself on documents without "pause for digestion"
(19). But his productivity unsettles the lawyer. Were Bartleby "cheerfully industrious,"
he would not be bothered, but the scrivener writes "silently, palely, mechanically" (20).
Bartleby's writing symbolizes the smooth proliferation o f law, suggesting that this "diy,
husky sort of business" governs human life without humanity. Melville's tone evokes
Irving's attitude in The Sketch B o o t writing expresses none of the community values
that orality does. Ichabod Crane's ever-hungry imagination sates only himself;
Bartleby's mechanical productivity, meanwhile, embodies the gap between the Chancery
as a remunerative business and its ideal function of supplementing precedent. At this
subtle moment in the narrative, the lawyer experiences his first bit of discomfort, not with
Bartleby, but with his own complicity in the system of paper authority.
The discomfort increases, obviously, when Bartleby begins announcing his
preferences. The sequence of tasks that he prefers not to perform is important. On his
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third day, the lawyer asks him to help verify a document, a common if "wearisome"
practice that ensures the uniformity of all copies. Whether this paper concerns commonlaw or the Chancery is unclear, but it is not Bartleby's handiwork: the need to verify the
copy arises "before any necessity had arisen for having his own writing examined." The
request occasions the first refusal: "...without moving from his privacy, Bartleby in a
singularly mild, firm voice, replied, 'I would prefer not to'" (20). The lawyer is
shocked, but refrains from firing his employee because Bartleby's productivity goes
uninterrupted: "I stood gazing at him awhile, as he went on with his own writing" (21).
Bartleby refuses his employer's authority to "compare" the documents. By referring to
Bartleby's "own writing," the lawyer indicts his authority as well: own confers
propriety, implying that writing contains traces of its author and therefore can never truly
be a "copy." The figural level of the text reinforces the propriety issue: if Bartleby's
copies are his "own writing," he must "own" them in some sense.
The second abjuration scene specifies the documents that the scrivener must
verify: "A few days after this, Bartleby concluded four lengthy documents, being
quadruplicates of a week's testimony taken before me in my High Court of Chancery."
The lawyer plans to distribute the four "copies" to his employees while "I should read
from the original" (21). Bartleby again refuses. The lawyer is struck by how deeply the
scrivener weighs his response. Obviously, he has a motive for violating his employer's
authority: "It seemed to me that while I had been addressing him, he carefully revolved
every statement that I made...but, at the same time, some paramount consideration
prevailed with him to reply as he did" (22). If the lawyer "revolved" his own statements
as intently as Bartleby does, he might question whether his document is an original if it is
"testimony taken before me." The original is itself a copy, a transcription of an oral
performance. It is considered an original only because it is the copy from which
subsequent transcriptions are produced. The lawyer assumes that he is the origin of
writing, that he controls its meaning, because of his authority in the office. Yet his own
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preference for proprietary pronouns undermines this assumption, not only "Bartleby's
own writing," but subsequent assertions as well: "Turkey, Nippers and Ginger Nut had
taken their seats in a row, each with his document in hand"; "These are your own copies
we are about to examine," he tells Bartleby (21-22; emphasis added). The casual
references to "his writing" and "his documents" blur the hierarchies of authority that the
law institutes, hierarchies that differentiate copies from originals and scriveners from
authors. The figural level of language points to the arbitrariness of the lawyer's authority.
In the third scene, the lawyer decides to test the limits of Bartleby's "mulish
vagary" to discover just what duties he will perform. He asks the scrivener to compare
copies, then to walk to the Post Office. Finally, he asks the young man simply to fetch
Nippers from the other room. Each time, Bartleby declines: "'I prefer not to,' he
respectfully and slowly said, and mildly disappeared" (25). McCall emphasizes the
importance of these adverbs, noting that "respectfully," "slowly" and "mildly" allude to
the narrator's assiduous effort to detail Bartleby's abjuration as specifically as possible
(142). The adverbs also emphasize the often overlooked fact that the refusal is never
aggressive, confrontational, or even physical: it is always a speech act. In fact, "I would
prefer not to" almost fits Austin's definition of the explicit performative utterance: verbs
in the "first person singular present indicative active" (56). {Would makes Bartleby's
utterance subjunctive not indicative; as Schehr notes, it makes the statement all the more
curious, since English associates should with the first person [100]; mood here heightens
sensitivity to the moment that language is on the verge of enacting an illocutionary force).
What makes the effect so mysterious? The answer lies not, as the lawyer believes, in the
motives that compel it, but how he interprets it.
The more beguiling Bartleby's preference, the more obsessed the lawyer becomes
with finding an explanation. The word prefer itself begins to haunt him: "Somehow of
late I had got into the way of involuntarily using this word 'prefer' upon all sorts of not
exactly suitable occasions. And I trembled to think that my contact with the scrivener had
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already and seriously affected me in a mental way. And what further and deeper
aberration might it not yet produce?" (31). The narrator is not alone here. Nippers
likewise takes to repeating the word. "He did not in the least roguishly accent the word
prefer. It was plain that it involuntarily rolled from his tongue. I thought to myself,
surely I must get rid of a demented man, who already has in some degree turned the
tongues, if not the heads of myself and clerks" (31). Bartleby is indeed a "tongue
twister": prefer is a legal term, defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "to bring before; to
prosecute; to try; to proceed with" (1342). As Herbert F. Smith argues, "the word itself
is exquisitely chosen by Melville to suggest the human and existential condition of
'bearing before' or 'setting before' in the matter of consequential choice" (740). A reader
without some knowledge of the law might be forgiven for not making the connection.
For a lawyer, even one who prefers not to "prefer" cases before a judge and jury, not to
catch the implications of the word signals a major clue to his mind-set (and to narrative
strategy). In a courtroom context, to prefer, as a performative utterance, signifies the
commencement of a proceeding or a prosecution. Yet the illocutionary function of I
prefer would only be completed, according to the constraints of the conventional
procedure, if the speaker were authorized to try a matter, an authorization that Bartleby
obviously does not possess. As Austin would say, Bartleby's utterance is a
misapplication. The lawyer misses this pun or figurative use of the word at that moment
because he can only interpret "1 would prefer not" as a literal refusal to work, a refusal
whose illocutionary force would normally be circumscribed by an employer's authority in
the office. 28 Much as Nippers erodes the lawyer’s authority by flagrantly "forging"
documents, so Bartleby, merely by uttering three words, undermines the institutional
authority.
Inevitably, Bartleby prefers not to copy at all, withdrawing into a "dead-wall
revery" that signals the slow, tragic progression toward his final preference not to live.
He refuses to recognize the value of money and refuses to deliver letters to the Post
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Office, not once but three times (25,32,36). Bartleby's abjurations center on conflicts of
authority in the era that Melville wrote. The change from hard currency to paper money
had been a major controversy in the late 1840s, as many distrusted the government's faith
in regulating its value. Similarly, the Post Office was mired in legal battles with New
York state over its authority to institute postage increases and modify delivery routes. 29
Bartleby's withdrawal can be read as a retreat from an imposed system of signification.
At wit's end, the lawyer tells Bartleby that he must quit the office, promising to assist him
in any possible way: "If hereafter in your new place o f abode I can be of any service to
you, do not fail to advise me by letter. Good-bye, Bartleby, and fare you well."
Leaving the pale copyist without further word, he exits his chambers, congratulating
himself for the propriety maintained during the exchange: "I could not but highly plume
myself on my masterly management in getting rid of Bartleby. Masterly I call it, and such
it must appear to any dispassionate thinker" (33). This mastery (as Smith suggests,
another pun on the lawyer's professional authority) lies in the perfect reason of his
actions: "I assumed the ground that depart he must; and upon that assumption built all I
had to say" (34).
Despite his belief in assumptions, the lawyer has begun to interpret the world
differently. If he once assumed an organic or natural connection between the word and
the thing it names, he now discovers one word signifying diverse phenomena—the word
Bartleby:
At the comer of Broadway and Canal-street, I saw quite an excited
group of people standing in earnest conversation.
"I'll take odds he doesn't," said a voice as I passed.
"Doesn’t go?—done!" said I, "put up your money."
I was instinctively putting my hand in my pocket to produce my own,
when I remembered that this was an election day. The words I had overheard
bore no reference to Bartleby, but to the success or non-success of some candidate
for the mayority. In my intent frame of mind, I had as it were, imagined that all
Broadway shared my excitement, and were debating the same question with me. I
passed on, very thankful that the uproar of the street screened my momentary
absent-mindedness. (34)
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As if resisting Bartleby's influence, he falls back upon his assumption of authority,
though he secretly recognizes that, for his assumptions to be effective, his scrivener must
share them, an admission that interpretation depends on a conventional procedure. The
lawyer knows that Bartleby is a man of preferences. His worst fears are confirmed upon
arriving at his office door the next morning when he discovers that Bartleby has yet to
depart. Just as the word prefer had possessed him, assumptions now haunt him:
"before I had prospectively assumed that Bartleby would depart, so now I might
retrospectively assume that departed he was. In the legitimate carrying out of this
assumption, I might enter my office in a great hurry, and pretending not to see Bartleby at
all, walk straight against him as if he were air.... It was hardly possible that Bartleby
could withstand such an application of the doctrine of assumptions. But upon second
thoughts the success of the plan seemed rather dubious" (35). "Preferences" and
"assumptions" symbolize the epistemological dichotomy between performative and
constative utterances. F ora man of assumptions, language is a medium for
communicating truth by representation: it assumes a clear distinction between the literal
and figurative. For a man of preferences, however, language is not a medium for
knowing but doing; as such, its value lies not in making truth available, but in
successfully or unsuccessfully enacting social conditions that create it. The subtle way
that Bartleby's preferences undermine his employer's assumptions is dramatized nicely
when the lawyer imagines walking into his office and, by pretending not to see his
scrivener, "walk straight against him as if he were air." The plan is a performative
attempt to create one's reality; the lawyer momentarily fancies that, simply by promising
himself that Bartleby is gone, he will be. His assumptions will not allow him that luxury,
however, and the performative power of language to act is again subordinated to its
constative function.
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Smith identifies a pun in "assumptions" as well: "Instead of engaging in ’vulgar
bullying...bravado...[or] choleric hectoring,' [the lawyer] simply asserts the principle of
assumpsit, a chancery writ issued in cases of nonfeasance (non-performance) in the
fifteenth century and later" (740). He ascribes the word play solely to Melville’s "bravura
punning performance," arguing that the lawyer remains confounded by literal
interpretation. The legal puns can also be said to index a profound change in his
orientation toward language: Bartleby's "I would prefer not" teaches him to read
figuratively, a lesson that he communicates not through testimony, which would prompt
only a literal interpretation, but with stylistic gestures like punning. The polysemic nature
of language inverts the literal meaning of his testimony, dramatizing his ultimate inability
to articulate the significance of Bartleby's existence in words. Puns free the performative
function of language from the compulsion of the constative, the idea that all statements
must describe reality. In fact, puns make nonsense out of that reality, undermining the
monolithic pretense of the constative. 30
Again, the argument is vital to understanding the narrative stance. In writing of
his encounter with Bartleby, the lawyer is essentially testifying about "true" events.
Austin claims testimony would be considered a performative utterance: "A report of what
someone else said is admitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance of our
performative kind: because this is regarded as a report not so much of something he said,
as which it would be hear-say and not admissible as evidence, but rather as something he
did, an action of his" (13). 1 think, however, that he violates his own distinctions
between performative and constative language here. Testimony, as a "report," describes a
previous situation. Because the referent is anterior to the speech act, it must be a
constative utterance, regardless of whether the testimony concerns "something said" or
"something done." Indeed, the constative function of such speech acts is rooted in
Aristotle's Rhetoric, where testimony is defined as a non-artistic proof: it carries its own
persuasive force and does not require "artistic" proof (i.e. rhetoric) to be convincing.
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Though he claims to be testifying, several contradictions arise that demand crossexamination. The third time that Bartleby states his preference, as previously noted, the
narrator says that he speaks "respectfully,11 "slowly," and "mildly," all of which enforces
the "mild effrontery" with which Bartleby abjures. Yet when the narrator stops to
summarize the "conclusion of the whole business," rallying his command of the facts, he
concludes that Bartleby would "refuse point-blank" (25). The passage sounds like a legal
document with its succession of subordinate clauses that summarize the conditions under
which Bartleby will work. Yet the contradiction between the way the lawyer describes
Bartleby's preference (respectfully, slowly, mildly) and the way he interprets it ("pointblank") implies a growth in perception, a deeper appreciation of linguistic subtleties. As a
character, he can only read the scrivener at the literal level, summarizing the facts and
organizing conclusions about a reason or cause in Bartleby that explains his mystery. As
a storyteller, he can narrate with an awareness of figurality that more fully complements
the scrivener's effect on others. Several more puns highlight this change in perception.
Shortly after Bartleby refuses to go to the Post Office, the lawyer discovers that
his clerk has been living in the law offices. Again, the "mild effrontery" of Bartleby's
preference not to allow him into the office at that time bears a strange, indescribable effect
on the lawyer: "It was his wonderful mildness chiefly, which not only disarmed me, but
unmanned me, as it were. For 1 consider that one, for the time, is a sort of unmanned
when he tranquilly permits his hired clerk to dictate to him, and order him away from his
own premises" (27). A common nineteenth-century synonym, "unmanning" has
particular connotations that Melville (ever sensitive to the sexual pun, as the hilarious
"archbishoprick" chapter of Moby-Dick demonstrates) would appreciate. In fact, the
word suggests a gender reversal of metaphors for the rhetorical situation. Melville
describes reading as a different type of "taking in," as when, in "Hawthorne and His
Mosses," he writes of the "germinous seeds" that "take root in [his] soul" {Writings 250).
Here the reader is penetrated by the text. The reference in "Bartleby" calls attention to the

65

phallocentric pretensions of interpretation, the idea that meaning is in the word. When
Bartleby unmans the lawyer, he divests him of his belief in the letter of the law; that this
point is expressed via a pun suggests the narrator is attempting to bring about a similar
reorientation in his reader.
Two more mild, wonderful examples of word play that Melville had to recognize
when he wrote the passage also enforce this reorientation of the reader toward the text.
The image of Bartleby "dictating" to the lawyer illustrates the inversion o f authority so
employee now controls employer. But it also inverts the notion of original and duplicate
so foregrounded in Bartleby's second abjuration. If Bartleby does indeed dictate to the
lawyer, the Master of Chancery is now the scrivener, in a position of "copying," which,
as a narrator, is exactly his condition: he "copies" or "testifies" to his true encounters
with Bartleby. Just as Bartleby's refusal to authenticate his copies displayed a possible
disregard for the mimetic relationship between an original and a copy, this inverted image
suggests the hierarchy itself is dissolved. "Premises" functions both literally and
metaphorically here, dramatizing the erosion of his social authority: he is physically
displaced from his Wall Street office, the site of his authorization, but he is displaced,
too, from his conceptions, his set of legal premises about his professional identity and its
hierarchical rights to govern. "Premises" refers back to the assurance with which he
introduces himself: "Imprimis: I am a man, who, from his youth upward, has been filled
with a profound conviction that the easiest way of life is the best" (14). The lawyer’s
description o f his feelings speaks more than he admits.
What brings the lawyer to a more developed, though wholly inexpressible
understanding of Bartleby's meaning is the Post Office rumor. The Post Office is an
authority only because it has no competition. As a state monopoly, it regulates the
delivery of letters because the law has awarded it that authority. Dead letters prove that
the system of communication it maintains is instituted, not natural or organic. Yet as
poignant a metaphor as the dead letter office is, the type of discourse that sparks this
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realization is equally important. Jean-Noel Kapferer’s thoughtful commentary on the
desires that circulate rumors is illuminating in this context: "Rumors flourish wherever
we find secrets. Secrecy, like censorship, increases the value of information and leads to
an exacerbation of 'desires to know more.’ As is classic in every market economy, a
shortage leads to a black market, here one of information, a circuit of unofficial,
unguaranteed and unvalidated information, that is nevertheless immediately consumed and
spread to the degree that the need to be informed has been frustrated" (183). Rumors are
one type of discourse in which the performative function can never be subordinated or
obscured by the constative. A rumor can never represent the truth and remain a rumor: it
gains a life of its own outside the imposed system of truth and falsity. No authority, not
even narrative authority, can validate a rumor without changing it. To the institutional
system of meaning making, a rumor should be of little consequence, a dead letter within
official interpretive contexts. But because, as Kapferer argues, its uncertifiable essence is
the catalyst of its circulation, rumors challenge the integrity of that system. Embodying
discourse that can never be verified or authorized, Bartleby is a gentleman forger, as the
grub-man at the Tombs suggests (72). Consequently, the meaning o f his death, the
conclusion of the biography that can never be fully written, must remain suggestive rather
than conclusive. The storyteller's growing sensitivity to language puts him in the
paradoxical position of not being able to announce it. To do so would be to overinsist on
the connection between the signifier Bartleby and all that the scrivener evokes.

Toward the Realist Short Story
Roland Barthes describes the transformations effected on language in the passage
from speech to print: "Wherever there is a concurrence of spoken and written words, to
write means in a certain manner: I think better, more firmly; I think less for you, I think
more for the 'truth.'" Evoking resonances of orality, Irving, Hawthorne, Melville strive
to maintain what Barthes calls the rhetorical "innocence" lost in this desire to capture
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truth, "our blunders, our self-sufficiencies (or our insufficiencies), our irresolutions, our
errors, our complacencies...in short, all the watered silk of our image-repetoire" (Grain 46). In the tale, these signs of contact between a storyteller and an audience establish an
imagined community that resists the anonymity of print. Even in "Bartleby," where the
embedding of narratological issues reflects the realist agenda taking shape in the early
1850s, the oral strand marks an intensely personal recognition. As such, Melville
appropriates the realist device of the narrator-observer to posit an essential thesis of
romance: the only truth that the lawyer can articulate is his rhetorical innocence. As the
short story continues to emerge from the tale, however, the oral strand is typically limited
to pseudo-conversational styles, whether colloquialisms or regional dialects. The overt
relationship between a storyteller and the audience does not establish contact but
reinforces the verisimilitude of the representation. The pivotal difference between the tale
and the short story rests in the cultural authority of the storyteller. The ambivalence
projected by the bachelor narrators arises from their liminal status in a culture where
imagination and fancy are idle leisures. Realists, however, assume greater social
authority by claiming to represent the "real" or "true" workings of their world. Rather
than promote an escape from reality, they uphold its norms. This authority is not
universally distributed, however. The next chapter explores how three women realists,
Rebecca Harding Davis, Sarah Ome Jewett, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, negotiated
their vision of the "real" without alienating the audience.

N otes
1Both Mott (70-73) and Charvat (38-55) offer concise publication histories of
The Sketch Book.
2 Ong describes oral residue as the resonance of spoken language that certain
linguistic features signify (153).
3 Orality was not without its champions, of course. Philosophical and rhetorical
pedagogy celebrated speech as the medium of linguistic immediacy whose truth was selfevident; writing, as a copy or reproduction, distorted meaning because it was more prone
to misinterpretation. Hawthorne’s work resonates with this teaching. While a student at
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Bowdoin College in the 1820s, he studied with Samuel P. Newman, whose treatise, A
Practical System o f Rhetoric, grounded in Hugh Blair's common-sense rhetoric, warns
against the speciousness of writing. Echoes of this bias run throughout Hawthorne's
work {The Scarlet Letter, with its polysymbolic scriptic A), but its most explicit rendering
occurs in the love letters written to Sophia Peabody in the late 1830s: he refers to speech
as "the soul of my thought" that cannot be easily dressed in writing, the "earthly
garments" of language. (See Centennial Edition XIV). This attitude, however, was fairly
restricted. More typically, writing represented "an advance over the spoken, in that it
solidifies by publication what might otherwise remain merely reported and distorted, and
in that it appeals coolly to reason while the spoken, in its very immediacy, is all to prone
to inflame the passions and the desires" (Simpson 56). I should clarify, as well, that
when I speak of "writing" and "textuality" I speak of printed discourse, fully recognizing
that deconstructive critics have dismantled the philosophical differences between speech
and written discourse. Again, I allow the distinction to stand because the differences
were operative in early 19th-century culture. As Ziff argues, Irving identified with
"literate culture," the transitional stage between oral and print culture. In literate culture, a
writer's social authority is a consequence of "rank, learning, or office"; it is "a position
of authority relative to his readership," which is "a determinate body of interested
persons." By valuing ethos, literate culture treats writing as an extension of the oratorical
rhetorical situation. In print culture, however, discourse is depersonalized, "transferring
authority from the speaker to the spoken." The discourse addresses an "indeterminate"
audience "made up of individuals who, by and large, neither kn[o]w nor [live] in
proximity to one another" (90-92).
4 One must be careful not to overstate the suspicion of imaginative literature,
however. Pattee claims, for example, that between 1830 and 18f*), The North American
Review, one of the country's most prestigious journals, reviewed exactly two story
collections, Harriet Prescott's The Am ber Gor&and Sarah Josephine Hale's If, Yes, and
Perhaps {Development 146). Astonishingly, he overlooks reviews of Hawthorne's two
editions of Twice-told Talesin the July 1837 and April 1842 issues, to name but two
obvious examples.
5 As de Stael's equation of "manly eloquence" with writing implies, gender
distinctions likewise permeate these traditions, though the associations are by no means
consistent. We find the feminine alternately mythologized as the truth that orality
embodies and as the figural sophistry of writing. (In Hawthorne's love letters, for
example, Sophia Peabody symbolizes the plenitude of speech). Similarly, masculinity is
at once associated with orality's material presence and with the unemotional reason of the
written word. In "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow," the varying associations can create
opposing readings. Does Ichabod Crane, the idle "man of letters" who loathes farming
and is easily agitated by the tales of the "old Dutch wives," project Irving's anxiety that
authorship is an effeminate profession because its "product" contributes little to his ideal
colonial village? Or does this voracious "genius of famine" who devoures tales symbolize
a masculine principle of commercial consumption whose aggressive individuality is at
odds with the communal identity that orality establishes? The viability of both
interpretations speaks to the historical concurrence of these two traditions.
6 See Michael Davitt Bell (71-77).
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7MiIIer*s biographies of Melville (eponymously titled) and Hawthorne (Salem is
My Dwelling Place) devote a great deal of attention to each writer's bachelorhood.
Banks's article offers the most concise analysis o f Irving's pseudo-flaneur persona.
8Hamilton argues that "sketch writers often elected to emphasize or, at least,
declare a preference for one sort of authority over the other and that these decisions were a
function of the writer’s gender, regional affiliation, race and ethnicity" (299). She
discusses many collections o f tales, including Alice Cary's Clovernook Sketches, Fanny
Fern's Fern Leaves from Fanny’s Portfolio, Caroline Kirkland's A New Home—Who'll
Follow, and Alice B. Neal's The Gossips ofRivertown. She does not discuss
storytelling frames, however.
9 Rubin-Dorsky suggests that the doubtful old gentleman might just be Ichabod
Crane, some years after his encounter with the Headless Horseman: "Having turned into
a curmudgeon, and disturbed to leam both the real events of that fateful night and that he
has now become a figure of comic derision, he insists that the portrait of himself must be
a fiction. Ironically, having once believed in rnagic and the imagination, he now insists
on law and logic. Yet he is still the victim of a joke" (119). Though no textual evidence
substantiates the claim, Rubin-Dorsky makes an imaginative connection that Irving would
appreciate.
,0 Ross surveys these metaphors, showing how they influenced library purchases
(149). Mallioux shows how the metaphor influenced readings of Little Women and
Huckleberry Finn in the postbellum decades ("Eating Books" 132-51).
11 Hedges, for example, complains of this "technical inconsistency" that
nevertheless does not break the "unity of interest and feeling" in The Sketch Book so the
audience "finally wants to read 'Rip Van Winkle' and T he Legend of Sleepy Hollow,' if
not as stories told by Crayon instead of Knickerbocker, then at least as stories that have
touched Crayon almost personally." For Rubin-Dorsky, Knickerbocker reflects different
aspects of Crayon's persona: "Like so many of Crayon's views and notions, the tales
have been picked up along the route of his incessant travels... they assume importance in
The Sketch Book because they are fundamentally expressive o f Crayon's concerns.
Above all, they address the question o f what role the imagination is to play in the life of
an eariy-ninctccnth-cenlury American author" (101). Neither explanation takes into
account the third voice, the salt aud-pepper storyteller.
12See Salmagundi, where Irving's fictional British traveler Lancelot Langstaff
wonders aloud whether "it takes greater ability to mend a law than a kettle...[especially]
laws that are broken a hundred times a day with impunity" (211). For background on
New York’s municipal government during the Irving era, see Hodges' New York City
Cartmen, J667-1850, especially Chapter 9, "Creating Security within the Municipal
Government. 1801-1818" (108-128). Irving's interest in the city itself is traced lightly
but informatively in The Knickerbocker Tradition.
13 Schegloff breaks these operations into three types o f interpretive activities: 1)
the geographical analysis, 2) the membership analysis, and 3) the "topic" or "activity"
analysis in which consideration of "the activities being enacted in the utterance" determine
the frame of reference. The analysis is "relevant to a speaker in building or assembling 'a
topic,' and relevant to a hearer in analyzing what is being talked to, what the focus is...as
a hearer must analyze place formulations to find their relevance, place formulations can be
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used to focus [the] analysis" (105-106). Topic-activity analysis determines whether a
frame of reference is constructed from the speaker or audience's perspective. Because
location formulations are generally used with some consistency, this analysis helps us
establish points of reference to determine the meaning of shifters. Schegloff describes a
number of formulation types: the geographical, such as addresses; the landmark, such as
"beside the school"; and the "course of action place," as in "where the school bus picks
up the kids" (97-99). The most common formulation, however, is based on "relation to
members": "my place" deictics like home, office are examples. These not only suggest
possession but possessiveness: they "have the special character not only of 'belonging
to1the m ember...but such a place is for a member 'where he belongs'" (97). Again, what
topic analysis reveals in "Sleepy Hollow" is an inconsistency in the co-referencing of
these formulations. The shifting frames decenter our sense of speaker- and hearershifters until we find it difficult to position ourselves in one or the other frame. Given
two images of the reader, we must split the difference.
14 See, for example, Monteiro, who discusses the sui generis quality of
"Wakefield" and relates the structural function of the moral to the Jamesian revelation in
"The Beast in the Jungle."
15For background on the New England sermon, see Buell, Literary
Transcendentalism (104-40) and New England Literary Culture (137-92); Gura's
introduction to The Wisdom o f Words also relates oratorical discourse to literary culture
(15-74).
16 Reynolds explores Hawthorne's interest in reform oratory, relating it to his
interest in popular fictions (225-42).
17 Exactly why The Story Teller went unpublished remains a mystery. After
failing to find a book publisher for the project, Hawthorne (through an intermediary,
Samuel G. Goodrich) placed it with the New-England Magazine ior serialization. "The
Story Teller. No. 1" and "The Story Teller. No. 2 ” (now titled "Passages") appeared in
November and December 1835, but the succeeding fifteen pieces appeared without the
intended storytelling frame. Hawthome later blamed editor Park Benjamin for fracturing
the unity of the collection; as Elizabeth Peabody would write, her brother "cared very
little for the stories afterwards, which had their original place in The Story Teller a great
degree of significance" (Conway 32). Adkins and Gross were the first critics to attempt
to reconstruct the unity of the aborted collection. More recently, both Baym (39-50) and
Colacurico (496-522) have attempted to analyze its thematic consistency in relation to
Hawthorne's early career. Because the narrator speaks of writing "Wakefield" while the
Story Teller tales were to have been orally performed, some critics have argued against its
inclusion in the cycle. I think they overlook the point that, as "Passages" reveals, the
narrator is writing the tales some time after they were performed. What is missing is the
scene of the story's performance, the contextual link, that would have incorporated the
tale into the frame. My own reading is indebted to Swann, who reads the performative
aspect of "Wakefield" in relation to Benjamin (185-202).
18The character is exceedingly sketchy in "Passages," but Hawthome later
claimed that the Unitarian evangelist Very Jones was the embodiment of everything that
he hoped to achieve in Eliakim Abbott.
19Cmiel's chapter on the influence of the Biblical style on Romantic language
during the 1820s and 1830s reveals that King James archaisms were considered the
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"epitome of democratic eloquence" because they are derived from Saxon rather than Latin
roots. The style was a controversial topic throughout the first half o f the century as
revisionists like Noah W ebster and Leicester Sawyer produced "modernized" versions of
the Bible that met with heavy resistance (94-122).
20Perluck describes "Wakefield" as Hawthorne's "half-serious self-appraisal both
as man and artist" that exposes "a wry awareness of...the public's smirking derision,
from the perspective of redoubtable middle-class sanity, of the artist's extravagance"
(181-%). His reading is complex and insightful, but he ignores Mrs. Wakefield’s role as
the captive audience.
21 My approach here is based on Charles Fillmore's theory of "case grammar."
As Fillmore and his successors argue, noun phrases serve various roles determined by the
verbs that they modify. An "agent" instigates the action expressed: "Wakefield lies
down." An "experiencer" conveys emotions taking place within a subject: "Wakefield...
discerns..." A "patient" is the thing acted upon: "Wakefield is excited b y ...." All noun
phrases can be assigned a role, not just the subject of the sentence. A "source" is a
location from which something emerges ("In some old magazine or newspaper 1 recollect
a story"), while a "goal" is the direction that a noun phrase moves toward ("He hurries to
his lodgings"). These are deceptively simple examples, however. As "Wakefield is
excited" suggests, role relations are determined by transformation from deep to surface
structure: passive voice turns the agent (sentence subject) into a patient (object).
Similarly, figures of speech like metaphor and hyperbole manipulate roles—inanimate
objects may suddenly possess volition or desire as agents, while humans may become
dumb "forces" that act without conscious will. Fillmore's original terms for the various
roles are by no means universal; mine are drawn from Pratt and Traugott (192-94).
22 M. A. K. Halliday links the ambiguity separating the agent and experiencer
roles to the difference between transitive and intransitive verbs: "the most generalized
pattern of transitivity. ..is one that is based not on the notions of actor and goal but on
those of cause and effect... there is one central and obligatory participant—let us call it the
'affected participant'—which is inherently involved in the process...an intransitive clause
is one in which the roles of 'affected' and 'agent' are combined in one participant" (353).
23 Neither of the two existing biographies of Field discusses his acquaintance with
the Pittsfield literary set, which included not only Hawthome and Melville but Atlantic
Monthly editor James T. Fields and Oliver Wendell Holmes, as well as their wives.
Heniy M. Field includes a chapter describing his father’s vacation adventures in eastern
Massachusetts, but mentions none of the area's famous neighbors (108-18). For a more
current analysis of Field’s life and work, see Van Ee.
24 Herbert F. Johnson describes the Master's responsibilities: "Chancery
proceedings were commenced by filing a bill in chancery with one of the clerks [a term,
significantly enough, synonymous with master]. Precisely how one was appointed to
this office is difficult to determine. It is obvious, however, that the leading attorneys of
the Province of New York functioned as clerks in chancery...[the lawyer] was not
counsel or solicitor for either party to the suit, but all papers in the suit were filed with the
same clerk, who would provide certified copies at a fixed fee per folio page. One is
compelled to conclude that the clerk in chancery was a member of the Bar who made his
office available as a repository for papers in chancery litigation." For a more recent
analysis of equity reform, see Hoffer (91-102).
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^A ustin illustrates his arguments with judicial examples: "it is worth pointing
out., .how many of the 'acts' which concern the jurist are or include the utterance of
performatives" (19). He is also interested in how written law enacts an illocutionaiy
force: "the word 'hereby*.. .serves to indicate that the utterance (in writing) of the sentence
is, as it is said, the instrument effecting the act of warning, authorizing, &c. 'Hereby* is
a use criterion that the utterance is performative" (57).
26 This myth has come under intense scrutiny by the critical legal studies
movement, which applies post-structuralist theories of interpretation to the law. For an
overview of the intersection between literary and legal studies, see Thomas, "Reflections
on the Law and Literature Revival,"
27 Ramon Saldivar applies Austin's theories to Moby-Dick, contrasting the
constative nature of Ishmael's narration with the performative quality of Ahab's
soliloquies in a fashion analogous to my approach. O f special interest is his interpretation
of "The Whiteness of the Whale" chapter, in which Ishmael juxtaposes the beautiful and
horrific connotations of the word "white" in a quest for the source or origin of its
meaning. Saldivar argues that only through contradiction and paradox can Ishmael
recognize a meaning: "The reason...can only be given, it seems, in terms of the symbolic
imagination and its vocabulary of contradiction, of oxymoron. But this language of
oxymoron forms an impasse beyond which constative knowledge cannot proceed. What
we are offered here is the notion of whiteness as of something like a free signifier—it
does not itself refer, but forms the constative essence of signification. Upon its pure
surface, imagination projects the possibility of meaning" (110-55). In my argument,
Bartleby is also a "free signifier." Like Ishmael, the lawyer realizes that meaning is not
"in" a substance but reflected off its surface, a realization that nullifies the socially
imposed distinction between literal and figurative language.
28 The performative utterance and concomittant illocutionary force are the subject
of a famous critique by Derrida, who claims that Austin defines them as an express desire
so that "performative communication once more becomes the communication of an
intentional meaning, even is this meaning has no referent in the form of a prior or exterior
thing or state of things" ("Signature" 322). Austin's text, compiled from lecture notes,
does imply a governing intention shapes illocutionaiy effect, yet it also establishes that
performative and constative utterances are shaped by a social context in which the
individual is but one constituent. For a critique of deconstructive readings of Austin, see
Petrey's Speech Acts and Literary Theory (111-30).
29 For background on disputes between state legislatures and the Post Office,
especially as they affected the delivery of newspapers and magazines, see Kielbowicz.
As his bibliography reveals, periodicals in the early 1850s often reported these conflicts
(not surprising, since their circulation was affected by postage increases). Melville
subscribed to at least one of those periodicals, Harper's, which would subsequently
published many of the tales that he wrote between 1853-56.
30Felman explores the relationship between puns and performative language in
The Literary Speech Act.

CHAPTER 2
HABITS OF STORYMAKING:
WOMEN WRITING REALISM, 1860-1900

As a transitional stoiy, "Bartleby" reveals Melville working the formative con
vention of realism to satisfy his romanticist aesthetic. "Life in the Iron Mills" dramatizes
the tensions between the tale and the emerging short story from the opposite perspective:
Rebecca Harding Davis uses a romanticist device, the emotional appeal, to achieve a
realist's vision. Davis died in 1910, barely two months before the December day that, as
Virginia W oolf would later claim, human character irrevocably changed and the modernist
era began. As a woman writer whose work spans the rise and ebb of 19th-century
realism, she offers a logical starting point for exploring the influence of gender on
storytelling. Her obituary in The New York Times captures the pervasive ambiguity
surrounding "Life in the Iron Mills": "It attracted attention from all over the country.
Many thought the author must be a man....The stem but artistic realism of the picture she
put alive upon paper, suggested a man, and a man of power not unlike Zola's" (13). The
analogy is anachronistic: when Davis debuted in the Atlantic Monthly in April 1861, Zola
was unknown in America. Nor does The Times reveal just who was confused about her
sex. While the story was published without attribution at Davis's request, Atlantic editor
James T. Fields, with a characteristic penchant for publicizing his authors, leaked her
name to the Boston papers. Within a month, Hawthome had sent a congratulatoiy letter,
and both Emerson and Bronson Alcott expressed interest in meeting her. 1 The real
curiosity of the obituary, however, can be narrowed down to one word: the conjunction
that separates "stem" from "artistic realism" and "man of power." If but appears to
bifurcate her achievement, it is because "Life in the Iron Mills" is an oddly divided work.
By "artistic realism," The Times presumably refers to the powerful exposd of working
conditions in Wheeling, Virginia (now West Virginia), the steel town on the Ohio River
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where Davis spent most of her life. By welding documentary details into long, iron-hard
descriptive passages, she forges a startling, sparse style: conjunctive images like "the
pig-pens, the ash-heaps covered with potato skins, the bloated, pimpled women at the
doors" foreshadow the clarity and focus of Walker Evans’s Depression-era photography
(48). Surrounding these images, however, are ornate, emphatic direct addresses char
acteristic of moralistic tales: "Stop a moment. I am going to be honest. This is what I
want you to do. I want you to hide your disgust, take no heed to your clean clothes, and
come right down here with m e,—here, into the thickest of the fog and mud and foul
effluvia. I want you to hear this story" (13). The conjunction that qualifies the
description of "Life in the Iron Mills" in The Times prompts a question: if artistic realism
is a powerful, masculine style, might "stem" imply a woman?
Robyn Warhol has argued that, during the Victorian era, didactic direct addresses
became "gendered interventions," derided as a "woman's strategy, to be applied at
moments when [the audience's] emotional receptivity should be most sensitive, and to be
avoided by practitioners of self-referential 'high art1" (205). By "practitioners" she refers
to William Dean Howells and Henry James, whose storytellers often do openly stage their
narratives. The key phrase is "emotional receptivity": Davis's addresses are emphatic,
while Howells' and James's are rigorously analytical, whether sociologically or
psychologically oriented. Economy here refers to the affective timbre of the address, not
necessarily the convention itself. As Warhol suggests, the gendering of the strategy is
rooted in a distinction between literary and nonliterary language: the former is repre
sentational, the latter pragmatic. Poetic language paints a picture; non-poetic language is
"rhetorical" in the narrow sense that it is the medium of mundane human communication
(192-94). The distinction illuminates the divergence of the short story from the tale.
Throughout the 1850s, editors and critics celebrated realism as artistically superior to the
didactic fiction published in Godey's Lady's Book, the New York Ledger, and other
popular periodicals. The tale had been corrupted by "stereotyped incident" and
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"hackneyed plots," but most of all by "unnatural language" that appealed to "uncultivated
instincts." According to critics, moral edification had severely limited artistic expression.
An entirely new form of short fiction was necessary, one that valued verisimilitude above
all else. 2 While Howells called storytelling "the old trade of make-believe," the province
of minors and "semi-fatuous persons of both sexes," the critical vocabulary more often
draped "unnatural language" in feminine garb. 3 Envisioning his realist advocacy as war,
Howells claimed he was "banging the babes of romance" (qtd. in Cady 1; then as now,
"banging" carried sexual connotations). Yet as editor of the Atlantic Monthly after 1869,
he solicited and published stories by Rose Terry Cooke, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and
Harriet Prescott Spofford, all of whom directly addressed their audience. He also claimed
that the stories of Sarah Ome Jewett and Mary Wilkins Freeman were "faithfuller and
more realistic than those of the men" ("Editor's Study" 640).
If narrative styles did not reflect sexual difference, the gendering of realism must
lie in the articulation of its aesthetics. In the Atlantic, the mode is repeatedly defined as
rhetorical economy: "telling a thing is enough and explaining it too much." By the mid1880s, Turgenev embodies the ideal; he is "a realist in the sense of hiding himself." Yet
realism involves more than simply transcribing events and manners. What makes it
artistic is the "the glamour of romance. ..with which realism does not discord." Accord
ing to James, a writer should explore "the relation between the cultivated fancy and the
visible, palpable facts of the world," one of many early critical comments that reveals
Hawthorne's influence. What critics called "photographic" realism (the harbinger of
naturalism) violated the same taboo as sentimental fiction: in both, storytellers too visibly
manipulated emotions. James twice ridiculed Davis's writing in the late 1860s for its
"injudicious straining after realistic effects which leave nature and reality at an infinite
distance behind and beside them" (qtd. in Davis 133). The statement points to an
intriguing paradox of the era: when stories by women writers lacked "cultivated fancy" or
"poetical insight," they were rejected for being too realistic. Fields asked Davis to revise
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her second submission to the Atlantic, "The Story of To-day," because it "assembled the
gloom" (qtd. in Yellin 166). Horace Scudder, who replaced Howells as the magazine's
editor in the early 1880s, returned "The Yellow Wallpaper" to Charlotte Perkins Gilman
with a terse note: "I could not forgive myself if I made others as miserable as I have made
myself!" (qtd. in Ammons Conflicting Stories, 35). Howells complained of audience
emotions being "rasped and twanged like fiddle-strings by the hysterical performances of
some of our authoresses." 4
"Hysterical" is a telling word choice; as a diagnostic judgment, it alludes to the
emergence of a critical vocabulary rooted in occupational "discursive practices" rather than
the religious institutions from which didactic fiction drew its moral authority. 5 Pro
fessionalization created a culture of experts charged with upholding cultural norms of
reality, whether in science, medicine, law, or journalism. Writing was one of the few
occupations open to women (teaching being the other), yet their absence from other fields
denied them the authority of expertise, which conferred a certain speaking privilege in the
post-bellum decades. Writers may never have enjoyed the prestige or lifestyle accorded
physicians and lawyers, but they claimed the "cultural authority both to possess and to
dispense access to the real" (Kaplan 28). 6 Romanticists like Irving, Hawthome, and
Melville expressed their ambivalence by cultivating liminal bachelor personae; (male)
realists aspired to the status of cultural arbitrators. As Howells would claim, a storyteller
need not "[account] in any way for his knowledge of the facts" (Double Billing 6). The
effect on narrative authority is immense. When realism becomes "a reading for content
that is modeled on reality at the expense of awareness of the signifying system of which
the work is constructed" (Bal 506), the audience is subordinated a priori to the narrator's
vision. Any deviation from the economical norm risks being labeled "supernatural,"
"fanciful," or, more extremely, "hysterical." Because masculine values predominantly
define this model of reality, pejorative terms become associated with feminine
communication styles.
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"Life in the Iron Mills," "A White Heron," and "The Yellow Wallpaper" were all
written for the Atlantic Monthly, the most active promoter of realism during the second
half of the century. Of the three stories, the Atlantic published only "Life in the Iron
Mills," a fact that alludes to the subtle conflicts between their style and the aesthetic
imperatives shaping the magazine's editorial tastes. With different degrees of openness,
Davis, Jewett, and Gilman confront the gender bias separating the "real" from the
fanciful; in doing so, they illustrate the interpersonal function of the direct address. Far
from being an aesthetic lapse, the convention allows storytellers to attract the widest
possible audience, one "having diverse occupations, prejudices, and life experiences, so
that their 'community' depends on the acceptance of their acknowledged differences."
Rather than proliferate a specific vision of reality, these stoiytellers "connect differentiated
groups and individuals. This makes the reading of [the stories] a different imagining
process from one of reading most modem [texts] 'addressed' to readers undefined,
anonymous, and conceived as responding in purely aesthetic terms" (Kroeber 99). Direct
addresses reveal how a story tel ler negotiates rather than assumes narrative authority.
In "Life in the Iron Mills," the narrator interweaves two styles of address
indicative of contemporary masculine and feminine narratives. By "cross-gendering" the
text, s/he links a broad middle-class audience in a communal vision of social progress. In
"A White Heron," the storyteller obliquely addresses the reader but stops short of
invoking the first- and second-person pronouns. Instead, with a variety of more subtle
intrusive techniques (questions, modal hedges, and descriptive detail, devices generally
associated with women's conversational style), she creates a "suggestive" narrative
whose reticence invites the reader's response. "The Yellow Wallpaper" offers the most
complex take on gender and realism due to its founding paradox: it "realistically"
dramatizes a non-rational point of view. Emphasizing a woman's struggle to resolve her
"habit of storymaking" with her husband's restrictive, rational perspective, Gilman
fashions an increasingly unrealistic style that implicitly critiques the assumptions of
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associative logic and reason underpinning rhetorical norms of representation. She
addresses her audience indirectly, provoking a series of interpretive inferences or
"implicatures" through which her voice must be abstracted from her character's.

R ebecca H a rd in g Davis a n d th e C ro ss-G en d ered T ex t
Patricia Yaeger calls attention to the various sociolects in "Life in the Iron Mills"
that dramatize class differences. Representing the pocket, the heart, and the head of the
world, three middle-class men stroll the mill debating the deplorable condition of the
workers' lives. They speak in "several rhetorical modes to dissemble economic distances
that would otherwise be unbearable" (268). Kirby, the son of the owner, exemplifies the
language of laissez faire: "Ce n 'est pas mon affaire. . .The Lord will take care of his own;
or else {the laborers] can work out their own salvation." Dr. May offers Scriptural
aphorisms in a philanthropic spirit. He believes that "much good was to be done., .by a
friendly word or two," but his maxims are compromised by his social status: he "talk[s]
down to the capacity of his hearer." Mitchell, a "thoroughbred gentleman," is the most
problematic, precisely because he resembles the middle-class audience of the Atlantic
Monthly. Educated, artistic, contemptuous of "one-idead men," his "taste, culture, [and]
refinement" allow him to view morality as aesthetics, an intellectual rather than social
issue. He alone recognizes what Hugh Wolfe tries to express in the statue of the korl
woman, but he refuses to articulate the connection that he feels. When pressed by May to
offer the sculptor a pittance of hope or encouragement, he says, "I am not one of them ....
Reform is bom of need, not pity" (38-39). According to Yaeger, Davis uses the debate
between the three men, which runs roughly a third of the story, to dramatize the
"subterfuge" of middle-class language: she "points to the ease with which well-to-do men
and women create figures of speech, and contrasts this glibness with the laborious speech
and the wage labor of the iron workers" (270).
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To not succumb to this "glibness,MDavis's storyteller must qualify the narration.
Yaeger argues that s/he "breaks her own metaphors" and other "rhetorical flourishes,"
ending with an image of the korl woman, the symbol of "the terrible silence within
speech, [of] the blasphemous exclusion [from language] of those who need it most." Yet
Yaeger's own words imply that Davis's "flourishes" have not been broken completely:
the story, she claims, "ends drenched in sentiment, but..." (273). As with The Times
quote, a conjunction is called upon to excuse the style. Other critics have been more
blunt. Robert F. Marler calls "Life in the Iron Mills" "depressing but overwritten" ("Tale"
169), while Josephine Donovan suggests that Davis was susceptible to the "weakening
indulgence" of "romantic hyperbole" (New England33). Sharon Harris, in the most
extensive study of Davis's career to date, argues that the direct addresses are ironic:
rhetorical "exaggeration" is meant to dissuade, not encourage, a sentimental identification
with the laborers. The instinct to justify emotional appeals illustrates how deeply reading
tastes are saturated by realist aesthetics. What goes unexplored is the effect that these
"rhetorical modes" might sway on an Atlantic Monthly readership, which, since the
founding of the magazine in 1857, had been exposed to numerous abolitionist and
suffragist appeals. 7 While these modes may "dissemble" economic differences, they
also allow the storyteller to connect the widest possible audience within a classcircumscribed readership. In other words, if the message is restricted to a single social
group, the narrator does not allow gender to further limit its circulation. S/he creates what
Warhol calls a "cross-gendered" text by mingling narrative styles culturally coded as
masculine and feminine.
Indeed, much of the critical confusion surrounding "Life in the Iron Mills" (its
"stem hut artistic realism") can be resolved by suggesting that it tells two stories
necessitating two styles of address. On the one hand, it is about Hugh Wolfe, an iron
puddler-artist who is wrongly accused of stealing Mitchell's wallet and commits suicide in
prison. His story is a stereotypically masculine narrative of an individual's struggle
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against averse social circumstances to realize "a consciousness of power...free to work,
to live, to love! Free! His right!" (47). The korl woman, with its "wolfish" face, is his
self-portrait. The narrative inteijections that characterize his tragedy are aggressive and
reprimanding: they rebuke the fictional reader, who becomes a character much like
Mitchell, for ignoring the conditions of the workers. According to Warhol, this narrative
stance distances the actual reading audience from the fictional "you": by "[providing] so
much information about the | reader] that the addressee" assumes the dimension of a
character, the narrator "necessarily places a distance between the actual [audience] and the
inscribed 'you' in the text" (29).
Another story deserves telling, however: it centers on Hugh’s cousin Deborah, a
hunchback whose unrequited love dehumanizes her. She looks to Wolfe "as a spaniel
[looks to] its master" (23); elsewhere, she is described as a witch, one of the "fierce
devils [that] whisper in [Wolfe’s] ear," tempting him, like a deformed Eve, to snatch the
delusive apple of a better life. (She steals the wallet that lands him in prison). Yet the
korl woman is a symbol of her longing and desire, too: both possess a "thwarted
woman's form." Wolfe's struggle is a social narrative in which the "vigor of a man"
degenerates into "a meek woman's face" (24). Because Deborah's tale concerns romantic
love, some critics have criticized it for stereotyping femininity by ignoring women's
economic status. 8 Yet inasmuch as Deborah does embody emotions traditionally
associated with femininity, sympathy in particular, she serves an important function: she
acts as the nexus for an "engaging" narrative strategy that encourages us to assume the
role of the fictional reader. As Warhol suggests, "Using narrative interventions that are
almost always spoken in earnest, [an engaging] narrator addresses a 'you' that is
evidently intended to evoke recognition and identification in the person who holds the
book and reads, even if the 'you' in the text resembles that person only slightly" (29).
As Warhol suggests, these strategies were not sex specific in the 19th century, but
she does argue that men tended to distance their audiences while women writers engaged
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theirs (33). There is another sign of "cross-gendering," however: the narrator's identity.
Nowhere is her or his sex announced, which is why I speak throughout of "s/he." Most
contemporary audiences assume the narrator is a woman, much as, according to The
Times, readers in 1861 assumed s/he was a man. Rather than argue whether Davis writes
more like a man or a woman, however, an inquiry into the style of "Life in the Iron Mills"
should center upon the very gender ambivalence that makes it interpretable in the context
of "artistic" (masculine) realism and "stem" (feminine) didacticism. The tonal expression
of this ambivalence can be located in what George L. Dillon calls rhetorical "footings,"
the relative degrees of engagement between the storyteller and the reader that various
linguistic features create. The distancing strategy conveys superiority, formality, and
directness while the engaging mode projects equality, informality, and obliqueness. 9
The tale begins with an aggressive challenge: "A cloudy day: do you know what
that is in a town of iron-works?" (11). S/he then opens a window to document the
tragedy, constantly begging the reader's response: "What do you make of a case like that,
amateur psychologist?.. .You call it an altogether serious thing to be alive: to these men it
is a drunken jest, a joke—horrible to angels perhaps, to them commonplace enough"
(12). As an "amateur psychologist," and later as an "Egoist, or Pantheist, or Arminian,
busy in making straight paths for your feet on the hills" (14), the fictional reader is at
worst indifferent or at best unsympathetic to the characters. According to Dillon, the
more a reader's role is "scripted" in this manner, the less likely the audience feels invited
to "form [its] own conclusions on the matter at hand" (29). Yet the narrator admits
uncertainty about how to tell the story that undercuts the superiority of this initial stance.
Three times in the opening frame s/he characterizes the narration as "idle," a notion that
"comes to me to-day, when from the street-window I look on the slow stream of human
life creeping past" (12). The enslaved flow of the "negro-like river" outside parallels the
"slow stream" of the workers' repetitive lives. But the analogy is too fanciful: the river
"knows that beyond there waits for it odorous sunlight,—quaint old gardens, dusky with
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soft, green foliage of apple-trees, and flushing crimson with roses,—air, and fields, and
mountains. The future of the Welsh puddler passing just now is not so pleasant" (13).
The river can escape the ecological devastation of the steel town simply by flowing on;
the workers cannot. This self-consciousness about technique establishes equality with the
audience. As Dillon suggests, "a Writer’s reference to his own performance can be
equalizing in that he accepts the Reader's judgments and right to criticize" (29). By
admitting uncertainty about the performance, opening the technique to evaluation, the
narrator is vulnerable to the same criticisms applied to the reader.
Sharon Harris reads the references to idleness as evidence of the narrator's
naivete: s/he is "a symbol of the idle lives of those who need not go down into the hellfires of the mill" (31). Elsewhere, however, the narrator assumes an unexpected
solidarity with the workers: describing the mounds of ore refuse that litter the furnace
rooms, s/he says, "Korl we call it here" (24). Obviously, such a blatant identification
with the characters’ world flies in the face of the narrator’s actual situation. S/he, like the
reader, is an outsider. Distance is symbolized by the fact that, throughout the narration,
s/he never leaves the house. The window opened in the first paragraph offers the sole
perspective to observe the laborers. If the sudden assumption of the editorial we seems
oddly transparent in its effort to distance the fictional reader from the workers, the
engaging strategy fills the vacuum by establishing equality with the audience.
As the storyteller invites us to descend into the pits, s/he reveals the purpose of the
story: "I want to make it a real thing to you" (13-14). Making the stoiy real, however,
depends on the reader's ability to "see it clearly," and that implies a recognition that the
narrator cannot control. S/he must exhort the reader to "look deeper"; this imperative
implies that discovery requires collaboration to sculpt meaning from the fragments of this
"half-forgotten story." The rhetoric of "looking deeper," repeated throughout the story,
can be contrasted to the "eagle-eyed reader" that Melville celebrates in "Hawthome and
His Mosses." Melville's "deep diving" reader relies less on collaboration than the

83
discovery of deep significances hidden by the storyteller to deceive the "superficial
skimmer of pages." The deep diver is an ideal reader who is "capable of fully fathoming"
a type of writing "insinuated to those who may best understand it, and account for it."
For Melville, literature "is not to obtruded upon every one alike" (Writings 239-53).
Reading "Bartleby," the superficial reader discovers an incomplete biography, but a deep
diver perceives gaps in the lawyer’s testimony from which symbolic conclusions emerge,
Davis's narrator, on the other hand, insists that writing should be obtruded upon by every
one alike, for what is at stake is a communal vision of reality.
The need to negotiate the real becomes more explicit as Wolfe is tempted
to keep Mitchell's stolen wallet. The direct addresses here assume a sermonic tone,
appealing to a Christian base of authority through Biblical allusion. The power of
observation is linked to spiritual perception: "whatever muddy depth of soul-history lies
beneath [the surface] you can read according to the eyes God has given you " (23). Sub
sequent addresses are even more emphatic: "Be just when I tell you about this night, see
him as he is. Be just,— not like man's law, which seizes on one isolated fact, but like
God's judging angel, whose clear, sad eye saw all the countless cankering days of this
man's life, all the countless nights, when, sick with starving, his soul fainted on him,
before it judged him and this night, the saddest of all" (25-26). Just, judging, judgment,
these cognates form the vocabulary of the distancing strategy. The particular rhetorical
practice invoked here is the jeremiad, a "mode of public exhortation," according to Sacvan
Bercovitch, "designed to join social criticism to spiritual renewal, public to private
identity, the shifting 'signs of the times' to certain traditional metaphors, themes, and
symbols" (xi). By 1861, the American jeremiad had long evolved from a Puritan sermon
into a mode of middle-class social prophecy. While at best pseudo-theological as it was
absorbed into secular discourse, it nonetheless offered a profoundly emotional style of
address for abolitionists, evangelists, and politicians. Bercovitch describes its persuasive
force as "a movement from promise to experience—from the ideal o f community to the
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shortcomings of community life—and thence forward, with prophetic assurance, toward
a resolution that incorporates (as it transforms) both the promise and the condemnation."
The jeremiad is a "ritual of consensus" because it negotiates a vision of reality according
to an ideal grounded in (presumably) shared values. Its strategic maneuver is "affirmation
through lamentation" (203). As part of a distancing strategy, it convinces the audience
that the storyteller preaches to the choir. It is the fictional reader, not us, who has failed
the moral standard. The more the textual "you" is characterized as transgressing these
shared values, the less the real audience is compelled to identify with it. Though the
narrator assumes a superior footing, the distance between the reader and the audience
exonerates the latter from the address. S/he is speaking/oz* rather than to us.
At certain points, the storyteller distances the audience from the reader by
identifying the textual "you" with Mitchell or May. After Wolfe's trial for stealing the
wallet, the doctor reads the report of the iron puddler's nineteen-year sentence to his wife:
'"Scoundrel! Serves him right! After all our kindness that night! Picking Mitchell's
pocket at the very time.'" Mrs. May promptly denounces the "ingratitude of that kind of
people." The storyteller laments the sentence: "Nineteen years! How easy that was to
read! What a simple word for Judge Day to utter! Nineteen years! Half a lifetime!" (51).
"Judge Day," who presides over Wolfe's trial, echoes both "judgment day" and "May,"
equating the doctor's offended philanthropy with blasphemous egotism: he delivers a
sentence that only God can rightfully make, which is precisely what the narrator warns
the reader not to do in the passage previously quoted. May does not "see [Wolfe] as he
his"; he fails to examine the "crime" in the larger social context.
But it is Mitchell who, by sparking the iron puddler's temptation, offers the most
consistent model for the "you." After the three men leave the mill as the furnaces temp
orarily shut down for Sunday morning, Wolfe remains on the cinder-road outside the
works, struggling to understand why he cannot rise above his grimy existence. The
narrator expresses the pain of his situation: "Do you remember rare moments when a
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sudden light flashed over yourself, your world, God? when you stood on a mountainpeak, seeing your life as it might have been, as it is?" (40). Rhetorical questions, as
Dillon remarks, are ambiguous devices. They simultaneously enact superiority and
solidarity: superiority because the narrator is not interested in the question's answer, only
in asserting that Wolfe's confusion is an emotional experience as profound in a laborer as
in an educated, reflective audience. But rhetorical questions also enact solidarity by
appealing to the cultural value placed in that moment of revelation, the Pisgah vision of
instant awareness central to the middle-class Bildungsrotnan, the narrative of development
(29). Its power lies in the positing of typological experience (as Bercovitch notes, Pisgah
is a central symbol of the jeremiad tradition [8]). Wolfe's vision raises a new
consciousness of his "squalid daily life": the coarseness, the ashes, "tonight they were
reality." He sees a vision of Mitchell, "all-knowing, all-seeing, crowned by nature,
reigning,—the keen glance of his eye falling like a sceptre on the other men," and he
recognizes that he, too, shares those qualities. They are not vague ambitions but practical
knowledge: "Through the years he had day by day made this hope a real thing to
himself,—a clear, projected figure of himself, as he might become" (40-41). His vision
is nothing if not the American dream of self-making. Linking Wolfe with Mitchell
through a revelation, the storyteller casts his struggle not as a threat to the middle class but
as a longing for assimilation within it. Describing Wolfe's ambition as "a real thing"
recalls earlier promises to "make [the story] real." What is posited here is not a
documentary reality, not a transcription, but the subtle negotiation of a social reality that
has failed its promise. "Look at me!" Wolfe cries to Deb. "Is it my fault I am no better?"
His frustrated individualism is indicative of the lament. As Bercovitch notes, mid-century
jeremiads typify individualism as "an exemplum of American enterprise" rather than
"something unique [like]...a Byronic of Nietzschean assertion of superiority." The
individual is "a model of progress and control that typifies the society as a whole" (156).
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As an artist trapped in an inhuman environment, Wolfe marks the stalling of that social
progress. The vision of American destiny has failed.
Critics often characterize Wolfe’s temptation as a fall into bourgeois values: in
deciding to keep the stolen money, he abandons his class in a desperate attempt to escape
the "social riddle" of his reality. According to the jeremiad model, however, he fails the
ideal vision of middle-class values. His reality no longer aims toward its providential
promise, but remains static and self-content, grounded in pragmatic justifications. The
conflict between human and divine law at the core of Wolfe's dilemma recalls the debate
over eternal and temporal justice that Melville explores in Pierre. In the fictional pamphlet
"authored" by Plotinus Plinlimmon, Melville laments the "virtuous expediency" that arises
in negotiating the distance between the ideal and the real. But as Bercovitch suggests, the
conjunction in Plinlimmon's title, "ChronometricalsandHorologicals" implies that "we
have access to both | worlds], providing that we embrace the realm of experience while
giving priority, in rhetoric and imagination, to the realm of the ideal" (30). The key
phrase in the pamphlet ("by their very’ contradictions they are made to correspond") marks
Melville's romanticist imagination. The narrator in "Bartleby" does give priority in the
postscript to the ideal, and he gains an intuitive insight (however unspeakable) into the
scrivener's tragedy. The difference between Melville and Davis again rests in their
orientation toward romanticism and realism. For him, "virtuous expediency" embodies
the individual's ethical commitment to an ideal truth that the pragmatic world makes flee
"like a sacred white doe in the woodlands" (Writings 244). For Davis, however, the ideal
represents a civic commitment to the social construction of reality. In terms of the artist’s
narrative, two typological experiences are interwoven. First, we witness what might be
called the last temptation of Wolfe, which illustrates what happens when expediency
offers resolution to a personal dilemma by sacrificing the ideal; and second, the reading
of this story, through which the narrator warns against repeating Wolfe's error through
the distancing strategy. In both, the drama rests on the inexorable gulf between divine
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and human justice. Wolfe recognizes that keeping the wallet does not violate God's law;
as Deborah tells him, it is his right. The recognition arrives "veiled by no sophistry," but
the line is ironic because the storyteller shows the "sophistry" of Wolfe's own thought
creating a private reality. He is blinded by an image of himself "as he might be, strong,
helpful, kindly.... What wonder if it blinded him to delirium,—the madness that
underlies all revolution, all progress, and all fall?" The question leads to the most
complex direct address in the story;
You laugh at the shallow temptation? You see the error in its
argument so clearly,—that to him a true life was one of full
development rather than self-restraint? that he was deaf to the
higher tone in a cry of voluntary suffering for truth's sake than
in the fullest flow of spontaneous harmony? 1 do not plead his
cause. I only want to show you the mote in my brother's eye:
then you can see clearly to take it out. (46)

The terms of the lament (full development vs. self-restraint, higher tones vs. spontaneous
harmony) are exceedingly vague, but they posit a subtle contrast between individual and
social progress. The narrator’s own tone suggests that such a contrast is too easy, too
"shallow," implying that the audience must look deeper to resist forming a judgment on
Wolfe’s temptation. The last line paraphrases Matthew 7:4-5, again dramatizing the
reception of the story as a typological experience; "Judge not, that ye be not judged."
Distance here is an ethical imperative. To "see clearly" we must see Wolfe’s tragedy as a
symbol of a larger social failure in which progress is defined as "fancied rights" and
"dreams of improved existences."
The divergence of the ideal and real is dramatized as Wolfe wanders through the
backyards of the laborers, indulging in a new superiority. This feeling "left him but once
during the night, when, for the second time in his life, he entered a church" (48). For
many readers, the passage marks an explicit rejection of Christianity because a reformer
preaches, "his words pass[ing] far over the fumace-tender's grasp, toned to suit another

88
class of culture" (49). His sermon addresses "the incarnate Life, Love, the universal
man: words that became reality in the lives" of his congregation, showing how a
community negotiates and collaborates on its vision of the real. Wolfe discovers that
these "light-laden words" are ineffectual; the congregation's reality is corrupt because it
offers no space to him. But before the reformer speaks, Wolfe is moved by the ideal that
the church represents: he "forgot himself, forgot the new life he was going to live." It is
the reformer's practice that enforces the class differences.
Significantly, after the scene where May offers his judgment, the distancing
strategy disappears; the narrator does not criticize the reader's judgments. Instead, the
addresses move toward equality by qualifying the narrator's own perspective. This
rhetorical "softening" occurs at an important thematic juncture where Wolfe, imprisoned,
recognizes his own separation, both from Mitchell and, more important, from his fellow
workers and Deborah. One of the most tragic moments occurs when he calls out to the
laborers in front of his cell, only to be ignored: "A longing seized him to be spoken to
once more" (59). Sensitive to this sudden need for contact, the narrator's own language
softens: "he thought it was to be for the last time. For the same reason, it was, I
suppose, that he strained his eyes to catch a glimpse of each passer-by, wondering who
they were, what kind of homes they were going to, if they had children" (58). Wolfe
struggles to make connections, not with people like Mitchell, but with people like himself.
The narrator, too, must make connections; by relaxing the assurance with which s/he
claims to know Wolfe's motivations ("I suppose" as opposed to "I know"), s/he opens a
space for the audience to step in and enact its own identifications. As Wolfe cuts his
wrists with a rasped slice of tin, the narrator tentatively characterizes his thoughts: "I
think in that one hour that came then he lived back overall the years that had gone before.
I think that all the low, vile life, all his wrongs, all his starved hopes, came then, and
stung him with a farewell poison that made him sick unto death" (60). The emphasis here
is on the narrator's own ability to imagine Wolfe’s final thoughts. By not characterizing
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the reader, s/he makes narration an act of empathy, subtly negotiating a joint perspective
on the action.
As Jane Tompkins notes, women writers like Stowe, Maria Cummins, and Susan
Warner (among others) incorporated the jeremiad into their style. The "sentimental
power" of the address was grounded not in the social authority o f Puritan ministers,
obviously, but in an emerging "new matriarchy" in which women embodied "the most
traditional values—religion, motherhood, home, and family" (139-45). I() Davis's use
of the jeremiad, I would suggest, does not fall into this tradition because she does not
reframe its providential sweep into a thematic framework specifically identified with
women's culture (i.e. domesticity). Wolfe's temptation takes shape as a stereotypically
masculine narrative. Deborah's story, meanwhile, is a romantic drama that pivots upon a
variation of the marriage plot central to the sentimental tradition. While other sentimental
tales portray marriage as a reward for virtue, Davis inverts its resolution, turning motifs
of romance into touchstones for the audience's receptivity. However less dramatic than
Wolfe's conflict, Deborah's drama serves as the sympathetic center of the narration. By
emphasizing her ability to make connections and transcend what Luce Irigaray refers to as
"the subordination of the feminine," the storyteller establishes a subtler, more intimate
relationship with the reader (65). 11 When Deborah is first introduced, for example, the
narrator focuses attention on her deformed body. She is "even more ghastly, her lips
bluer, her eyes more watery" than Wolfe's emaciated father, who slumbers on a nearby
pile of hay. Her disfiguration parallels the disfiguration that Mitchell, May and Kirby (as
well as the narrator) observe in the figure of the korl woman. The artistic vanity that
Wolfe embodies cannot admit connections; from his perspective, feminine emotion
disfigures a body. For Deborah, however, the lack of that emotion is disfiguring.
The attitudes of Wolfe and Deborah toward intimacy point to the varying intensity
of the two narrative strategies. Whereas the storyteller emphasizes how Wolfe's hunger
weakens him, making him woman-like, Deborah's condition is obvious and needs no
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elaboration: "She was hungry, — one could see that easily enough" (17). Here there is
no command to look deeper. "One" depersonalizes the reader's identity. No longer
specifying an amateur psychologist or Egoist, the pronoun admits a broader range of
response. By not scripting a reader role, the narrator grants the audience interpretive
space to establish its own connections. This movement towards equality is enhanced as
the narrator speculates why, unlike many of the other workers, Deborah drinks nothing
stronger than ale: "Perhaps the weak, flaccid wretch had some stimulant in her pale life to
keep her up, — some love or hope, it might be, or urgent need. When that stimulant was
gone, she would take to whiskey. Man cannot live by work alone" (17). According to
Dillon, adverbs o f uncertainty like perhaps and speculative phrases like "it might be" are
narrative "hedges." They bring the reader to an equal footing because the narrator does
not dictate the exchange (28). The invitation to speculate about Deborah's character
signals the collaborative moment as narrator and audience investigate, together, her
motivations. In this sense, the aphorism tacked onto the characterization seems ironic,
more indicative of the distancing strategy. As Mary Jacobus has suggested, maxims are
particularly masculine speech acts in their reliance on succinct definitions of truth (42).
Speaking an aphorism about "man" that sounds suspiciously like something May might
say, the narrator dramatizes how authoritarian speech acts distance the audience.
Rhetorical hedges encourage the reader to get beyond Deborah's "thwarted
woman's form" and see that she, too, like Wolfe, has a story, and one that a middle-class
audience should have no trouble understanding: she is unloved. It is not merely that
Deborah's love for Wolfe is unrequited. The point is that Wolfe's pity is patronizing: "It
was his nature to be kind, even to the very rats that swarmed in the cellar; kind to her in
just the same way." This knowledge, the narrator says, "might be that very knowledge
had given to her face its apathy and vacancy more than her low, torpid life" (22). That
suggestion, tentatively voiced ("might"), is reinforced as the narrator argues that
Deborah's story is only superficially separated by class. The knowledge that gnaws her

face is the same "dead, vacant look" that often overtakes the "rarest, finest of women's
faces." Suggesting that her tragedy is unrelated to her class, the narrator can reveal the
source of this tragedy: "one can guess at the secret of intolerable solitude that lies hid
beneath the delicate laces and brilliant smile" (22). Deborah's environment may deform
her more, but the source of that deformity, solitude, is one that threatens all audiences.
This does not absolve the narrator of criticism, of course; love's ability to rectify
"the accident of class" in a woman's life remains a stereotypical representation of feminine
dependence on man. Rhetorically, however, s/he appeals to the possibility of dissolving
class boundaries to recognize a universal humanity and, thus, a stronger potential for a
shared reality. This seems true even at the two most problematic points in the text, when
Deborah reveals why she stole Mitchell's wallet from his pocket and her conversion, after
serving three years as Wolfe’s accomplice, to a life of Quaker restraint. In the first case,
Deborah struggles to explain to Wolfe why the money will change his life. "She was
young, in deadly earnest," the narrator says. "Her faded eyes, and wet, ragged figure
caught from their frantic eagerness a power akin to beauty" (43). This "beauty," of
course, is a quality that the artist Wolfe fails to recognize until now. Deborah refers to the
"witch dwarfs" who haunt the moors. If one gave him money he could go "where t' man
lives that talked to us to-night" (Mitchell, in other words) and "Hugh could walk like a
king!" She identifies with these creatures: "If I were t' witch dwarf, if I had t1money,
wud hur thank me?" Doing so, she represents herself as Wolfe portrays himself in the
stature of the korl woman: as deformed by hunger for human connection.
But Wolfe fails to understand the nature of her hunger: "He thought the woman
mad, tried to check her, but she went on, fierce in her eager haste" (43). Before he can
stop her, the narrator intrudes to redefine Deborah's emotions: "Mad? Yes! Are many of
us mad in this way?" Significantly, s/he does not answer the question, though, one
senses that s/he wants the reader to answer it, privately. Unlike the opening sentence,
this question is not a taunt or challenge. The plural us is a broader, more inclusive
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pronoun than in "Korl we call it here." By not characterizing the reader's response, s/he
allows the audience to overcome the pejorative connotations of witchery and madness by
recognizing the emotional impulse behind Deborah's actions.
The second problematic moment is Deborah's conversion. After her release from
prison, she moves to a Quaker estate beyond the city. "I end my story here," the narrator
says. "There is no need to tire you with the long years of sunshine, and fresh air, and
slow, patient Christ-love, needed to make healthy and hopeful this impure body and soul"
(63). The statement echoes the unwillingness to complete the story after Wolfe’s arrest.
Whereas s/he made that point with a rhetorical question ("You wish me to make a tragic
stoiy out of it?"), here there is no confrontive footing. S/he obliquely represents the act
of storytelling as an encumbrance on the reader. Numerous critics have found the
conclusion impalpable, seeing in the implicit Christian resolution a highly suspect
conclusion to a story so powerfully grim. 12 Such complaints miss the tentativeness of
the narrator's tone: "There may be in her heart some love denied her here, — that she
shall find him whom she lost, and that then she will not be all-unworthy. Who blames
her? Something is lost in the passage of every soul from one eternity to the other, —
something pure and beautiful, which might have been and was not: a hope, a talent, a
love, over which a soul mourns, like Esau deprived of his birthright. What blame to the
meek Quaker, if she took her lost hope to make the hills of heaven more fair?" (64). The
storyteller attempts to identify with Deborah's thoughts. The rhetorical hedges ("there
may be," "something," "might have been") permit the audience likewise to speculate.
Deborah's long stare at the mountains even recalls the narrator's own long stare at the
workers in the opening paragraph. The distance both must overcome is the distance of
identification. For Deborah, it is the need to identify with Quaker doctrine; for the
narrator, it is the need to understand Deborah’s human motivations, to make them real so
a reader like Mitchell cannot reject them for not being common.
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The story ends with the narrator admitting that the korl woman sits in the library,
partially veiled by a curtain: "Its pale, vague lips seem to tremble with a terrible question.
'Is this the End?1they say,—'nothing beyond?'—no more?1 Why, you tell me, you have
seen that look in the eyes of dumb brutes, — horses dying under the lash. I know" (64).
The certainty expressed in this utterance is neither confrontive nor superior; it reveals an
awareness of the connections that s/he has made both with and between the audience and
the characters, a connection forged out of sympathy for both. The "vague, pale lips" that
tremble to speak a terrible question are the narrator's own lips as s/he struggles to tell a
story and overcome a dark solitude: "The deep of the night is passing while I write."
Representing both the artistic longing of Wolfe and the emotional longing of Deborah, the
veiled korl woman becomes an interpretive symbol that the narrator must represent
without fully defining its meaning for the audience. If, as Patricia Yaeger suggests, the
statue represents the "terrible silence" within speech, the veil itself represents the
subjectivity of perception that must give voice to that void. Wolfe fools himself by
believing that he envisions truth "veiled by no sophistry." The concluding frame, by
contrast, implies that the truth is created when one strives to look through it. Davis's dual
narrative strategy dramatizes what Irigaray calls "mimetism," a "play with mimesis" that
uses the dominant mode of discourse (in this case, artistic realism) to recover "a possible
operation of the feminine in language" (the 1-you relationship between the storyteller and
audience). Deborah's story may not be the thematic focus, but her drama allows the
storyteller to recuperate narration from negative connotations of femininity to negotiate a
vision of a new, "cross-gendered" reality. The final sentences of the story capture this
hopeful transition as the sun rises to cast its light across the veiled statue: "Has the power
of its desperate need commanded the darkness away?" Its peculiar appeal rests in the way
that it both seeks and asserts an answer that, once uttered, should seem obvious and
inevitable. The reponse desired is then less verbal than intuitive. As with many rhetorical
devices practiced as the Civil War loomed, the distancing and engaging strategies assure
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the audience that cultural unity can be found even in the face of overwhelming
differences.

Sarah Orne Jewett and the Power of Polite Suggestion
No one ever accused Sarah Orne Jewett of writing like a man. When she
submitted the first of her many contributions to the Atlantic ("Mr. Bruce" in 1869), the
"realistic effects" available to the storyteller had diversified to include couleur locale,
regional imagery distinct from the urban panorama of the Boston-New York literary axis.
While local color now refers predominantly to women writers, the term was less gendered
in the 19th century, applied first to George Eliot's Romola, then to the stories of Bret
Harte, Edward Everett, Stowe (post-{/«c/e Tom), Rose Terry Cooke, Mary Wilkins
Freeman, and Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, among others. 13 What separates this generation
of women writers from Catharine Sedgwick, Hannah Lee, and E. D. E. N. Southworth is
their freedom from what Josephine Donovan calls the "Cinderella script," in which "the
trials and tribulations of a morally pure heroine whose suffering, patience, and endurance
are in the end rewarded with Mr. Right" (Afew England 28). Rather than restrict feminine
identity to a marriage plot, women local colorists focus on female communities whose
dynamics were shaped by the rhythms of domestic ritual. The emphasis on the inner
world of the home led to occasional criticism that they wrote about "safe" subjects, but
Jewett's generation differed from the Howells-James school of realism more in scope
than style. Thus while Jewett's apprentice stories rely on the melodramatic plot twists of
the sentimental mode (death and broken hearts abound), the narrative commentary never
resorts to moral exhortation. Jewett attributed her storytelling aesthetic to her father: "A
story should be managed so that it should suggest interesting things to the reader instead
of the author's doing all the thinking for him, and setting it before him in black and white.
The best compliment is for the reader to say 'Why didn't he put in "this" or "that....
(Letters 100). She took the advice to heart and developed a similar disdain for overt,
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aggressive narrative authority. Late in life she defined her style as "imaginative realism,"
in which a "reticence or bravery of speech," relying on the "power of suggestion," allows
the audience to express the "unwritable things that the story holds in its heart" {Letters
119). Elsewhere she complains that in Jane Austen's writing "all the reasoning is done
for you and all the thinking....It seems to me like hearing somebody talk on and on and
on while you have no part in the conversation, and merely listen" {Letters 135).
Conversation is a central metaphor in Jewett's realism; writing for a small, circumscribed
readership (mainly "highly critical friends in Boston...mostly people who like to be
entertained rather than puzzled" [qtd. in Caiy 45J), she establishes reticence as an inviting
silence, a signal to her audience that storytelling is an exchange.
Jewett's reticent style should be read in the context of what Caroll Smith-Rosenberg calls the "female world of love and ritual" (53-76), an intimate yet formal realm of
mutual support and exchange through which many 19th-century women cultivated their
writing and education. Jewett engaged in a number of affectionate, often romantic
correspondences, most famously with James T. Fields’s widow Annie after his death in
1881. 14 Friendships like this constitute what sociolinguists refer to as a social network,
a speech community that, by virtue of verbal or written interaction, develops its own
codes of conversational propriety. The female world that Smith-Rosenberg describes
developed at a time when scholars, clergymen, and even newspaper editors lamented the
failure of American English to rise above its uncouth, frontier origins and assume the
grace and fluency of the British mother tongue. Kenneth Cmiel has shown how this
debate transformed into a middle-class obsession with politesse. Throughout the postbellum decades, etiquette books, home encyclopedias, periodicals like Godey's and
Harper's, and even daily papers offered advice on "gentle speech," promising genteel
refinement to those fearing the erosion of linguistic norms in the face of immigration,
migration, and ambiguous class stratification (191-205). Those suspicious o f gentility
derided etiquette as a woman's prerogative. Mark Twain, often singled out for his vulgar
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use o f vernacular, wrote a number of anti-suffragist sketches in the late 1860s that parody
politesse as effeminate talk. The most popular etiquette books of the era likewise link
gentility with femininity.

The influence of politesse on Jewett's narrative strategy is

more obvious when compared to Howells's use of the conversation metaphor. For the
editor, criticism is a congenial chat, an opportunity to "sit at fine ease, and talk over...
such matters of literary interest as may come up from time to time." Yet the reader is "not
allowed to interrupt" and "is reduced to silence" (321).
"A White Heron" dramatizes the differences between masculine and feminine
speech styles. The standard reading argues that Sylvia rejects the tempting influence of
patriarchal values ("violence, voyeurism, and commercialism") to embrace those
traditionally associated with feminine or matriarchal culture. 16 Like Deborah in "Life in
the Iron Mills," Sylvia represents sympathy; she even comes to Mrs. Tilley's lonely farm
from "a crowded manufacturing town" not unlike Davis's Wheeling. Deborah is
"deformed" by Wolfe’s emotional opacity, his inability to express anything but pity for
her. The narrator of "A White Heron" likewise implies that a woman's emotions can turn
her into a servant, not a mutual partner. The metaphor of "canine servitude" (Pratt
"Women and Nature," 479) appears in both stories: while Deborah looks to Wolfe "as a
spaniel to its master," Sylvia feels affection for the hunter as "a dog loves." Yet Sylvia,
more than Deborah, perpetuates a world of communicative harmony. She listens "with
comfort and companionship to the drowsy twitter of a half-awakened bird" (795). She
hears the thrushes "with a heart that beat fast with pleasure" (793). Her relationship with
Mistress Mooly the cow also suggests a natural reticence. She ”call[s] Co'! Co'! with
never an answering Moo," letting the animal play its hide-and-seek game without losing
patience. Sylvia's communion with nature is linked to her fear of people. Mrs. Tilley's
farm is a world where the stray cats purr louder than humans dare talk; upon her arrival,
she whispers her joy at not having to interact with people. The natural world operates
according to implicit codes of turn taking. When those codes are ignored or upset, as
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when Sylvia inadvertently prevents a toad from returning to its home under the doorstep
(794), cooperation is threatened, and communication breaks down. The heron, too,
symbolizes conversational propriety. What sends the elusive bird from its perch on the
ancient pine is a "company of shouting catbirds," whose "fluttering" and "lawlessness"
destroy its contemplative peace.
The hunter threatens the integrity of this realm. He appears in the woods with a
"determined and somewhat aggressive" whistle. Though he speaks in a "cheerful and
persuasive tone," always kind and gallant, he frightens Sylvia into an "awed silence."
Invited to supper, he listens eagerly and sympathetically to Mrs. Tilley until, soliciting
sympathy, she tells him about her four dead children and her vagabond son Dan who is
"no hand to write letters" from California. When she mentions Sylvia’s knowledge of the
woods, the hunter loses all empathetic pretenses: "The guest did not notice this hint of
family sorrows in his eager interest in something else" (793). He interrupts the old
woman, turning the conversation to address his interests: how Sylvia might help him
track the elusive white heron. "'So Sylvy knows all about birds, does she?' he ex
claimed, as he looked round at the little girl who sat, very demure but increasingly sleepy,
in the moonlight."
His agenda becomes more apparent the following morning as he and Sylvia search
for the heron. The little girl intuitively walks behind the hunter, refraining from initiating
dialogue: "The sound of her own unquestioned voice would have terrified her, — it was
hard enough to answer yes or no when there was need of that" (794-95). Sylvia's silence
here is far different from her reticence among the thrushes. It is no longer a listening
strategy; the power that the hunter embodies has quieted her. In the dominating medium
of masculine language, a woman cannot help but be hushed, like the very birds the hunter
shoots down.
The semiology of "going gunning" symbolizes this power to silence women.
Emily Dickinson's "My life had stood — a loaded gun," a poem that employs much the
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same imagery as Jewett's story, offers a functional contrast. In both cases, the loaded
gun, an obvious phallic image, represents the logocentrism of masculine language that
controls and limits expression of female experience. By identifying her life through this
symbol, Dickinson's speaker admits not only the appropriation of her speech ("The
Owner passed— identified / And carried me away"), but how her voice now fires upon
other women figures ("And now We hunt the Doe"). The poem suggests that, for a
woman's expression to carry any authority, she must speak with a man's aggressiveness
so that "None stir the second time / On whom I lay a Yellow Eye." O f course, "gunning"
language robs the female speaker of a supportive community. Masculine language may
offer the power to force a reaction from the world, but it deprives her of truly exper
iencing feeling. She gains "the power to kill" only by sacrificing "the power to die"
(369). >7
By contrast, Sylvia's ambivalence toward "gunning" prevents that appropriation
of voice. She may feel a "loving admiration" for the hunter so that "the woman's heart,
asleep in the child, was vaguely thrilled by a dream of love," but, unlike Deborah, her
romantic awakening is not dependent upon a man. Sylvia's climb up the great pine tree is
itself an erotic experience: "There was the huge tree asleep yet in the paling moonlight,
and small and hopeful Sylvia began with utmost bravery to mount the top o f it, with
tingling, eager blood coursing in the channels of her whole frame" (795). Her silence
may be instinctual or self-conscious, but it wins her independence from the alienating
power of masculine representation. It sends the hunter away, disappointed, leaving the
little girl with a "sharp pang," which lasts only momentarily before she becomes again a
compassionate listener: "She forgot even her sorrow at the sharp report of his gun and
the piteous sight of thrushes and sparrows dropping silent to the ground, their songs
hushed and their pretty feathers stained with blood" (797). As a pun, "sharp report"
evocatively fuses the noise of the fired rifle (a noisiness similar to the industrial
cacophony that Sylvia escapes) with the "piercing" mythos of phallocentric language.
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"Sharp report" also alludes to reportage, to the documentary impetus of realism,
commenting in turn on the storyteller's own strategy. To prevent hushing the audience,
the narrator must speak suggestively. The interpretive freedom that reticence offers is
most obvious in the problematic conclusion of the story. Sylvia’s silence is announced in
a series of narrative intrusions in which the storyteller not only tells us that "Sylvia cannot
speak" but adds her own opinion: "No, she must keep silence!" (797). Her presence, far
from clarifying how Sylvia's silence should be interpreted, only muddies the waters
because she never establishes a "footing" between her perspective and the reader's.
While the authority dynamics in the story are apparent, the reader roles that can be
abstracted from the drama are not. Many readings of "A White Heron" argue the
storyteller fashions a shared perspective with the audience: "The narrative voice... claims
to speak for the reader, voicing what should be the reader's thought. This amounts to an
assertion of communion between narrator and reader as we contemplate Sylvia" (Heller
187). 18 The very paradox of "asserting communion" suggests that if the storyteller
voices "what should be the reader's thought" rhetorical suggestiveness has given way to
subtle didacticism. Such generalizations ignore other moments where the reader is invited
to identify not only with the storyteller, but with Sylvia, the heron, and even the hunter.
The stoiyteller may tempt us to sympathize with Sylvia without inviting identification with
her. Identification, in a reading context, is the process by which the audience chooses
which textual personae model the reader's role that the storyteller presumably endorses.
By revealing only bits of information while withholding others, she establishes a
perspective distinct from the reader's without specifying superiority or solidarity. The
multiple roles that result present vastly different implications for construction of an
interpretive stance.
Louis A. Renza outlines one possible perspectival relationship. Reading "A
White Heron" alongside Jewett's biographical novel A Country Doctor, he provocatively
suggests that the narrator assumes a paternalistic stance toward Sylvia. The concluding
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lines that characterize Sylvia’s disappointment in failing to satisfy the hunter (she "could
have served and followed him and loved him as a dog loves" [797]) allude to the
narrator's own stance toward Sylvia. For Renza, this father/daughter relationship, rein
forced not only by a similar reference to "canine servitude" in both the novel and Jewett’s
own diaty (referring to herself and her father), allows Jewett to "elude would-be feminist
and patriarchal ideological conscriptions alike" and produce a self-consciously "minor"
literature that defies institutionalized aesthetic codes, including realism (Minor Literature
73-115). If the narrator is indeed a "father" to Sylvia, the storyteller silences both the
character and the reader much as the hunter silences Mrs. Tilley and Sylvia. In speaking
for the little girl, the narrator does all the thinking, placing the audience in a position of
"merely listening."
This argument is supported by the storyteller's use of the second-person you
when addressing both Sylvia (explicitly) and the reader (obliquely) in the conclusion:
"Now look down again, Sylvia, where the green marsh is set among the shining birches
and dark hemlocks; there where you saw the white heron once you will see him again;
look! look!" (796). The emphatic tone is repeated in the ambiguous final sentence in
which syntactic obscurity creates the illusion of a direct address: "Whatever treasures
were lost to her, woodlands and summer-time, remember! Bring your gifts and graces
and tell your secrets to this lonely country child!" (797). The you is generally assumed to
refer to "woodlands and summer-time." Yet the phrase can also be read as modifying
"treasures" so "remember" functions as an imperative whose implied subject is the reader.
We are asked to tell our secrets to Sylvia, identifying the reader then as the white heron
and, ultimately, recalling the persistent associations between the bird itself and the
protagonist (heron=heroine), identifying us with the little girl as well. Sylvia doubles for
the reader, while the storyteller’s exhortative tone in those two particular intrusions
mimics the parental tone with which the sportsman earlier addresses the girl: '"Don't be
afraid,’ he added gallantly. 'Speak up and tell me what your name is, and whether you
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think 1 can spend the night at your house, and go out gunning early in the morning"1
(792).
Yet the narrator refrains from speaking the "secret" of the story, making the
narrative her own symbolic white heron. Like Sylvia, she "cannot tell the heron's secret
and give its life away" (797). From this perspective, the narrator functions as a
metatextual double for Sylvia, leaving the reader to double for the hunter who,
presumably, is "well worth making happy, and ... waits to hear the story she can tell"
(797). The variety of possible identifications suggests that silence in "A White Heron" is
not an absence of voice. Just as Sylvia's ambiguous motivations are obscured by the
narrative intrusion, so the storyteller's own intentions are obscured. Even when the
narrator speaks, she does not necessarily admit secrets.
The rhetorical devices that create this reticence allow the storyteller to foreground
subtle details that an attentive audience will question. If realism traditionally promotes a
"self-evident wholeness that is not even noticed but merely assumed" (Bal 509), these
devices prevent that assumption of narrative unity, lnterrogatives, for example, highlight
inconsistencies in character. In written form, the question is perhaps the most obvious
syntactic device for "displaying connectedness" (Fishman 236). When the hunter asks if
he might spend the night at Sylvia's house to "go gunning" in the morning, the storyteller
poses two seemingly straightforward questions that ostensibly dramatize the depth of the
little girl's fear: "Sylvia was more alarmed than before. Would not her grandmother
consider her much to blame? But who could have foreseen such an accident as this? It
did not appear to be her fault, and she hung her head as if the stem o f it were broken"
(792). Significantly, these interrogatives are not rhetorical questions like those in "Life in
the Iron Mills." One senses that an answer is expected; having only met Mrs. Tilley
indirectly, we have no reason to assume that she would blame Sylvia for this "accident."
This question becomes an orienting device that helps us "foresee" the oncoming conflict.
Yet Mrs. Tilley fails to blame the child; instead, the hunter awakens the grandmother's
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"long slumbering hospitality." She not only invites him into the house but promptly
begins "gossip[ing] frankly” about the intimate tragedies in her life. In fact, Mrs. Tilley
only rebukes Sylvia when the little girl fails to help the hunter. These questions mixorient
rather than orient us. They subtly call attention to the distance between Sylvia's
perspective and the storyteller's. Indeed, closer inspection reveals that the sentence is free
indirect discourse: the speaker voices the child's point of view without allowing her own
perspective to shape the utterance. For whatever reason, the little girl misjudges her
grandmother’s response, and the questions wam the reader against assuming that the
storyteller wants us to identify completely with the child's perspective.
Subsequent interrogatives also defer interpretive authority. Having climbed the
pine-tree, Sylvia catches panoramic sight of the world beyond Mrs. Tilley's farmhouse.
She sees the church steeples, the villages, and the sails of the ships at sea. The narrator
breaks the drama o f Sylvia's visual rapture to refocus the girl's attention: "Where was the
white heron’s nest in the sea of green branches, and was this wonderful sight and pageant
of the world the only reward for having climbed to such a giddy height?" (796). The
immediate answer is, of course, no, for the narrator tells Sylvia where to look to find the
heron perched on his pine bough. The second half of the question is not so easily
answered, however. The world’s pageant is bound up with the very value system that the
hunter represents, namely the "reward" and the promised ten dollars that he will pay if
Sylvia leads him to the heron's nest. "Reward" calls attention to Sylvia's expectations
toward the bird, which were previously dramatized in her journey through the pasture,
where she no longer embodies mutual exchange as she did in the story's beginning.
Running from the farmhouse to the pasture path, she jars the perch of a sleeping bird.
Although she still listens with "comfort and companionship" to the bird's chirp, she does
not realize that her empathetic existence with the landscape has been upset. A squirrel
scolds her as a "harmless housebreaker"; sparrows and robins "wake and twitter to the
dawn," though Sylvia remains curiously indifferent to them, knowing she must speed up

103
her climb if she is to reach the top bough and make her "project" useful. The storyteller
even voices her own concern in an exclamatory aside: "Alas, if the great wave of human
interest which flooded for the first time this dull little life should sweep away the satis
factions of an existence heart to heart with nature and the dumb life of the forest!" (795).
In order to redirect Sylvia's concentration from the reward, then, the storyteller
must ensure that the child does not send "an arrow of light and consciousness from [her]
two eager eyes" while perched in the bough. To discover the heron’s secret, Sylvia must
return to the state of congenial sympathy with nature that she earlier possessed. The
arrow imagery alludes to the very weaponry that the hunter carries, not only his gun, but
the jackknife that he gives the girl. Sylvia's gaze itself is potentially a weapon to earn her
reward. Yet when the heron leaves it perch, annoyed by the catbirds, the storyteller
describes him as moving "like an arrow presently to his home in the green world beneath"
(796). Here the arrow alludes to the solemn bird’s natural poise and speed, the very
qualities that will be exterminated if the hunter manages to shoot and stuff it. In a
standard reading of "A White Heron," the arrow imagery connects the little girl and the
bird as symbolic correlatives. Yet the storyteller's disparate use of the symbol, once to
imply Sylvia's dangerous attraction to the hunter’s values, once to imply the natural world
threatened by those values, makes such a connection irreconcilable. Instead, the
difference in arrow imagery alludes to the storyteller's subjectivity, undermining the
authority of her question as an orienting device, much as the question itself undermines
our identification with Sylvia. That is, by alluding to inconsistencies in her own
perspective just as she alludes to inconsistencies in Sylvia's, the storyteller warns against
expecting a "reward" from the narrative similar to what Sylvia expects from discovering
the heron.
Modals also enhance the reticence of Jewett's style, much as they introduced a
degree of tentativeness in Davis's engaging strategy. Significantly, in "A White Heron,"
they appear more frequently after the hunter introduces himself, enhancing the contrast
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between the aggressive, "gunning" style of masculine discourse and the more supportive,
interactive female style of conversation, which, beside the hunter’s language, appears
unassertive. In terms of the narrative voice, however, the modals mark the storyteller's
willingness to "hedge" her own representation. As Bent Preisler remarks, the
"tentativeness signals" that modals send imply "that the speaker is not to be held
responsible for the truth of the proposition" (114). Sylvia's struggle to climb up the pine
tree is rich in suggestive possibilities:
The tree seemed to lengthen itself out as she went up, and to reach farther and
farther upward. It was like a great main-mast to the voyaging earth; it must truly
have been amazed that morning through all its ponderous frame as it felt this
determined spark of human spirit creeping and climbing from higher branch to
branch. Who knows how steadily the least twigs held themselves to advantage
this light, weak creature on her way! The old pine must have loved this new
dependent. More than all the hawks, and baths, and moths, and even the sweet
voiced thrushes, was the brave, beating heart of the solitary gray-eyed child.
And the tree stood still and held away the winds that June morning while the dawn
grew bright in the east. (796)

The pathetic fallacy emphasizes the "oneness" with nature that Sylvia's rural values
encourage. But the tree's perspective also provides a dramatic correlative of the
storyteller's own point of view. Indeed, it reveals the narrator's naivete, implying that
she may be an "unreliable narrator." There seems to be no reason, after all, given the
equality between nature and humanity previously established, that the tree would love the
beating heart of a child "more than" the other animals. The "determined spark of human
interest" resonates with the hunter’s own project, one that, obviously, is much more
scientific than compassionate. The sentence that reinforces the paragraph's "pathetic"
thesis ("Who knows") actually subverts it: though the empathetic tone conveys the tree's
total commitment to Sylvia's climb, suggesting a maternal, nurturing nature willing "to
advantage" the little girl, the sentence is properly an interrogative that emphasizes the
subjectivity of the narrator's perspective. In an omniscient narrative stance, the storyteller
would know how each twig supported the girl. Cloaking her uncertainty in an
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exclamatory utterance, the narrator nonetheless de-emphasizes her authority as she speaks
most assertively. She explicitly cues us to her distance from the little girl: "Sylvia's face
was like a pale star, if one had seen it from the ground, when the last thorny bough was
past, and she stood trembling and tired but wholly triumphant, high in the tree-top."
Sylvia's triumph further indicates that her project has distanced her from nature: her
climb is a competition between her and the tree. Similarly, the ascent distances her from
the narrator's own perspective. The descriptive features of that empathy lose definition
and the little girl becomes a "like a pale star" in the storyteller's eye.
One final component of Jewett's technique can be placed in the context of
prospective turn-taking cues: her use of descriptive modifiers like adjectives, adverbs,
and shifters, particularly the definite and indefinite article. Again, these modifiers have
been characterized traditionally as feminine speech. 19 Their luxuriance raises questions
of ambiguous effect. On the one hand, they might limit the audience's responsive space
by overdetermining the narrative picture. Indeed, much 19th-century realist criticism,
broadly committed to telling "the thing as it is," roundly rebuked writers for breaking
narrative economy to indulge in "literary" or rhetorical "flowerings," rebukes voiced in
gendered language. Reviewing Jewett's first story collection, Old Friends and New,
Horace Scudder complained that her style prevented her characters from "act[ing] for
themselves ... at present they cling to her skirts and she leads them about with her" (qtd,
in Nagel 28). But many of Jewett's descriptive devices actually raise interpretive
questions by calling attention to the storyteller’s subjectivity. Mistress Mooly is described
as a "homed torment"; birds say goodnight with "sleepy twitters"; "nodding" rushes
grow in the swamp. Often employed to humanize nature, the adjectives dramatize the
curious idiosyncrasy of the storyteller’s perspective.
Additional cues appear in the adverbs that modify nearly every piece of direct
quotation. Jewett's characters do not merely "speak"; they speak "kindly," "graciously,"
"frankly," "doubtfully," "eagerly" or "desperately." Again, these modifiers are the
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storyteller's evaluation of the speech act; they are descriptive tags that impinge on the
mimetic purity of the dialogue by suggesting that the speech is passing through the
storyteller's perspective as it is "reproduced" in the act of telling. The audience must
reconcile the narrator’s inteipretation with its own sense o f the developing character
dynamics. When, for example, the hunter tells Sylvia and her grandmother that he means
to "get [the region’s rare birds] on my own ground," Mrs. Tilley asks "doubtfully"
whether he cages them up. Of course, the birds are not caged, but stuffed and put on
display. The adverb subtly suggests that Mrs. Tilley knows the answer to her own
question; to some degree, she must be aware that the hunter's presence threatens her
farmland values. This hint recalls Sylvia's worry, noted earlier, that the grandmother
would blame her for bringing the dangerous intruder into their world. Yet nothing Mrs.
Tilley does through the rest of the story is influenced by this realization. She is more
eager to please the hunter than her granddaughter. Mrs. Tilley either forgets what the
young man represents or is simply willing, in exchange for ten dollars, to compromise
her principles. Either way, with one discreet characterization, the storyteller hints at a
hidden depth in an otherwise stagnant or flat character.
No element of the story better symbolizes the narrator's suggestive reticence than
the white heron itself. Indeed, the incongruous details that invite the reader to fill the
textual silences begin and end with the difference between a white heron, as the title
insists, and the heron, as it is referred to throughout the story. More than one reader has
inadvertently spoken of "The White Heron"; even as scrupulous a critic as F. O.
Mathiessen misread the title. 20 The confusion arises because the bird is discussed in
decidedly singular terms, as that heron, as it. The hunter initiates the ambiguity: "I
caught a glimpse of a white heron three miles from here on Saturday, and I have followed
it in this direction. They have never been found in this district at all. The little white
heron, it is" (794). Not indigenous to the district, the bird is a refugee, a lonely exile
much like Sylvia, pursued by a predator as it struggles to find contemplative peace and
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security. Its mythic elusiveness leads Sylvia to think of it as the heron. She remembers
"that strange white bird" she once approached in the swamp. The storyteller directs
Sylvia's attention to "a white spot of him like a single floating feather" that grandly flies
with "steady sweep of wing and outstretched slender neck and crested head" (796).
The storyteller then provides one detail that neatly, subtly encapsulates the
suggestive nature of her narrative method: "The heron has perched on a pine bough not
far beyond yours, and cries back to his mate on the nest, and plumes his feathers for a
new day!" (796). There is no further reference to the mate. Neither Sylvia nor the
storyteller comments on its presence, so there is no way of determining whether this
second bird is also a white heron. (White herons, or snowy egrets as they are more
commonly called, occasionally crossbreed with the little blue heron species). Marvel
ously understated, the detail is a narrative luxury seemingly inconsequential to the
thematic meaning; it creates what Barthes calls I'effetdu reel, a "referential illusion" that
substantiates the aura of the "real." The truth could not be otherwise, however the white
heron that Sylvy watches may be a white heron, for two of them may sit in the pine, one
on the bough and one in the nest. Just as, for Barthes, denotation of reality necessarily
gives way to connotation in the interpretive act, the presence of the mate is there solely for
the audience, a "secret" waiting to be perceived ("Reality Effect" 141-48). As an obvious
figure for the text itself, the heron(s) symbolizes the multiple meanings of the story. The
difference between "The White Heron" and "A White Heron" is the difference between
one story and countless stories, the difference between a Howellsian monologue and a
more interactive dialogue. The "secret" that the narrator cannot speak, in as much as
secrets can be spoken, is the indeterminacy of the text. The question "Who can tell?" is a
gesture of sharing. It encourages the reader to answer, simply and confidently, lean.

108
Charlotte Perkins Gilman:

"The Yellow Wallpaper" and "Implicature"

Unlike Jewett, Charlotte Perkins Gilman cared little about politesse. She wrote to
preach: "If it is literature, that is an accident" (qtd. in Lane 155). In the case of "The
Yellow Wallpaper," the didactic impulse is understandable given its autobiographical
genesis. In 1887, Gilman (then Charlotte Stetson) borrowed a hundred dollars and
entered a Philadelphia sanitarium operated by Dr. Silas W eir Mitchell, a neurologist
practicing an immensely popular curative for physical exhaustion. Gilman sent the doctor
a list of her symptoms: depression, anxiety, and occasional uncontrollable outbursts.
Having already treated two of her cousins, he promptly dismissed the letter as "selfconceit." Though the majority of his patients were women, the doctor was neither
sensitive nor objective. (Coincidentally, he treated Davis for a similar bout of exhaustion
in the mid-1860s). In his major critical treatise, Fat and Blood (1877), he describes
hysterics as "the pests of many households.. .who furnish those annoying examples of
despotic selfishness, which wreck the constitutions of nurses and devoted relatives, and
in unconscious or half-conscious self-indulgence destroy the comfort of everyone about
them" (226). His parochial bedside manner was not atypical. While the etiology of
hysteria included a wide range of physical ills, symptoms were generally classified by
personality traits; even speech patterns that struck a physician as incoherent,
impressionistic, or overly emotional were routinely interpreted as nervous exhaustion. 21
According to Gilman, the treatment was designed return the patient to "as domestic a life
as possible." She was confined to bed, isolated from everyone except the doctor and his
staff, hand fed, massaged, and, in all likelihood, given thrice daily enemas. After a short
time, she returned home. "Have but two hours’ intellectual life a day," Mitchell
prescribed for continued recuperation. "And never touch pen, brush or pencil as long as
you live" (qtd. in Lane 120-21).
But Gilman did touch pen, finding in work a routine far more therapeutic than the
enforced passivity of the rest cure. After divorcing her husband and moving to

California, she fictionalized her experience in the powerful story of a woman incarcerated
by her physician-spouse. Yet if she intended to preach, the resulting story is hardly
didactic in tone. Presented as passages from an unabridged diary, the text lacks a
storytelling frame that would dramatize its transmission. Unlike James's later The Turn
o f the Screw, whose ambiguities bear a passing resemblance to Gilman's story, there is
no fictional audience whose reading offers a model o f reception. The only reader
addressed is the generic "you," interchangeable with "one," an abstraction that deper
sonalizes the woman's obsession with the wallpaper: "You think you have mastered it,
but just as you get well underway in following, it turns a back-somersault and there you
are. It slaps you in the face, knocks you down, and tramples on you....If you can
imagine a toadstool in joints, an interminable string o f toadstools, budding and sprouting
in endless convolutions — why, that is something like it" (518). By deleting all signs of
reception, Gilman takes realist objectivity to an extreme: there are no obvious clues of an
authorial consciousness through which the representation filters. The diary is a "found"
text addressed to no one. The diarist even speaks of writing on "dead paper," evoking the
"dead letters" that Bartleby carted to the flames. The contrast is important. "Bartleby"
marks a movement toward a realist style by positing a narrator-observer who testifies,
without pronouncing judgment, to his true encounters with the scrivener. The meaning(s)
of Bartleby's abjuration must be inferred from the lawyer's own struggle to read the
scrivener. "The Yellow Wallpaper" foreshadows modernism by immersing us in the
perceptual immediacy of the woman's consciousness. In the absence of an overt,
objective rhetorical stance, the narration resembles what Barthes calls a "writerly" rather
than "readerly" text: interpretation is less an act of decoding than o f composing the
significance. 22 By deferring so much authority to the audience, Gilman’s method would
seem to violate her professed intent.
The reception history of "The Yellow Wallpaper" illustrates the consequences of
this inteipretive freedom, for the stoiy was not widely read as social criticism before its

Feminist Press edition in 1973. As Gilman notes in her autobiography, audiences
congratulated her for conveying mental deterioration with such verisimilitude; detractors
wondered whether she insulted those struggling "against an heredity o f mental
derangement" (Living 120; emphasis added). In other words, the woman's breakdown
was interpreted as a consequence of her personal pathology. Few recognized that John
the husband drove her crazy with his oppressive rest cure. Even an explicit reference to
Mitchell went unnoticed. Instead, the story was read as a horror tale. Gilman publicly
revealed its autobiographical roots in a 1913 article published in Forerunner, a newspaper
that she edited. She wrote it "to save people from being driven crazy," she announced,
adding, ironically perhaps, that "it worked" ("Why I Wrote" 20). She repeated her
didactic claims several times before her death in 1935, even limiting her ideal readership
to a specific audience: "One girl reads this, and takes fire! Her life is changed. She
becomes a power—a mover of others—I write for her" (qtd. in Allen 145). But while
Gilman herself was recognized as an authority on household management, publishing
several works on domestic science and women’s economics, "The Yellow Wallpaper"
was largely ignored. Howells reprinted it in an anthology of horror stories in 1920, its •
only appearance in a book for more than fifty years. If Gilman hoped to prompt a debate
about the medical establishment’s treatment of women, why make the story so
ambiguous?
Wai-Chee Dimock has suggested that the story presupposes a reader "whose
sanity and rationality are the very credentials by which she can diagnose the ailments of
the characters.. .someone...always granted a clear knowledge, both of the 'reality' of the
wife's madness and of the 'reality' of the marital situation." Perhaps then a more explicit
storytelling frame would make this reader too visible a presence, allowing the audience to
merely mimic rather than assume, without narratorial prompting, this "clear knowledge."
The difference between the interpretive postures points to the pragmatic function of the
narration. For Dimock, Gilman posits an ideal reader "with a specific and historically
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recognizable profile, created in the image of professionalism at its most idealized,
endowed with the sacred attributes of specialized knowledge and interpretive
competence." As she notes, the identity o f this reader hardly matches the historical profile
of the "girls" that Gilman aspired to address. The identity gap between the ideal reader
and historical audience informs the text with a "transformative agency [that has] the power
to produce effects," namely to imbue in the audience the interpretive power that the
woman, in the story itself, is deprived. To achieve this, the "literary form ...
compromises a network of knowledge between author and [audience], a network
maintained largely at the expense of the characters in the story" (611-15).
One obvious site of this network are "double-voiced" utterances in which the
narrator's explicit meaning seemingly clashes with the values of the implied author that
we slowly abstract from the stoiy: "John laughs at me, of course, but one expects that in
marriage." In its fictional context, the confession resonates with defeat and resignation, a
stoic recognition that within her marriage the only reward for self-expression is ridicule.
Certain audiences, however, will recognize an ironic inflection; many people, after all, do
not expect to be laughed at in marriage. (Sadly, some do and will not sense irony).
Anyone familiar with the autobiographical background of "The Yellow Wallpaper," in
fact, will find it difficult to believe that Gilman would endorse such an assertion. H. P.
Grice offers a helpful interpretive model for illustrating how we deduce a meaning only
implied by the surface semantics. He argues that conversational interaction is governed
by an implicit principle of cooperation: we generally conform to "the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk-exchange in which [we] are engaged" (7). When statements violate
this contract, we subject them to a general series of cognitive operations, which Grice
calls "implicature." The audience resolves the violation by inferring an implicit meaning
and assuming that the speaker is willing to continue cooperation. Irony arises when a
speaker flouts the "maxim of quality," that is, s/he violates the inherent agreement that
s/he will not knowingly say something that s/he does not believe. 23 Grice's model helps

112
illustrate why Gilman would choose to address her audience through implication: by
flouting the predominant norms of associative logic and reason that define late-19th
century rhetoric, she undermines the very standards that distinguish "reality” from
"fancy," norms in turn employed to diagnose hysteria. 24 If, as Elizabeth Ammons
argues, the subject of the story is "writing as a subversive act, as a dangerous move
because it threatens the system of control constructed to contain women" (Conflicting
Stories 38), Gilman's subversion lies squarely in a paradox: she "objectively" represents
a fanciful perspective, collapsing the distinction separating them.
In a literary context where so much interpretive authority is deferred to the
audience, implicature blurs the roles between storyteller and reader. This blurring is
figured into the thematic unfolding of the story itself, but in reverse. That is, the
narration, by prompting continual inferences, encourages the audience to assume the role
of the teller, while John pressures his wife to abandon her "habit of storymaking." Extant
criticism often argues that "The Yellow Wallpaper" is an allegory of gendered reading:
John’s authority as both husband and doctor limits the woman's interpretive freedom. 25
But rather than simply "read" the wallpaper, the woman, at least at first, tries to invent a
narrative to solve its mysteries. Storytelling is vital to her mental health. As she reveals
in one passage, she has long overcome fear by creating fanciful tales: "I used to lie awake
as a child and get more entertainment and terror out of blank walls and plain furniture than
most children could find in a toy-store. I remember what a kindly wink the knobs of our
big, old bureau used to have, and there was one chair that always seemed like a strong
friend. I used to feel that if any of the other things looked too fierce I could always hop
into that chair and be safe" (515). Narrative is a coping strategy: imagining knobs as
eyes and chair arms as kindly hugs allows her to naturalize phenomena and assume
responsibility for her reality. In coercing his wife to check her "imaginative power," John
demands that she see reality from a far more terrifying perspective: one that she must
simply accept.

The eyes formed by the bureau knobs highlight the ocular imagery prevalent
throughout the story. The woman first imagines the wallpaper as two bulbous,
unblinking eyes that scrupulously stare at her with "impertinence" and "everlastingness,"
mirroring the intensity of her own gaze. The scene is pivotal for determining how the
woman gauges her relationship to the wallpaper, the text that she authors. Richard
Feldstein has compared the mirror gazes to the "intrapsychic splitting" of Lacanian
meconnaissance or miscognition. For Lacan’s infant who sees itself in a mirror, the
"spectral" or "Ideal I" first envisions itself as an imago with "the armour of an alienating
identity," an autonomous, unified self, which is a fictional construction sanctioned by the
reality of a body. Later that "specular I" is deflected into a "social I" that misidentifies
itself with images of other subjects. The mirror stage thus ends in "paranoiac alienation,"
which, at its extreme, Lacan equates with obsessional neuroses like hysteria (269-79). In
the previous chapter, I suggested that the gaze structure illustrates the reader's perspective
on the metafictional staging of "Wakefield." The mingling of agency and affectivity that
Hawthorne achieves with his oracular syntax dramatizes an ambiguous transfer of
narrative authority. In "The Yellow Wallpaper," meconnissance highlights the splitting of
the woman's identity into non-negotiable subject and object roles. She identifies the
imago on the wall both as herself ("I wonder if they all came out of that wall-paper as I
did?" [522]) and as the other ("I pulled and she shook, I shook and she pulled and before
morning we had peeled off yards of that paper" [521]). Implied in this second
identification (symbolized by we) is the woman's imaginary audience, the fictional you to
whom she narrates. She identifies with you : "I never saw so much expression in an
inanimate thing before, and we all know how much expression they have" (515). As she
becomes increasingly incapable of distinguishing/from the other, referring to her image
in both first and third person, you is addressed more frequently: "You see I have
something more to expect" or "And I’ll tell you why — privately..." As "privately"
implies, the narrator imagines her reader as the other, an audience to whom she can tell or
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narrate events. In the final journal entries, however, you becomes an actor, embroiling
her in a narrative that she does not author: "But I am securely fastened by my well-hidden
rope — you don't get me out in the road there!" (522). You is a storyteller with the
authority to dictate her actions.
The story line that she does gradually concoct for her imago is restrictive and
limiting, revealing the strictures placed on her own powers of invention. She is
fascinated as the figure becomes many women, yet she is increasingly unable to construct
a unified story. The paper controls her: "But nobody could climb through that pattern —
it strangles so" (520). The images that she sees are shaped according to the bars on the
windows, and she is forced to read rather than author them. Yet, as a subsequent entry
makes clear, imagination can slip through the bars. The wife sees the creeping woman
outside: "I see her in that long shaded lane, creeping up and down. I see her in those
dark grape arbors, creeping all around the garden. I see her on that long road under the
trees, creeping along, and when a carriage comes she hides under the blackberry vines."
The scene mirrors an earlier description of the garden and the shaded lane. In that
passage, she establishes an implicit contrast between her perspective and John's. One
window offers a "lovely" view of the bay and a wharf; the other looks over "mysterious"
arbors, "riotous" flowers, and "gnarly" trees, the modifiers highlighting the richness of
her imagination. Here she dreams that people walk freely, but in the later entry the
escaped woman now hides, "humiliated" at thought of being seen in daylight. She tries to
resolve the conflicting perspectives by taking in the entire panorama: "I often wonder if I
could see her out o f all the windows at once. But turn as fast as I can, I can only see out
of one at one time" (521). Either she can abandon her perspective and assume John's or
she can maintain her own. In the first case she remains imprisoned in a mode of
expression that robs her of her meaning-making faculty; in the second, she speaks in a
style that her husband deems unhealthy.
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She tries to ignore the window ("I don't like to lookout the window even — there
are so many of those creeping women, and they creep so fast" [522]), then, in an
equivocal gesture that frustrates critics, she tears down stretches of the wallpaper. Unlike
Davis's storyteller, who veils the korl woman to acknowledge the inevitable coloring that
perspective brings to language, the woman denies her linguistic subjectivity. Identifying
with the creeping woman, she becomes a character in her own narrative: "I wonder if
they all come out of that wall-paper as I d id ? ... I suppose I shall have to get back behind
the pattern when it comes night, and that is hard!" (522). The story ends with what critics
typically refer to as a dubious victory. The woman does exert control of her own
narrative by forcing John to find her creeping along the smooch in the wall because "I
want to astonish him," yet that creeping remains a "humiliating" posture. The extent to
which the woman identifies her fictional reader as her author, as John even, is apparent
from her final words as he faints from shock: "I've got out at la s t... in spite of you and
Jane. And I've pulled off most of the paper, so you can't put me back" (513). The line
echoes a previous address to you ("you don't get me out in the road there!"), identifying
the addressee with the authority who limits her writing.
By portraying a woman denied the right to tell stories because narration, as an
exercise of the imagination, deviates from reality ("the old trade of make-believe," as
Howells called it), Gilman suggests just how oppressive a rational point of view can be.
Far from relaxing the wife, John's treatment exacerbates her nerves by forcing her to face
a world robbed of narrative. The woman's transformation from writer to reader is a
process that the text rhetorically prevents from occurring to its audience. The secret
network established with the implied author centers on certain discourse markers that
convey and sanction a communal sense of the "real." The phrase o f course, for example,
appears in "The Yellow Wallpaper" more than a half-dozen times. Typically, it asserts a
non-negotiable statement; the speakers priori establishes his/her norm of perception as a
standard, not allowing an opportunity to disagree. Yet the very need to assert non

116

negotiability undermines its effect; in this sense, o f course conveys vehemence and
tentativeness. As M. A. K. Halliday remarks, "The importance of modal features ... lies
in an apparent paradox on which the entire system rests — the fact that we only say we
are certain when we are not" (qtd. in Preisler 181).
An obvious example of this (un)certainty occurs when the woman questions
John's diagnosis. She wants to leave the "haunted house," but he flatly refuses: "I
cannot possibly leave town just now. O f course, if you were in any danger, I could and
would, but you really are better, dear, whether you can see it or not. I am a doctor, dear,
and I know" (517-18). He silences her with the illusion of superiority that o f course
fosters. It allows him to bind her to his authority, cowing her into agreement: "So of
course I said no more on that score," she admits at the end of the journal entry (518), But
John's utterance undermines itself. He must "repair" the impression of selfishness by
asserting his concern for his wife ("if you were in any danger, I could and would"). The
need to qualify his apparent self-centeredness raises the question of whether staying in the
rented home is merely a convenience or whether he believes the cloistered environment
has improved her condition. The issue is irresolvable, however, because an objective
view of John is never offered. The author flouts Grice's "maxim of quantity," by not
providing sufficient information to interpret his utterances in the manner that realism
demands. He is condescending, authoritarian, and undoubtedly a bad physician, but the
central question surrounding his character goes unanswered: is he conscious o f the
maliciousness of his treatment or does he believe that he has his wife's best interest at
heart?
For the diarist, o f course is a sign of perspectival confusion: "John does not
know how much I really suffer. He knows there is no reason to suffer, and that satisfies
him. Of course, it is only nervousness. It does weigh on me so not to do my duty in any
way!" (514). It signals her tentative self-diagnosis but reveals as well the influence of
John's conviction that she creates her own symptoms. In attempting to resolve the two
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perspectives, she asserts her opinion less forcefully than she asserts her husband's. O f
course reveals an intense attentiveness to the structure of her own talk as she attempts to
arrive at some conclusion regarding her health. In this sense, it marks a "self-repair"
similar to John's use o f o f course. Just as that repair called attention to the psychological
motives behind John's act, so, too, this one signals the subtlety with which the author
portrays the woman’s conflict. Her condition is not "only nervousness" because every
other detail suggests that her health is in serious danger. Again, the voices of the narrator
and implied author clash here as we recognize the statement as untrue; the author is
flouting the maxim of quality. Doing so, she alludes to the depth of the conflict in a
manner that, were it more explicitly detailed, we would merely witness, not create
through inference.
As the story progresses, o f course marks a turn away from her perspective toward
John’s. Significantly, this transformation suggests that she assumes her fictional
audience will side with her husband: "I cry at nothing, and cry most o f the time," she
says. "Of course, I don't when John is here, or anybody else, but when I am alone"
(516). The modal emphasizes her awareness that she can only express herself in private,
away from John, who would ridicule or dismiss those tears as nervous agitation. In a
subsequent journal entry, she recognizes that because she occupies the nursery, her infant
child is spared the misfortune of being haunted by the wallpaper "I never thought of it
before, but it is lucky that John kept me here after all, 1 can stand it so much easier than a
baby, you see. Of course, I never mention it to them any more — I am too wise, — but 1
keep watch of it all the same" (517). "I am too wise" reinforces the air of superiority that
o f course rhetorically intones. The woman has learned to keep her thoughts private, but
her expression of those thoughts indicates that she has absorbed more of John's style of
interaction than she may be aware.
Despite these differing uses of o f course in the characters' utterances, the audience
recognizes that the author places an ironic stress on the modal that distances her from the
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characters, forcing us to infer what she implies. Its final use echoes its first appearance in
this sense. When the woman contemplates jumping out the window, she says, "But I
wouldn't do it. O f course not. I know well enough that a step like that is improper and
might be misconstrued" (522). Conveying the imprisonment of her limited options for
self-expression, the statement sounds too self-aware for the character, especially in a
scene where she crouches and creeps endlessly along a smooch in the wall. In the voice
of the author, however, the statement intones a wicked awareness of the woman's limited
options. Even as drastic a step of self-determination as suicide does not allow the woman
the authority to author her life. As a bad reader, John would never recognize his own
complicity in the act.
If o f course signals the conflict between John’s oppressive perception and the
diarist's style of self-expression, and and but convey the effect of her breakdown. Their
usage falls under Grice’s "maxim of manner" (because conjunctions structure units of
information into sequences) and the "maxim of relation" (because they signal a relative
willingness to share "the floor"). Gilman exploits the coordinating function of and
through repetition and contrast: "My brother is also a physician, and also of high
standing, and he says the same thing. So I take phosphates or phosphites — whichever it
is, and tonics, and journeys, and air, and exercise, and am absolutely forbidden to
'work' until I am well again" (512). In the first sentence, the details form a sequence of
accrued information intended to convince her to trust the accuracy of John’s diagnosis.
Not only does her brother have an immediate personal connection to the patient, he is also
a doctor, and also well respected in the community, and if his diagnosis matches John's,
she has little reason to question her treatment. This is the basic function of and", it
organizes idea units to create the illusion of progressive logic. The author can question
the apparent logic behind such sequencing by parodying the form in the second sentence.
The ands that link different ingredients in her treatment do not mark any obvious
progression but display an appalling randomness; the repetition infuses the utterance with
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an air of exasperation that dramatizes her lack of control over both her treatment and selfdetermination, which is further emphasized by the ironic quotation of "work." The rapid
movement from phosphites to tonics to air and exercise reveals how she has been
overtaken and acted-upon by the medical diagnosis.
While undermining this coordinating function, she simultaneously exploits the
conjunction's interactional function. And typically silences an audience by signalling the
speaker's desire to continue the unfolding sequence. But as the woman's utterances
increasingly fail to conform to a logical order, and appears more frequently in her journal:
''Of course I don't [cry] when John is here, or anybody else, but when I am alone. And 1
am alone a good deal just now” (516). And here marks another "self-repair," a
clarification of the previous statement that conveys her desperate need to create "a real
earnest reasonable talk" that will please John. Increasingly, however, conjoined
sentences neither form a sequence nor revise an earlier statement: "It is getting to be a
great effort for me to think straight. Just this nervous weakness I suppose. And dear
John gathered me up in his arms, and just carried me upstairs and laid me on the bed, and
sat by me and read to me till it tired my head" (517). Linking phrase upon phrase here
allows Gilman to create the illusion of a rambling speech style: it dramatizes the woman's
frenzied need to get the ideas on paper before John catches her writing. In subsequent
passages, this need is projected against the imaginary audience. The conjunction silences
the fictional you before it can interrupt: "I think that woman gets out in the daytime! And
I'll tell you w hy—privately—I've seen her!" (520).
Karen Ford has pointed out that but, "the conjunction of contradiction," appears in
T h e Yellow Wallpaper" fifty-six times to symbolize the "unheard of contradictions" that,
for her, symbolize the relationship between male and female discourse. Because the wife
cannot speak without her husband contradicting her and asserting his diagnosis, she
inadvertently begins checking her own imagination, censoring her expression: "every
time the narrator speaks, she is interrupted and contradicted until she begins to interrupt
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and contradict herself." For Ford, interruptions and contradictions dramatize the
narrator's verbal imprisonment in male-dominated language, symbolized by the wallpaper
itself, which possesses "the capacity to contradict and immobilize the women who are
trapped within it" (311).
The conjunction also performs a number of functions that suggest the diarist does
tentatively assert herself. In many passages, but establishes an implicit contrast between
John’s diagnosis and her own:
John is away all day, and even some nights when his cases are serious.
I am glad my case is not serious!
But these nervous troubles are dreadfully depressing.
John does not know how much I really suffer. He knows there is no
reason to suffer, and that satisfies him.
Of course, it is only nervousness. It does weigh on me so not to do my
duty in any way. (513-14)

The second sentence is ironic: the storyteller flouts the "maxim o f quality" because the
audience assumes that the wife's case is indeed "serious." But helps establish that,
regardless of what John says, the narrator does indeed suffer. Without but, the
contrastive value between the two sentences would be lost. O f course, this subtle self
exertion is immediately lost as o f course "hedges" her self-expression. Had a second but
been inserted between this sentence and the subsequent confession ("It does weigh on me
so"), her self-diagnosis would be more assertive. Without it, however, the contradiction
is truly "unheard."
One function of but then is to mark the tension in the character's developing self
conception. By implying this tension, the storyteller signals these complexities without
intervening in the text and destroying the realistic illusion. The audience must account for
the connections made between sentences. An example occurs at the beginning of the
story's third section:
I don't know why I should write this.
I don't want to.

121
I don't feel able.
And I know John would think it absurd. But 1 must say what 1 feel and
think in some way — it is such a relief.
But the effort is getting to be greater than the relief. (516)

Both conjunctions dramatize the wife's commitment to her self-expression and her
awareness that the commitment itself may be affecting her health. The very energy that it
takes to express her depression makes her sicker.
The most complex functioning of but to differentiate the woman’s perception
from John's occurs in the final, climactic section of the story. Here the conjunction helps
dramatize the woman's breakdown between her identity as storyteller and reader. Critics
are often hard pressed at this point to account for the text's production. As the narrator
herself implies, she has stopped writing in her journal, yet the narration continues. This
"unfolding in an impossible form" is linguistically highlighted in the text by tense shifts
(Triechler 73). Moving from a past tense description of events to a present-tense
declaration of action, these shifts generally pivot on the conjunction:
Jennie looked at the wall in amazement, but I told her merrily that I did it
out of pure spite at the vicious thing.
She laughed and said she wouldn't mind doing it herself, but I must not
get tired.
How she betrayed herself that time!
But I am here, and no person touches this paper but me, — not alivel
(522)

By betrayal, the wife refers to her suspicion that both John and Jennie have become as
fascinated with the wallpaper as she has. She does not realize, or does not admit, that
their amazement results from their concern with her fascination with the pattern. By
paraphrasing Jennie's response, the author can install a conventional use of the
conjunction to emphasize the degree to which the wife's usage flouts the maxim of
relation. In Jennie's discourse, the contrastive value functions as a marker of order:
sympathizing with the wife's distaste, she can admit a similar inclination. Recognizing
the extent of the wife's obsession, however, allows Jennie to warn the diarist about
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exhausting herself. The narrator's use of but in both cases is somewhat different; In this
first instance, the clauses do not merit contrast; they are not connected in any cause/effect
fashion that would require setting them up against each other. The final use of the
conjunction is the most important, however. Again, there seems little contrast value in
linking them with but. Its use here is a vivid instance of self-revision. It shifts the wife’s
perception to her present-tense condition, focusing her concentration on her goal: tearing
down the paper.
At least three other instances of this last type of flouting occur in the section. In
all three cases, the conjunction marks the woman’s reorientation from narrating to acting,
dramatizing the blurring of roles between storyteller and reader. As if denying the
richness of her imagination, she provides a sequence of unconnected, stark descriptions
of the room whose contents have been removed as the family prepares to leave the
ancestral halls:
1 quite enjoy the room, now it is bare again.
How those children did tear about here!
This bedstead is fairly gnawed!
But I must get to work.

Her work—throwing the key to the locked door out the window, tying herself to the bed
and then attacking the wallpaper—is a vivid inversion of the constructive work of writing
that John denies her. Instead of imagining her fancies, she now acts them out at the same
moment that she narrates them. But marks her reorientation away from the job of
describing to the job of acting.
The conjunction appears one final time in the narrator's closing words to
emphasize the author’s flouting. John breaks into the room and promptly faints when he
finds his wife creeping: "Now why should that man have fainted?" she asks. "But he
did, and right across my path, by the wall, so that 1 had to creep over him eveiy time!"
(523). "But he did" is realist reporting at its most economic, and the transition into that
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stance from the narrator's question reveals an author flouting the distinctions between
subjectivity and objectivity. Quite simply, John has become the object of his wife’s
diagnosis. The final words of the story suggest that, far from being a stable norm against
which fancy might be defined, realism itself is a form of hysteria, arising out of a
desperate need to authoritatively document the world without admitting subjectivity. 26

Toward the Modernist Short Story
By eliding signs of an authorial consciousness telling a story, Gilman fore
shadows the perceptual impressionism that, in the early 20th century, becomes the
hallmark of modernist storytelling styles. What links her to realism is the pretext of diary
writing, which stages the unfolding of the text as a document intended for transmission.
The fictional you addressed by the wife dramatizes the situation of all storytellers who
appeal to an audience existing only in the imagination. Like Davis and Jewett, Gilman
manipulates this second-personal pronoun to renegotiate the prevailing norms of the real,
norms that limited female expression in the late 19th century. Davis and Gilman conceive
of storytelling as a political enterprise, an exchange meant to effect a particular change.
Jewett is less of an activist, but the metaphor of conversation by which she defines her
vision of narrative is equally at odds with the objective imperative of realist aesthetics.
For all three writers, representing the real involves more than transcribing the world into
words. Reality requires consensus.
Gilman presages modernism in another important way. When she revealed the
autobiographical origins of the story in "Why I Wrote The Yellow W allpaper’" in 1913,
publicity had become an accepted form of news, creating celebrities out of public figures
whose personality merited detailed analysis. That same year, Gertrude Stein was the
subject of a "profile" in a magazine called Arts and Decoration, published to
commemorate the Armory Show, the controversial exhibition that first exposed
modernism to American audiences. The article draws an extended analogy between Stein

and artists like Picasso and Matisse whose work she collected: "She has taken the
English language and, according to many people has mis-used it, or has used it roughly,
uncouthly and brutally, or madly, stupidly and hideously, but by her method she is
finding the hidden and inner nature of nature" (qtd. in Mellow 172). The threat posed by
Stein's "method" is greatly exaggerated in the article, for at the time she was better known
as an art collector than an artist. Her short-story cycle Three Lives (1909), whose
publication she had financed, generated lukewarm reviews, with one critic referring to her
as a "fine realist," perhaps the only time in her career she would be accused of that. The
"many people" who claimed that she abused the language refers mainly to her brother
Leo, with whom she shared the increasingly famous atelier at 27 rue de Fleurus in Paris
until the previous year. Written by her good friend Mabel Dodge, the article was
conceived specifically to publicize Stein, and it worked. A New York Times reporter,
Carl Van Vechten (who would become a crucial supporter), quickly dispatched an article
on her, and within the year, both the Chicago Tribune and the publishing house Putnam's
satirized her style—this at a time when her work was virtually unavailable. Stein called
the publicity "la glorie," thinking it would attract commercial publishers and a wide
audience. Instead, more than twenty years would pass before her readership approached
the disproportionate amount of press that she received. The next chapter explores how
the publicity phenomenon influences an audience's interpretation of a story. As
interviews and profiles popularize an authorial persona, style becomes less an expression
of community experience than a manifesto of singular consciousness. The result is a
prevailing paradox of modernism: in stories by Stein, Ernest Hemingway, Djuna Barnes,
and Richard Wright, the authorial ethos offers an abstract substitute for the narratorial
function that modernist styles typically elide.
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N otes
1Davis's memoirs of meeting the Concord literary coterie are uncharacteristically
humorous: she recalls Hawthorne rolling his eyes at Alcott's "orotund" talk and Oliver
Wendell Holmes's affection for tombstone inscriptions (Bits 30-31).
2 Both of Marler's articles explore the emergence of a realist aesthetic in the era of
the didactic tale. "From Tale to Short Story" offers an important survey of the critical
patterns generated in the rise of the mode. Unfortunately, his own distaste for the
"decadence" of sentimental and didactic literature does not allow him to evaluate fairly the
contemporary social function of these modes.
3 Women realists frequently satirized the didactic tale because its exhortative
narrative stance perpetuated insuperable sexual stereotypes by idealizing femininity as
virtue incarnate. Rose Terry Cooke, a leading local-color writer, parodies this moral
pragmatism in "Miss Muffett and the Spider" (I860). Writing "in the author-itative
plural," the editorial "we" recasts the Mother Goose nursery rhyme as a didactic allegory
on proper female behavior. The satire is as acid as Twain's portrait o f Emily
Grangeford’s poetry, replete with exclamatory declarations of intent: "I am going to write
a story, instead of a treatise solemn and staid, a story illustrative of a distich of Mother
Goose—not, oh! not after the faithless fashion o f 'him who told the wondrous tale’ of
Mother Mary—a prophecy that indicates to the philosophic mind the reign of that sen
sational periodical, The Daily Ledger. .." (764-71). The analogy between typological
narratives (a common variety of the tale) and nursery rhymes reveals just how tenuous the
religious authority that informed didactic storytelling was in the eyes of many realists.
4 Quotations not parenthetically cited are from the Atlantic Monthly and, unless
otherwise noted, are drawn from Helen McMahon's study, which remains the best survey
of the magazine's critical tastes. As her index reveals, the magazine reviewed a
disproportionate amount of novels compared to short-story collections.
5 Definitions of 19th-century realism are notoriously diverse and varied, denoting
either a style or a school. Though objectivity has long been associated with Zola and
scientific detachment, American realism defined itself against the sentimental tradition
before discovering continental models like Flaubert and Zola in the 1870s. See
Habegger, for example, who argues that James and Howells suffered a "sissy" selfconsciousness as male writers in a profession dominated by woman. Their rigorous
aesthetic declarations thus mark an attempt to make literature a more masculine enterprise
(103-12). Coultrap-McQuin's Doing Literary Business examines the cultural status of the
professional woman writer in the postbellum era, focusing on authors all but ignored in
the 20th-century, including E. D. E. N. Southworth, Sara Parton ("Fanny Fern"), and
Mary Abigail Dodge ("Gail Hamilton").

6 Felman offers an illuminating description of the patriarchal assumptions that
circumscribe the real from the fantastic: "realism postulates a conception of 'nature' and
'reality' which seeks to establish itself, tautologically, as 'natural' and 'real'...nothing is
less natural than this frontier that is supposed to separate the 'real' from the 'unreal' and
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which in fact delimits only the inside and outside of an ideological circle: an inside which
is inclusive of 'reason' and men, i.e. 'reality' and 'nature'; and an outside which is
exclusive of madness and women, i.e. the 'supernatural' and the 'unreal.'" For Felman,
realism not only exiles women from reason to the supernatural; it also reduces her to "a
spectacle, to an object which can be known and possessed" ("Women and Madness" 6,
9). In a similar vein, Wilson examines the influence of American professionalization on
the realist style, focusing on "popular naturalism," a direct, aggressive, self-consciously
masculine style that defined itself against a feminine literary style (1-62).
7The politics of the Atlantic Monthly deserves a more comprehensive telling than
it has received. Mott devotes only scattered paragraphs to its liberal orientation (American
Magazines: 1865-85, especially 90).
8Fetterley, for example, dismisses Deborah as an artistic failure because her
presence suggests that "women's hunger for love may be denied or fed, but whether their
life turns tragic of joyous bears no relation to their class" (Provisions 312).
9 Dillon defines footings as a complex register of linguistic markers, including
interrogatives, modals, and pronouns, that constitute a stance toward the reader. He
describes addresses as varying degrees of "engagement" ranging from romance to
combat. His scale encompasses five planes, which extend the typical stylistic
descriptions beyond vague, conceptual terms like "intimate" and "authoritative." The
peculiarities of each register will become more apparent throughout my reading; for now,
I simply list the polarities that define the planes: impersonal vs. personal, distant vs.
solidary, superior vs, equal, confrontive vs. oblique, formal vs. informal.
10In her chapter on Uncle Tom's Cabin, Warhol defines the sermonic direct
addresses as part of the engaging narrative strategy because the invocation of "you,"
"thou," and "ye" make a "general appeal to the reader’s presumed experience of emotions,
in order to render more immediately present the feelings" of the characters. What makes
Stowe's novel a "cross-gendered" text are more specific addresses to readers that reveal
the narrator staging the text (101-15). I have redefined Warhol’s categories to better
illustrate the split between gendered narrative and gendered style in "Life in the Iron
Mills." Unlike Stowe, Davis does not distance her real-life audience to signal irony. I
associate the jeremiad with the distancing strategy because the scripted role of the "you"
encourages the audience to identify with the storyteller's "we." While distanced from the
fictional reader, we are incorporated in the narrator's ideal community.
11 Davis's engaging strategy foreshadows the social feminism of orators like
Frances Willard, who did not address millennial subjects but spoke on domestic,
women's issues. Campbell argues that Willard, whose popularity as leader of the
Woman's Christian Temperance Movement postdates "Life in the Iron Mills" by some
twenty-five years, exploited the paradoxes of "feminine feminist" and "womanly
rebellion" by celebrating the centrality of stereotypical feminine virtues to American
culture, thus unobtrusively campaigning for suffrage and educational rights: "Seeing and
hearing Willard, her audiences — male and female — must have believed they could have
it all: femininity and reform, successful female leadership which affirmed true
womanhood and separate spheres" (130). Davis and Willard both wrote for The
Congregationalist, a conservative, anti-suffrage Boston paper, which suggests how their
attempts to rewrite femininity within pre-existing cultural contexts severely limited their
thinking on women's issues. They were mutual if somewhat distanced admirers. Willard
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apparently found Davis's essay "In the Gray Cabins of New England" a bit too
aggressive in its emphasis on social rather than spiritual salvation for the unmarried
village women condemned to "drudgery." Davis was not too offended, however. She
included Willard in a list of major female reformers in Bits o f Gossip. See Harris (262,
291).
12 Coppelia Kahn, in a review of the Feminist Press edition, refers to the book's
"sole weakness" as its "doctrinal, Christian answer" ("Lost and Found” 117).
13 The

gendering of local color remains controversial. Douglas argues that
women regionalists retreated from the professional gains achieved by sentimental writers,
helping the male academy diminish their centrality to American realism. Donovan,
meanwhile, sees local colorists as establishing a new "women's literary realism" that
recuperated female protagonists from the limiting plots of the sentimentalists while
expanding representation of the domestic sphere to issues other than romance (1-7). Alice
Hall Petrey inverts the definitional dichotomy (particular vs. universal) that separates local
color from realism, arguing that regionalist social manners are symbolic of universal
humanist values (111-26). Habegger excludes local color from the realist tradition
because of its "deep rejection of the contemporary world" in favor of pastoral nostalgia,
which precludes it from analyzing the present-tense "social world" on which Howells
focused (104-105). Buell sees local color as a transition between romance and realism,
noting that its "syrupiness" was exactly the quality that masculine realists dedicated
themselves to eradicating from narrative style (331). Transitional definitions imply that
realism evolved beyond local color when the truth is just the opposite: many
contemporary writers are literary descendents of Haite, Jewett, and Cooke. What
sanctions the exclusive association between local color and women writers is its detail and
scope, which suggests the private rather than public sphere. Schor explores how detail
traditionally has been associated with a feminine aesthetic.
!4 An unexpurgated edition of Jewett’s collected letters remains to be printed. The
first published version, edited by Annie Reids, was heavily edited to remove references
to the erotic nature of the Jewett-Relds friendship. See Donovan, "The Unpublished
Love Poems" (107-17). Cary’s 1967 edition is a vast improvement but excludes
numerous letters not owned by Colby College.
Kasson's Rudeness and Civility emphasizes the influence of gender on
etiquette more the Cmiel's Democratic Eloquence. For contemporary readings of gender
and sociolinguistics, see LakofPs Language and Woman's P la ce; Coates's Women and
Society; Priesler's Linguistic Sex Roles in Conversation; and Cameron's Feminism and
Linguistics.
15

16 Representative essays include Ammons's "The Shape of Violence in Jewett's
'A White Heron'"; Griffith; Held; Brenzo; Caiy, Sarah Orrte Jewett; and Mathiessen
(145-46). These are merely a,sample of the many that make similar arguments.
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17 Singley explores the similarities between the two poems through the paradigm
of initiation rather than language (36-47).
18 Heller's argument is echoed by Atkinson (71-4).
191 refer here to a long debate over whether women employ rhetorical hedges
more frequently than men or whether this "voluble" tendency is a social stereotype. Otto
Jesperson, one of the earliest historians of language use, argued that female speakers used
adverbs of intensity like "so" because "women much more often than men break off
without finishing their sentences, because they start talking without having thought out
what they are going to say" (215). The obvious sexism of such an assertion only points
out the paucity of its own logic. Yet many linguists with a specifically feminist
perspective have committed similar errors of generalization. Robin Lakoff, for example,
is routinely criticized for suggesting in that women indulge in "empty" adjectives because
of a socialized inferiority complex. In her more recent work, she discusses the
controversy. See Talking Power.
20 See Mathiessen (14546); Schakford (363); and Habegger (104-5,372),
among many others.

21 For an overview of how diagnostic practices constrained women's social roles,
see Smith-Rosenberg's " The Hysterical Woman: Sex Roles and Role Conflict in
Nineteenth-Century America," in Disorderly Conduct (197-216). Shapiro offers a booklength examination of the very unobjective methods the medical established used to
diagnose hysterics.
22 I borrow Barthes's distinction between the "readerly" and writerly texts
liberally, recognizing that, for him, the latter offers inteipretive freedom from an authorial
consciousness, allowing the audience to enjoy the textual erotics. My own sense is that,
in American more than France, audiences have been taught to read to deduce authorial
intent, or at least to attach a greater amount of importance to it.

23 Grice illustrates his maxims with general statements of principle. Quantity rests
on two cooperative agreements: "make your contribution as informative as is required"
and "do not make your contribution more informative than is required." The second
category, quality, concerns the truth value of the speech act and is based on the
presumption that speakers neither say what they believe is false or assert truths for which
they lack adequate evidence. Relation, the third category, operates according to a single
maxim: "Be relevant." Finally, manner, the fourth and final category, concerns how the
speech act is communicated and conforms to traditional rhetorical principles: avoid
obscurity, ambiguity, be brief and orderly. Grice delineates four ways in which speakers
may fail to fulfill a maxim: either they may unintentionally violate a conversational
postulate or simply opt out, or a speech act may force a clash between two conflicting
maxims. Finally, and most importantly, they may flout a maxim, by which they
"blatantly" fail to fulfill the CP, though, unlike the other three ways of failing to fulfill the
maxims, flouting does not jeopardize the cooperation principle. According to Pratt, even
when a fictional speaker opts out, violates, or clashes maxims, we interpret the failure as
the author's intentional flouting: "In order to cooperate as the literary speech situation
requires, the reader confronting a violated maxim in a literary work must interpret the
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violation as being in accord with the 'accepted purpose or direction of the exchange' in
which he and the author are engaged. The reader must assume that regardless of what the
fictional speaker is doing, the author is observing the [cooperative principle]...
consequently, when a fictional failure fails to fulfill a maxim, it will usually be the case
that the author is implicating things in addition to what the fictional speaker is saying or
implicating" (Speech Acl 198-99).
24 For background on 19th-century rhetoric in general, see Nan Johnson,
especially 191//.
25 See Kolodny, "A Map for Misreading"; Triechler; Fetterley, "Reading About
Reading." More recently, these readings have been critiqued for promoting an essentialist
view o f gender. See Haney-Peritz; Jacobus, "An Unnecessary Maze of Sign-Reading";
Lanser, "Feminist Criticism, T he Yellow Wallpaper,' and the Politics of Color in
America"; and Dimock.
26 Diamond makes a similar point in regard to realist theater (59).

CHAPTER3
CULTIVATING VOICES:
REPORTING SPEECH AND THOUGHT IN MODERNISM,
1908-1940

During Gertrude Stein's triumphant 1934-35 American lecture tour, a group of
envious Hollywood moguls asked how she managed to generate such favorable publicity.
"By appealing to a small audience," she replied (Everybody's Autobiography 284). The
comment illuminates an important paradox defining narrative authority in post-realist short
fiction. Stein invokes here a cardinal tenet of modernism: art is autonomous from mass
culture, transcending the historical conditions of its origin through radically experimental
techniques that create a self-sufficient, anti-communicative aesthetic medium. Modernists
themselves, however, were adept at manipulating the burgeoning phenomenon of pub
licity, appropriating a range of emerging journalistic forms (the "profile," the gossip
column, the interview) to popularize their agenda if not their art. 1 Shrewdly recognizing
the media's attraction to provocative personalities, Stein parlayed the persona of a
"difficult" writer to wide recognition—to the point where she was better known than her
work. While supporters and detractors debated her merits in the large-circulation press,
those same publications consistently rejected her work, with only Vanity Fair exposing
her to a wide audience. While a Saturday Evening Post subscriber would have to wait
until 1938 to read a contribution from her, that same reader likely knew more than a
decade earlier how Gertrude Stein was supposed to sound. By the mid- 1920s, style
became a synecdoche of personality so that "voice" was nearly as recognizable as physical
appearance. Stein was dubbed the "Mother Goose of Montparnasse" because she
practiced an instantly identifiable brand of "baby talk,"

because she served as

expatriate mater to all those "young men of twenty six" who flocked to Paris to write
under her tutelage.
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Of course, this self-conscious autonomy from America's mass readership often
masked desires for the fame that publicity promised. Before the breakthrough of The
Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas (1933), Stein claimed that she was "working for what
will endure, not a public"; yet, for more than a decade, she had deluged the Atlantic
Monthly with submissions, testing the patience of editor Ellery Sedgwick, who claimed
that America lacked a sympathetic "literati or illuminati or cognoscenti or illustrissimi" to
understand her writing. "You could not even find a handful of careful readers who would
think that it was a serious effort," he added (qtd. in Mellow 347). (A few years later,
when Sedgwick agreed to excerpt Toklas in four installments, he expressed relief that "the
real Miss Stein" had pierced her "smoke-screen"). Hemingway was never interested in
the glory of avant-garde obscurity. He modelled his earliest work on the slick formula
fiction of The Post. In Paris, he placed the stories collected as In Our Time with local
literary journals like transatlantic and This Quarter only after they were rejected by com
mercial magazines. Between 1925 and 1930, arguably the apex of his career, he placed
only one story in a prestigious mass-market periodical ("Fifty Grand," published by the
Atlantic in July 1927); most appeared in the medium-circulation Scribner's Magazine, the
house organ of his publisher. Only in the 1930s, long after "fame became of him" (as
Archibald MacLeish wrote), would Cosmopolitan, Esquire, and Ken offer the lucrative
remuneration that F. Scott Fitzgerald had been earning from competitive periodicals for
more than a decade.
Neither Djuna Barnes nor Richard Wright achieved the celebrity status of Stein
and Hemingway, but their work was equally identified with their public personae.
Barnes appears in 1920s gossip columns as a caustic, cerebral wit, far too smart and
artistic to appeal to the American "booboisie." Reviews of her two original story collec
tions, A Book (1923) and A Night Among Horses (1929) reinforce the image: they
complain of stylistic excesses and undue morbidity, accusations often leveled at
"bohemian" artists. Her critics failed to recognize the influence of the metropolitan New
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York dailies for whom she began writing in 1913; between 1916 and 1920, when she left
America for a twenty-year European exile, the New York Morning Telegraph Sunday
Magazine alone published nearly two dozen of her short stories, giving her the largest
readership she would ever achieve. As Douglas Messerli writes, the impressionism that
foreshadows her masterpiece Nightwood (1936) was entirely compatible with the sensa
tionalism of the dailies: "The very qualities which help to make these tales seem so
eccentric—the use of flat, stereotyped characters, the narrational intrusions, and the
emphasis on unresolved narrative action—may have as much to do with where or when
Barnes published them as with any decision to write peculiar or obscure fictions" ("The
Newspaper Tales" 16-17). Literary myth also has it that, once in Paris, Barnes made a
self-conscious distinction between journalism and fiction; yet her contributions to Vanity
Fair and Smart Set are no less experimental than the work published in the little maga
zines. Only after she abandoned journalism altogether (when she left Paris in 1932) did
she lose access to a mass audience. Wright was just beginning his literary apprenticeship
at this time. Long before publishing his first major story, he crafted a Marxist literary
aesthetic that he called "personalism," a testimonial stance in which "personal protest"
would "seek to make those who come into contact with it take sides for or against certain
moral issues" (qtd. in Fabre 143). Wright's own migration from the Jim-Crow South to
the urban North became the formative topic of his early work, not only his stories, but the
political essays and reviews that he contributed to New Masses, Saturday Review o f
Literature, and Harper's, which often read like excerpts from his autobiographies.
Fiercely protective of the intellectual property in his work, he redressed critics who misin
terpreted his intentions, publicizing his social and artistic aims through press releases and
lecture tours. Unlike Hemingway, he often rejected lucrative theater- and movie-adaption
deals that failed to guarantee him artistic approval over the final product. He even
parlayed the controversy surrounding his novel Native Son into a wider celebrity when
he starred as Bigger Thomas in the 1950 film.
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For at least one critic, short-story writers were particularly susceptible to the
publicity phenomenon because of an unholy dependence upon the periodical industry,
both commercial and avant garde, which had a financial stake in cultivating "name"
authors. In The Dance o f the Machines (1929), Edward J. O'Brien draws an extended
analogy between the machine and the American short story, arguing that the industrial
ization of literary form places an undue emphasis on style. As editor of the Best Short
Stories series from 1915 to his death in 1941, O'Brien was an influential historian and
advocate of short fiction. In 1923 he included Hemingway’s "My Old Man" in his
anthology (even dedicating the volume to him) though the story was previously
unpublished. By the end of the decade, however, he regarded the short story as a
"mechanistic structure." "The American short story is impersonal," he writes. "Like the
machine, [it] manufactures ’types,’ and it is the recognition of these ’types’ which
appears to give pleasure to the reader.” The magazine trade traps quality writers into
perpetuating a product: "If the American short story writer achieves a satisfactory
mechanical product which the magazine of large circulation finds acceptable to its
advertisers, he is not allowed to practise literary birth control....The most popular writers
of short stories in the most popular American periodicals have a definitely recognized
pattern from which they do not widely depart. It is known as their ’style.’" O’Brien adds
that "many talent artists who honestly believe that they are doing their best and frequently
are doing so" become trapped in this quest for a marketable style (124-25). His critique
includes subtle references to Sherwood Anderson, a "promising American writer who had
a passion for Turgenev...[but who] has now given up writing short stories and is a
’publicity expert’" (152-53) and Hemingway, whose "earlier sensitiveness to character
has become strangely blurred...he has lost much of his economy of statement" (138).
For O'Brien, a storywriter's need to advertise his/her style is symptomatic of a cultural
obsession with "veneer," the "deft, slick patter" that gives "flavor" to the product: "I have
come to be suspicious on principle of storywriters who talk too much about their art.
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After a few years, their stories become rather like D. A. R. culture and apples from
Oregon. Apples from Oregon are huge and have a wonderful polish, but apples of
humbler size and appearance have a better flavor. The most highly flavored American
short stories appear to be coal tar products" (153).
The identification between the artist and the art that O'Brien laments points to a
deeper paradox of modernist styles. The signature technique by which storytellers
distinguished themselves was partly founded on how they accommodated other voices in
their writing: in other words, how they dealt with the issue of polyvocality. As I argued
in the last chapter, the putative impartiality of realism encourages the storyteller to probe
multiple perspectives from the vantage point o f an observer who witnesses and reports.
"The Yellow Wallpaper" foregrounds the perceptual immediacy of its protagonist, but the
narrative act itself is still present, though embedded and fictionalized in the pretext of
diary writing. In modernism, however, storytelling is often elided altogether. There is
rarely a demonstrable sense of address; instead, narration unfolds as a panorama of
perceptual impressionism. In the absence of a more overt narrative stance, an audience
may fill the role of the absent storyteller with the implied author, the behind-the-scenes
shape shifter who manipulates its sympathies. As Michel Foucault suggests, this "author
function" operates according to a cultural desire for authority. Perception of an authorial
presence allows one to delimit meaning in deference to the values embodied by that
writer's public identity, thus restricting the "free circulation" of signification so that,
ultimately, an author becomes "the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in
which we fear the proliferation of meaning." At its simplest, celebrity serves as a
"principle of thrift" (274). At the same time that modernist styles de-authorize their
enunciation by eliding the narrative act, they are identified, in the cultural milieu, as
expressions of an singular authorial ethos.
The paradox of the author function resonates through countless modernist
manifestoes. T. S. Eliot decries the influence of "newspaper critics" whose "Blue-book
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knowledge" of writers' lives inflated "popular" reputations, but the founding thesis of his
"impersonal" theory of art in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919) nonetheless
celebrates the peculiarity of the artist. Art requires "a continual extinction of personality,"
a "self-sacrifice" to something "which is more valuable" (i.e. the artistic medium) that
makes it an "escape" from emotion. "But, of course," he adds, "only those who have
personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape from these things" (5).
True art necessitates a "more perfect" mind that eschews "sincere emotion" in favor of
"significant emotion." In other words, it takes a special kind of person to be impersonal.
The leap from this paradox to outright praise for aesthetic individuality is a short one as
the singularity of voice is canonized as an essential gauge of art: "One knew when one
was reading a Joyce or Lawrence or Hemingway stoiy because it bore on its every page
the signature of a unique sensibility responding to experience in an absolutely individual
way" (Aldridge "Gray Middle," 269). Uniqueness and "absolute" individuality are a far
cry from the community and counsel that Benjamin (writing in 1936) argues are the
pragmatic goals of storytelling.
One signal of the elision of storytelling in modernism is the prevalence o f free
indirect discourse, which promises access to a character’s "consciousness without the
apparent intrusion of a narrative voice... fit presents] the illusion of a character’s acting out
his [or her] mental state in an immediate relationship with the reader" (Pascal 52).
Modernists did not invent free indirect discourse (hereafter called combined discourse);
its popularity is credited to a variety of early realists, from Austen to Goethe to Flaubert,
with James recognized as its most prominent American agent. In the realist mode, a
storyteller acts as a ventriloquist, putting words into the mouths of "dummy" characters
and controlling the audience's perception of other voices. Because it is grounded in the
"real," the authority o f the narrative style is rarely challenged. 2 In the modernist mode,
however, the (hypothetical) effect of combined discourse is not unlike the telephone (in
which the voice is separated from the body) or the silent movie (in which the body was
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rendered mute before the soundtrack). It posits an inexorable fissure between the
reception act and the origin of the utterance. A character's perception and the narrator's
cognition are intertwined, diminishing the authority of the latter because his/her point of
view carries no more emphasis than the figural perspectives. For Marxist critics like
Adorno and Horkheimer, combined discourse creates a "negative knowledge" that
precludes a complacent reader response by fragmenting and defamiliarizing reality (qtd. in
West 63). Regardless of whether one agrees with the "radical" or avant-garde value of
the technique, the effects that it creates transform several characteristics of storytelling
addressed in previous chapters.
First, because combined discourse represents (or re-presents) a character's words
or thoughts in the narrative style, it dramatizes the revision inherent in any act of retelling.
Irving introduced this difference-within-repetition into his legend by attaching Knicker
bocker's editorial frame to the text, which precludes attribution of the narrative voice to a
single speaker. But if Irving's frame signalled the transcription o f an oral narrative into a
written text, combined discourse, as a "radically bivocal language (that] defies normal
vocalization," more frequently evokes writing (McHale 282). O f the four modes of
storytelling discussed in this study, modernism announces its writtenness most intently.
As a result, focus is directed to the linguistic medium itself, not its transmission. As Karl
Kroeber argues, the "teller function" of traditional narratives leads us to identify with
different phenomenological perspectives; combined discourse "intensifies, complicates
and subtilizes that identifying tendency. The result...is a demand for continuous complex
intensity of response...[that] arises from readers' conscious engagement in a linguistic
performance. One cannot respond to the basic sylleptic bind—do these words represent
the character's or the narrator's perception?—without recognizing that one has
encountered a verbal [meaning linguistic, not oral] dilemma" (106).
Not all modernists employ combined discourse, of course; nor are many stories
composed exclusively o f it. As Brian McHale has shown, it falls midway on a scale of
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possibilities for reporting speech and thought. At one extreme is the "purely diegetic,"
indirect or reported speech, which involves "only the bare report that a speech event has
occurred, without any specification of what was said or how it was said" (258). At the
other extreme is the "purely mimetic," direct speech or dialogue, which encourages
identification with the figural voices. The stories gathered in this chapter illustrate these
possibilities. In "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene," Stein subsumes the voices of her
characters within her own ludic style: "she was telling about using other ways in being
gay, she was telling about learning other ways in being gay." The distance that she places
between the "original" utterances and her representation of them is immense. She does
away with the dramatic fictional contexts from which meanings arise, subordinating
semantics to the sonic texture of her style. The resulting narrative voice assumes
prominence over other voices yet refrains from articulating a single, determinate meaning.
Hemingway, on the other hand, avoids speech summary by staging long interchanges of
direct speech that efface his narratorial agency. Conversation reveals how context shapes
a meaning often at odds with the words spoken. In "Hills Like White Elephants," talk
dramatizes how "the barrier to articulation is the cost of being precise in language" (Lid
402). Because these exchanges often revolve around sexual politics, their interactive
pattern illustrates the gender dynamics of conversation. One particular characteristic of
Hemingway's style, repetition, highlights the illusory purity of direct speech. "All
dialogue is conventionalized or stylized to some degree," McHale writes. "Straight
forward transcription would be intolerable...since the 'normal non-fluency' of ordinary
speech has the appearance of illiteracy in print" (259). Precisely because Hemingway
strives to omit all clues of a narrating consciousness, how he crafts his dialogue becomes
the most obvious expression o f his agency.
Stories by Barnes and Wright typically incorporate more diverse forms of speech
representation, creating "double-voiced" narratives in which implicit meanings require
some knowledge of the authorial ethos. "Run Girls, Run" is a texturally dense, allusive

138
story that juxtaposes Elizabethan and modern idioms as it revises stereotypes of
femininity perpetuated by Western mythology. The parody arises from an inherent
contrast between formal oral discourses drawn from Barnes's theatrical background (the
soliloquy and epic formulae) and typographic devices (parentheses, orthography).
"Almos' a Man," Wright's most anthologized short story, offers a litmus test for a whole
range of assumptions about the social affectivity of art and the minority writer’s
relationship to dominant culture. In the story, Wright juxtaposes combined discourse
with a more mimetic form of perceptual representation, interior monologue, creating a
pattern of perspectival shifts heightened by the movements in and out of Afro-American
dialect. The pattern dramatizes the importance of individualism in Wright's work,
revealing a striving for a pure, "thinkerly" style of narration that transcends a language
compromised by its social usage.

Gertrude Stein:

Indirect Speech and Conversation

"I do not like stories," Stein declares in Geography and Plays (132); even to read
a work like "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" as short fiction requires preliminary justifi
cation. Though Three Lives (1909), her first published book, is a story cycle modelled
on Flaubert's Trois Contes, little in her subsequent oeuvre complements traditional
notions of storytelling. Most obviously, the bulk of her work is non-mimetic, fore
grounding stylistic effects like rhythm and repetition over theme and content. A narrative
for Stein does not tether its relevance to a particular time and place. Instead, structurally
and rhetorically, the work incorporates and revolves around the moment of composition,
its creative genesis maintained in a continuous present tense that aims to shelter it from
history. Words must resist "outside" social contexts that might limit their meaning. The
sentence, not the utterance or speech act, is the fundamental unit of language because it
exists "contained within [itself] and anything really contained within itself has no
beginning or middle or ending" (Narration 52). 3 As such, Stein's writing challenges the
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very idea of storytelling as communication, often to the point where concepts like plot,
characterization, and point of view sound like a dead language when applied to her work.
As if to heighten this threat to narrative norms, she writes within traditional genres: most
famously, the "autobiography" of her companion, Alice B. Toklas. Subtitles identify
other works as plays, novels, and opera librettos. Blood on the Dining-Room Floor
(1933), which has inspired an increasing amount of commentary in recent years,
simultaneously celebrates and subverts the conventions of the mass-market whodunit. 4
The only story that Stein does not re-write, in fact, is the short story.
Answering why is a difficult task. Though several briefer prose works appear in
little magazines like Broom, the Little Review, and The Reviewer, she never speaks of a
short form in her lectures and criticism, conflating, instead, narrative with the novel. 5
As a result, critics rarely read these briefer pieces in the context o f the modernist short
story. Carl Van Vechten describes "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" as a "sketch" (Selected
Writings 422). Both James R. Mellow (331) and Wendy Steiner (16) compare it to the
lyric portraiture gathered in Matisse Picasso and Gertrude Stein (1933) and Portraits and
Prayers (1934). In its original context in Geography and Plays, the piece may not seem
much more of a narrative than the collages of doggerel, closet drama, and meditative
prose that compose the rest of the collection.
Yet Vanity Fair, reprinting the story in July 1923, subtitled it "The Tale of Two
Young Ladies Who Were Gay Together and How One Left the Other Behind" and added
an introduction that labels it a short story. Probably written by Edmund Wilson, the
magazine’s managing editor, the note is important both for what it says and implies.
Among the many stories that Vanity Fair published during Wilson's tenure (1920 to late
1923), only "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" prompted prefatory remarks; equally
experimental texts by other writers are identified with a particular genre only in the table
of contents. Vanity Fair may have been one of the few publications with an enviable
circulation to offer Stein wide exposure before 1933; yet its editors were apparently
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uncertain about how a mass readership might receive her writing. Nearly apologizing for
her inventiveness, the introduction assures the audience that the story is comprehensible:
"in one of Miss Stein's simpler manners, [it] should convince those readers who have
hitherto been baffled by her later and more telegraphic style that she is really a writer of
remarkable abilities." 6
Rather than "telegraphic," Stein's manner might be described as "telescopic."
Sing-song rhythms condense and distance the drama, often obscuring the fact that there is
a plot. After leaving her parents' home to cultivate her voice, Helen Furr meets Georgine
Skeene, with whom she becomes "regularly gay." Hints of tension develop between the
women: Miss Furr does not like to travel as much as Miss Skeene, and when they visit
the "quite pleasant home" that Helen has left, she refuses stay. Men also pose a vague
threat: "There were men there then who were dark and heavy and they sat with
them ...and they went with them," though where and what happens is inconclusive. By
the final paragraph, the women drift apart: "Helen Furr was living somewhere else then
and telling some about being gay and she was gay then and she was living quite regularly
then." Ostensibly, when Stein wrote the piece (in 1908, fourteen years before it was
published), she based the characters on a lesbian couple, Ethel Mars and Maud Hunt
Squire, who frequented her atelier at 27 rue de Fleurus. The story may also capture
private uncertainties about romantic entanglements; still recovering from an early,
unsuccessful relationship with May Bookstaver (the basis for her first novel, the
posthumously published Q.E.D.), Stein had met Alice B. Toklas only a year earlier, and
the women would not "marry" for two more. 7 Whatever autobiographical tones
resonate here, "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" is not the happy story that its style suggests.
As Maijorie Perloff argues, the change that Helen Furr undergoes must be inferred
through the "permutation of a highly selected group of ordinary words." This
permutation creates "the skeleton narrative of any number of possible stories," from
which the audience fashions an interpretation (676). 8 Nowhere is this responsibility
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more obvious than in Stein's use of "gay." Contemporary audiences, accustomed to its
slang association with homosexuality, may identify a sapphic subtext more quickly than a
1920s readership, for whom it primarily meant "happy" or "festive." 9 But no internal
evidence confirms or denies the couple’s lesbianism. Nothing within the story limits the
word "gay" to a single, substantive meaning.
An equally important word, "telling," alludes to a deeper paradox between style
and content. To cultivate her voice, Helen Furr must tell others about being gay. The
first major reference to speaking appears roughly halfway through the story when the
women visit Mr. and Mrs. Furr, presumably Helen's parents. Miss Furr "said she would
not stay, she said she did not find it gay, she said she would not stay where she did not
find it gay, she said she found it gay where she did stay and she did stay there where very
many were cultivating something" (19). When her companion leaves and Miss Furr
realizes that "she was not at all feeling any need of having Georgine Skeene," she finds
her voice suddenly superfluous: "She could use it and she did use it but then there was
not any way of working at cultivating a completely pleasant voice when it has become a
quite completely well enough cultivated one, and there was not much use in using it when
one was not wanting it to be helping to make one a gay one. Helen Furr was not needing
using her voice to be a gay one" (21). Only when she begins to leam from "very many
[who were] telling about using other ways in being gay" does she begin cultivating it once
more. By "telling," Miss Furr is then "teaching" others how to develop their voices,
"telling about little ways one could be learning to use in being gay...telling them quite
often, telling them again and again" (22). Cultivation implies artistic development; by the
end of the story, Helen Furr's "telling" arguably becomes a public performance. 10 Like
numerous stories by women modernists, "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" grounds the
struggle for artistic self-expression in the creation of an alternative, coded language that is
comprehensible only to a small audience. 11 Without an appreciative community of
"gay" listeners, there is "not much use in using" Helen Furr's voice.
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The paradox is that while Miss Furr cultivates her voice, Stein never allows it to
be heard; she excludes us from the ideal audience that can recognize or benefit from
Helen's developing talent. Diegetic summaiy distances figural voices by narrating speech
acts with only a vague reference to content or tone (McHale 258). 12 When Miss Furr
refuses to remain at her parents' home, for example, repetition conveys her
dissatisfaction. A rhetorical effect, not what she says or how she says it, intensifies the
emotion of the scene. With its subtle variations on a basic syntactic structure, the passage
(quoted above) illustrates why Stein preferred the more emotive word "insistence" over
"repetition"; "There can be no repetition because the essence of that expression is
insistence, and if you insist you must each time use emphasis and if you use emphasis it
is not possible while anybody is alive that they should use exactly the same emphasis"
("Portraits and Repetition" 167). In this case, even Helen's audience is ambiguous; it
may be Georgine or her parents or both. Similarly, while Miss Furr tells others how to
be gay, the storyteller offers no clue about how her new-found confidence affects her
voice. While the story line implies a change, the evidence never surfaces through the
authorial style. Why does Stein refrain from slipping into the voice of her character?
The simplest explanation is that she is working in a decidedly anti-representational
mode. Other modernists fragmented character through interior monologue and combined
discourse. Stein foreshadows postmodernist writers like Robbe-Grillet by reducing
fictional people to linguistic abstractions (Berry 96-97). The pun on "fur" and "skin"
says more about the sensuality of the characters than the story admits. Diegetic summaiy
also complements her desire to free narrative from time: eliding dramatic scenes allows
her to ignore the "extraverbal" content of a speech act, those contextual conditions,
whether "social, historical, meteorological, physiological" that shape the creation of
meaning. 13 Without reference to a specific historical moment, words assume an
omnitemporal aura.
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A less obvious justification for speech summary centers on Stein's attitude toward
writing and orality and the reception activities that each inspires. Direct speech,
obviously, evokes oral conversation in which participants alternately speak and listen.
Stein tries to prevent this model of interaction, composed of two distinct activities, from
serving as an interpretive analogy to writing and reading. Instead, her style provokes a
reading response charged with composing the story’s significance. And herein lies the
twist in her construction of narrative authority. While eliding dramatic dialogues, she
fashions a "metaphorical" conversation, not with an audience but between the audience
and her words. While the narrative voice is monologic, its authority is transparent: it
does not dictate a single, determinate meaning but invites a plurality of responses. As
Harriet Scott Chessman remarks, "Stein suggests that the act of creating becomes an act
intricately bound up with the act of receiving; the two acts, mysteriously, often appear to
occur simultaneously and can no longer be easily distinguished" (148). Stein's voice, far
from being self-important in its hermeticism (as her contemporaries often charged), offers
a Rosetta stone for the voice of her readership. Rather than evoke, her style "evocalizes";
it orients us not to the site of emission but to the site of reception so that our reading
voices (or gives rise to) an "acoustic textuality." 14
The "aurality" of Stein's style, paradoxically, is founded on a stringent distinction
between speech and writing. "Of course I don't talk as I write!" she replied to a question
asked by more than one suspicious reader. In an important series of lectures delivered at
the University of Chicago in 1935, she explains that "you do not cannot must not shall
not write as you talk" because "when you talk...w hat you say has no importance mostly
to any audience because any audience has no feeling that they are an audience not while
everybody is just talking" (Narration 54). Conversation is such an ordinary, common
place exchange of words that we grow complacent and accept conventional meanings.
The key to reception (at least in this lecture) is "recognition," on the part of writer as well
as audience. To illustrate its importance, she describes how she translated the poems of a
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young French poet. Translation is significant here because it is literally a re-writing in
which reading and composition are incorporated into the same act. The work of this
young poet, however, possessed a "certain smoothness" that alienated her from the
creative process. "Hitherto I had always been writing, with a concentration of recognition
of the thing that was to be existing as my writing as it was being written," she says. In
these poems, recognition was completed: "there it was it was already recognition a thing I
could recognize because it had been recognized before I began my writing." As a result,
she could only be "carrying out" an idea that already existed: "and then suddenly I
realized... that the words come out differently if there is no recognition as the words are
forming because recognition had already taken place" (52). Playing the part of a reader,
Stein dramatizes why writing must incorporate the process of its own becoming. Without
self-reflexivity, the different roles between writer and audience solidify into insuperable
identities; art, for the audience, becomes a vicarious experience. Only when we discover
a writer in the process of "naming" words can recognition survive the original scene of
composition and endure as an replicable experience.
According to Stein, recognition rarely takes place in oral conversation because
speakers fail to exert the self-reflexivity that makes them, at the same time, listeners:
When you write this is of course recognition there is the recognition
that you recognize what you write as you write, while as you talk there is of
course some recognition but really is there any real recognition recognition of
what you talk as you talk. 1 myself think not, and therefore naturally not you
do not write as you talk...There really is no real reason why you should since
after all you are not your audience as you talk nobody really is not really as
anybody talks that is just talks. (54)

Recognition in conversation is theoretically possible, however. Listening (and, by
extension, reading) becomes an act of reception because "everybody gets
tired...everybody always has to be listening to something, that is the way it is always
anybody has to be listening to something that is what makes life lived...you are always
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listening to some one to something and you are always telling something to some one or
to any one." It takes "genius" and energy to tell and listen at the same time; much of
Narration is concerned with how various modem media (newspapers and history books
especially) bifurcate this process by making listening "too easy." In "Miss Furr and Miss
Skeene" then, Stein submerges speech events because exchanges would allow the
audience simply to eavesdrop. A dramatized pattern of "just talking" implies that meaning
can be located in the call and response of the characters, not in the audience's own
dialogue with the text.
An interesting paradox in Stein's deconstruction of writer/reader roles further
illuminates the effects of her telescoping style. Narration was first heard as an oral
performance, appearing in book form only later, a fact that she addresses in the lecture.
The oral performer is "physical|ly] exciting"; s/he possesses a presence that "destroys the
physical something that a writer is while writing" because "while he is writing that
physical something by existing does not connect him with anything but concentrates him
on recognition." In the act of writing, identity formation is a perpetual mutation of self
cast as discovery or surprise: it is self-consciousness as self-creation. But oral
performance physically ties the voice to the body, to an identity that is no longer in transit
but stabilized within a figure or form. 15 In this sense, direct speech might actually pose
a threat to the cultivation of Helen Furr's voice. Were her words offered in dialogue, the
audience might associate voice with body, activity with substance. Words might become
flesh too easily if offered in quotation; they would refer to a thing, not a process. De
emphasizing talk through diegetic summary allows Stein to develop a voice without
reference to a "corpo-reality" that would arrest its formation.
Indirect speech enacts this simultaneous listening and speaking because, according
to V. N. Volosinov, it presupposes "an analysis simultaneous and inseparable from
transmission" (130). 16 In other words, by summarizing someone else's speech, we
transform it, and transformation implies an evaluation by which we choose to highlight
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certain features. Direct quotation or citation is passive reproduction, but the analysis
inherent in the indirect-speech act prompts simultaneous listening and talking, making it
comparable to the process that Stein describes. Various forms of indirect speech resonate
with different types of analysis. On the one hand, summary may emphasize the theme or
referent of the original message. This type of analysis "receives an utterance purely on
the thematic level and simply does not 'hear' or take in whatever there is in that utterance
that is without thematic significance." The dichotomous type focuses upon the "texture"
of the transformed speech: "it incorporates into indirect discourse words and locutions
that characterize the subjective and stylistic physiognomy of the message viewed as
expression" (130-31). In fictional discourse, o f course, previous utterances are
hypothetical. Stein does not really summarize what Helen Furr says; she merely
pretends. Yet audiences tend to interpret indirect speech as if an original did exist
(McHale 256). The emphasized aspect of the message (either the referent or the texture)
is a clue to what the storyteller presumably feels is important about the character. In more
mimetic texts, determining what type of analysis the storyteller performs necessitates only
listening, for we can grow attuned to features of a character's voice even while passively
participating. But a telescoped narrative, because fictional speech acts are merely
described, prompts us to hear and speak at once; in attempting to recover an irrecoverable
original utterance, we must write as we read. Reception and creation become
interchangeable activities.
At first glance, Volosinov's analytic paradigms might seem wholly inapplicable to
Stein's indirect speech. Talk is so transformed that its original content and texture are
equally obscure: "Very many were telling about using other ways in being gay." What is
important here, however, is how Stein literally de-personalizes speech by transforming
words into textures. "Vety many" refers to a constituency identified only by its large
membership; like a Greek chorus, this plurality is represented as speaking with one voice
in one instance. Even though the summary acknowledges various "ways" to be gay, it
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does not discuss any of those differences. For Volosinov, the "maximal compactness"
achieved when numerous reported utterances are "received as one whole block of social
behavior" typically indicates a content analysis where "only the 'what' of speech is taken
in and the 'how' is left outside reception" (119). Yet Stein substitutes her "how" for the
"what" of this chorus; the rhyme ("ways"/"gay") foregrounds the sonic texture of her
style rather than any feature of the figura! speech. Similarly, "She told many then the way
of being gay" compresses Helen's speech to the point where her original meaning and
manner are irretrievable. The only referent to "gay" is the texture that it assumes in the
narrative context.
Diegetic summary also distances tensions between Miss Furr and Miss Skeene:
"The voice Helen Furr was cultivating was quite a pleasant one. The voice Georgine
Skeene was cultivating was, some said, a better one. The voice Helen Furr was
cultivating she cultivated and it was quite completely a pleasant enough one then, a
cultivated enough one then. The voice Georgine Skeene was cultivating she did not
cultivate too much" (18). The passage may convey Stein's awareness that lesbian couples
can replicate heterosexual sex roles: in not cultivating her voice too much, Miss Skeene
plays the part of a "wife" to Miss Furr's "husband." 17 According to these roles, only
one voice speaks for a couple. In this case, Miss Furr makes the decisions: "They did
some travelling, not very much travelling, Georgine Skeene would have liked to do more
travelling, Helen Furr did not care about travelling." As with the ambiguous "very
many," the voices of the anonymous speakers who feel that Miss Skeene's voice is "a
better one" are summarized within a single speech act. There is little opportunity to "hear"
what their words might have been; as a result, dissenting voices cannot be identified with
a particular social group. They remain disembodied, impervious to "specularity." 18 As
Volosinov explains, "There is no wherewithal here for the speakers'] individuality to
congeal into an image" (132). The repetitive structure of all four sentences ("The
voice...was cultivating") suggests that the texture, too, has been transformed to conform
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with the authorial style, figural voices exist as mere traces, their message transformed to
emphasize syntactical rhythm.
Elsewhere, however, one can discern a more overt interplay between a fictional
utterance and its narration. When the narrator reports that Helen "said she would not stay
where she did not find it gay," one assumes that the rhyme is not characteristic of her
dialogue, especially since similar rhyme schemes appear in passages that have no diegetic
summary. But the same cannot be said for repetition. As I suggested earlier, repetition
here intensifies Helen's unwillingness to remain in a place where she cannot cultivate her
voice. Texture is equally expressive of the "stylistic physiognomy" of Helen's voice as
its authorial counterpart: it signifies her insistence as well as the narrator's. Similarly,
"telling them quite often, telling them again and again" captures the emphatic nature of
Helen's speaking: it dramatizes her need to teach others how to be gay to continue
cultivating her voice. Repetition may be such an obvious trait of the authorial voice that
its relevance to the character's summarized speech can be easily overlooked. The passage
fuses Volosinov's analyses: because the "referent" is so ambiguous (the particular
meaning of "gay"), recognition must rely on texture to communicate a meaning. The
conjunction of sound and sense creates an onomatopoetic style.
Speech summary allows Stein to transform techniques of attribution into issues of
reception. Words create soundscapes rather than landscapes; as a result, character
develops from sonic rather than psychological patterns. Apparently, the interpretive
possibilities generated by the play of rhyme and rhythm so disconcerted the modernist
sensibility of Vanity Fair1s editors that they decided to clue their audience to "a" meaning.
In its introduction, the magazine links manner to story line with a stunning reductio ad
absurdum: "It will be seen that the style, though queer, is exactly suited to the subject"
(55). Connotations of "gay" may have been equivocal in the 1920s, but "queer" was an
obvious code for same-sex relations. The note makes a connection between sexual
preference and narrative technique that few in the audience would miss. With a subtle
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reference to Stein's lesbianism (an open secret in literaiy circles), Vanity Fair attempts to
yoke voice to body.
An even more dramatic example of how the author function limits meaning is
illustrated by a parody of "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" that Vanity Fair published in its
October 1923 issue. Entitled "When Helen Furr Got Gay With Harold Moos: A
Narrative Written in the Now Popular Manner of Gertrude Stein," the piece is credited to
"K. D." (37). As the title suggests, K. D. cannot simply reproduce Stein's voice in order
to pinpoint the particular object of ridicule; the parodist must introduce new characters, a
new plot, new words, and new inflections that tear the fabric of imitation. After Georgine
Skeene leaves, Helen Furr takes up with Harold Moos, who "was not a gay man."
Despite Moos's apparent heterosexuality, Miss Furr is "more gay when Harold Moos sat
regularly with her than when other dark and heavy and bald men sat with her." She takes
great delight in pulling his chair out from under him and knocking his hat off his head.
These are the very types of scene-specific actions that Stein avoids narrating. To
emphasize the revisionary plot, K, D. must ascribe characters motives that, in the
original, are ambiguous, as in the most surprising plot twist: "One day when Helen Furr
was being gay and Harold Moos was feeling dark and very heavy and very bald and not
at all gay they were married."
Despite the nuptials, Miss Furr resists becoming Mrs. Moos, and the parodist
portrays her "gaiety" as irresponsible and frivolous. In the original, Helen wins
independence, but in the parody she remains a child. K. D. implicates Stein in this
behavior by referring to Helen's "baby-talk" (a common description o f Stein's style) and
a more direct association with homosexuality: "She would be gay in baby-talk then, and
she would be gay in lisping," Harold Moss ultimately finds himself so oppressed by his
wife's need to be gay that he turns violent: "I have been thinking up a way o f making you
less gay and of making myself more regularly gay and in a wholly new way; and, with
that end in view, I hereby hit you three times regularly on the head with this walking
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stick." Just as Mr. Moos attempts to cure Miss Furr of her sexuality, K. D. tries to
rescue the word "gay" itself from the erotic significations that Stein invites it to assume.
To make the point, K. D. must allow Harold Moos to speak. But the introduction of
dialogue signals the end of parody and the assertion of a conventional moral authority. It
marks the point at which K. D. stops imitating Stein in order to intimidate or threaten her.
Direct speech is the explicit statement of meaning and motive that Stein's indirect speech
avoids.

Hemingway: Repetition, Stylization, and Dialogue
In her autobiography, Stein launches a famously caustic attack on Hemingway,
describing him as a better Rotarian than modernist. Her "favorite pupil" in turn declared
that she was simply ungrateful for what he had taught her: "She could never write
dialogue. It was terrible. She learned how to do it from my stuff...She never could
forgive learning that and she was afraid people would notice it, where she'd learned it, so
she had to attack me" {Green Hills 65). Even after admitting that his own penchant for
repetition had been inspired by his Parisian mentor (but only after Stein died in 1946), he
would repeatedly claim to have taught her dialogue, as if to cancel a debt that bothered
only him. 19 His insecurity is unfounded. As Perloff shows, their repetition serves
different ends: Stein's tends to connote, while Hemingway's denotes (698). Whether
Stein learned to write dialogue from him is equally doubtful, for two the writers employ
divergent forms of reported speech, creating vastly different effects. As in "Miss Furr
and Miss Skeene," Stein submerges speech with diegetic summary, providing only a
skeletal description of fictional dialogue. When she does approach a more mimetic style
of direct discourse, she omits quotation marks, accents, and other typographic cues that
encourage the audience to segregate voices. 20 Hemingway, by contrast, often omits
everything but dialogue. To borrow his famous image, verbal exchanges are the visible
surface of the iceberg; whatever drama floats below must be inferred from the characters'
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talk. The difference in stance is easily summarized: Stein locates meaning making
outside of the fictional rhetorical situation, while Hemingway firmly grounds it there.
Conversational exchanges are most prominent in the stories gathered in Men
Without Women (1927). While In Our Time (1925) and Winner Take Nothing (1933)
contain a range of reported speech and thought, Hemingway's second collection is nearly
devoid of subjective narrative stances. Few speech acts are summarized, and combined
discourse appears in only two stories. 21 Narratorial reticence is so extreme that several
stories, including "Hills Like White Elephants" and "The Killers," have become canonical
examples of the "behaviorist" or "objective" style of storytelling in which the narrative
perspective resembles a camera lens, recording without comment events that pass before
its eye. From Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren through Wayne Booth and
Seymour Chatman to Gerard Genette and Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan, the rigorous
impersonality of Hemingway’s stance manifests a fundamental distrust of language. As I
argued in the last chapter, cultural presumptions about gendered language allow direct
addresses to be stereotyped as a feminine strategy: the appeal that they voice is somehow
excessively emotional and therefore unbecoming a "rational, objective" (i.e. masculine)
narrator. If reticence and understatement are (presumably) uncharacteristic of feminine
speech, we should not be surprised to find Hemingway's severe economy of expression
described as "masculine nudity of the starkest sort" (qtd. in Stephens 62). Unmediated,
direct discourse is the purest expression of a man-without-woman style.
What happens when a reader is exposed to "naked" dialogue? Virginia W oolfs
review of Men Without Women offers some preliminary suggestions:
A writer will always be chary of dialogue because dialogue puts the most violent
pressure on the reader's attention. He has to hear, to see, to supply the right tone,
and to fill in the background from what the characters say without any help from
the author. Therefore, when fictitious people are allowed to speak it must be
because they have something so important to say that it stimulates the reader to do
rather more than his share of the work of creation. But, although Mr.
Hemingway keeps us under the fire of dialogue constantly, his people, half the
time, are only saying what the author could say much more economically for
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them. At last we are inclined to cry out with the little girl in "Hills Like White
Elephants"!:] "Would you please please please please please please stop talking?"
(qtd. in Stephens 53)

Jig actually says please seven times, not six, revealing the "violent pressure" applied to
W oolfs own attention. Dialogue is an interpersonal device that invites creativity from the
audience by asking it to imagine the extraverbal realities (intonation, the temporal "stops"
between responses) that shape meaning. Yet the gesture can have an adverse effect: the
"tendency to flood the page with unnecessary dialogue" results in a "lack of sharp,
unmistakable points by which we can take hold of the story." Without some narratorial
intervention, characters may talk just to hear the sound of their own voices.
Equally important, Woolf critiques the link between Hemingway's narrative
reticence and his "self-consciously virile" public persona. Part of the review is a response
to an advertising blurb announcing that in Men Without Women "the softening feminine
influence is absent—either through training, discipline, death, or situation," a line lifted
(without permission) from Hemingway's correspondence with Max Perkins, his editor at
Scribner's (Selected Letters 245). "The greatest writers lay no stress upon sex one way
or another," W oolf argues. Far from being a measure o f heroic restraint, reliance on
dialogue belies artistic cowardice. She makes her point by appropriating an analogy
undoubtedly dear to Hemingway's heart: "Though Mr. Hemingway is brilliantly and
enormously skillfull, he lets his dexterity, like the bullfighter's cloak, get between him
and the fact." The bullfighter too preoccupied with style can "go through every sort of
contortion so that the public thinks one is running every risk and displaying superb
gallantry. But the true writer stands close up to the bull and lets the horns—call them life,
truth, reality, whatever you like,—pass him close each time." The stories in Men Without
Women are "dry and sterile" because dialogue allows the author to avoid that close pass.
Whether one agrees with W oolfs judgment, her review highlights the interpretive
difficulties that a reader faces when the narratorial context is elided. The problem is

153
further complicated because Hemingway's characters frequently sound like their author,
or, rather, what audiences expect the author to sound like. They share his preference for
simple sentences, imprecise modifiers ("bright," "nice"), proper nouns, and, most
important, repetition. What happens when a storyteller's stylistic devices perforate the
figural speech and call attention to themselves? Bakhtin calls this phenomenon
"stylization," a type of double-voiced discourse in which the audience perceives two
perspectives informing the same word, competing to be recognized (Problems 18990). 22 Typically, Bakhtin writes, dialogue embodies the storyteller's "objectification" of
a speech style associated with a certain "characterological type or profile." The audience
recognizes a firm boundary between authorial and figural voices; the storyteller's
"semantic authority" is never threatened because the figural voices serve an overall
authorial design. This is why, according to Bakhtin, dialogue does not automatically
create a double-voiced discourse. In stylization, however, the audience recognizes the
authorial style within the character's voice, impinging the (relative) autonomy of that
objectified type or profile. "A character always speaks in earnest," Bakhtin writes, but
when the values publicly associated with Hemingway's style influence the interpretation,
characters begin to speak in Ernest. When, for example, the reviewer for the Boston
Evening Transcript announces that "there is nothing about his prose or his subject matter
that is effeminate," one wonders if he even read "Hills Like White Elephants," one of
several stories in Men Without Women that asks the audience to identify with the
"softening feminine influence" supposedly eliminated by discipline and training (qtd. in
Stephens 63).
Despite this reviewer's judgment, critics generally agree that Hemingway was
capable o f "presenting] a woman's point of view and attributing] her plight... to a
combination of male self-involvement and self-aggrandizement, a combination of which
the text is aware and to which it is not sympathetic" (Baym "Actually," 112). Jig is often
introduced as the prime evidence; none of the ambiguity surrounding the characterization
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of Margot Macomber surrounds her. Still, stylization in "Hills Like White Elephants"
poses an interesting question: what happens when the audience is encouraged to identify
with a "woman's point of view" expressed in a style culturally deemed as "masculine"?
By way of an answer, I want to focus on Hemingway's repetitions, analyzing their
function, first in the dialogue between Jig and her companion, and then in the
surrounding authorial context. Stylization works at cross-purposes on these two narrative
planes because it prompts two different types of reader response. In the fictional
dialogue, repetition is a turn-taking gesture that symbolizes the imbalance of power in the
couple's relationship. Jig cannot directly express her feelings because the companion
rewrites her words. She can only mimic his language, challenging his control through
parody. When mimicry fails to address the imbalance, she simply adopts his strategy,
and the conversation breaks off without resolution. Repetition is thus a key device of
what Madeline Kahn calls "narrative transvestism.. .the process by whereby a male author
gains access to a culturally defined female voice and sensibility but runs no risk of being
trapped in the [culturally] devalued female realm" (6). This thematic pattern develops
linearly, a product of narrative sequence that, according to Herbert Zapf, makes the
audience "psychically subject to the temporal process of the fiction, to the changes and the
promising or disappointing turns of events." Yet repetition appears in the surrounding
narratorial context as a Iiteraiy device that tonally foregrounds the aridity and bleakness of
the theme. The pattern here offers potential clues to the unarticulated meaning of the
story, the absent "deep structure" that one must infer. According to Zapf, "what happens
on the level of narrated events is no more important than what these events signify, how
they are to be interpreted and related to other elements and layers of the text" (97). Rather
than encourage identification, repetition at this level distances us from the characters. In
other words, the narratorial context employs the same repetition strategy that, in the
fictional dialogue, prevents Jig from expressing herself in her own conversational style.
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Deborah Tannen illustrates how repetition functions in the ideal conversation: the
audience speaks not to disagree or interrupt but to confirm its continued receptivity.
"Shadowing" a speaker’s language creates cohesion because recurring words bond
people. Speakers also repeat their own words, either to clarify their meaning or to
maintain a running summary of a complex topic. As with most conversational devices,
repetition is gender-coded. Men often repeat phrases or words to contest each other's
authority, while women repeat to offer support and encouragement (Talking Voices 41Si). In "Hills," however, repetition strategies dramatize each character's need to frame
the conversation to a private advantage. Feeling his control over the relationship
threatened by Jig's pregnancy, the American continually restates his opinion that the
"operation" (the abortion) is "perfectly simple" and causes neither physical nor
psychological damage. When Jig intimates that he makes this claim for selfish reasons,
he must convince her otherwise and begins repeating a new phrase: "I don't want you to
do it if you don't want to." In this "presentational" persuasion strategy, repetition creates
a "rhetorical presence" by foregrounding an assertion and forcing the listener to respond
(Johnstone 207).

Jig,by contrast, imitates his words to undermine the authority that the

companion presumes. For a time, she even makes him responsible for broaching
intimacy, which she can then reject.
The couple's first exchange illustrates how the companion controls the
conversation by redefining terms to his own advantage:
"They look like white elephants," she said.
"I've never seen one," the man drank his beer.
"No, you wouldn't have."
"I might have," the man said. "Just because I wouldn't have
doesn't prove anything." (211)

Jig insults the man's imagination when he refuses her invitation to join in the
conversation. He responds by challenging her assertion. Substituting "might" for
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"wouldn't," he re-writes her words, expunging the pungency. Repeating the original
phrase then allows him to dismiss completely the charge: she has no proof. Here the
strategy works. Rather than carry on the conversation, Jig looks at the beaded curtain in
the doorway of the bar. The exchange captures the asymmetry that provokes her to
challenge his authority: the companion claims the right to define the terms in which they
will talk.
When Jig repeats the American's words, she redefines his meaning by mimicking
his authority. Assuming his voice, she can then reprimand him for his own failure in the
relationship:
"It tastes like licorice," the girl said and put the glass down.
"That's the way with everything."
"Yes," the girl said. "Everything tastes of licorice. Especially
all the things you've waited so long for, like absinthe."
"Oh, cut it out."

Jig describes the taste of the drink, which she apparently does not like, much as she
describes the hills as white elephants. The simile is an invitation to talk. Yet the
American interprets the comment as a complaint: the flavor is his fault. He communicates
his impatience by suggesting that she compares "everything" to licorice. Jig in turn
interprets this as implying that she complains too much. She repeats his words, mocking
his judgment to point out where he has failed her. Apparently, the companion has been
promising absinthe for some time. Regardless of the symbolic importance of licorice and
absinthe, the passage exemplifies how repetition empowers Jig, if only momentarily: she
can subvert his control by turning his own standards against him. Recognizing this, the
American can shore up his eroding authority only by commanding her to stop the parody.
Jig does not stop talking, however. She repeats her own words, transforming
them from assertions to questions: "1 wanted to try this new drink: That's all we do,
isn't it—look at things and try new drinks?" Quoting Robin Lakoff s work on tag
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questions ("isn’t it"), Pamela Smiley has suggested that Jig turns her assertions into
questions because she lacks authority and self-confidence (291-92). I would suggest,
rather, that the strategy authorizes Jig to define the relationship. Tag questions may signal
a lack of self-assertion, but, as Lakoff has more recently argued, they also function as a
more aggressive gesture: they coerce a respondent into agreement by limiting the range of
reply to a yes or no (Talking Power 247). In this case, the companion passively concurs
by echoing Jig's words. "1 said the mountains looked like white elephants. Wasn't that
bright?" she asks. "That was bright," he agrees, not attempting to re-frame the statement.
Jig maintains the advantage only momentarily, however. The companion engages
his presentational strategy as he tries to convince Jig why the abortion is their best option:
"That's the only thing that bothers us. It's the only thing that’s made us unhappy" (212).
Whenever Jig voices her suspicion, he reminds her that "if you don’t want to you don’t
have to. I wouldn't have you do it if you didn't want to," a line repeated five more times.
Jig remains unpersuaded, however. The reason is that, as the American tries to sway her,
she recognizes that his conversational style enforces her dependence upon him. As he
assures her that "I know you wouldn't mind it," he implies that she should defer all
decisions to him. She begins to understand that they will never be "all right and...happy"
regardless of whether she consents to the abortion. To counter his argument, she asks a
series of questions, attempting to re-frame the dialogue to more openly address the
inequality in their relationship.
"And you really want to?" [she asked.J
"I think it's the best thing to do. But I don't want you to do it if
you don't really want to."
"And if I do it you'll be happy and things will be like they were
and you'll love me?"
"I love you now. You know I love you."
"I know. But if I do it, then it will be nice again if I say things are
like white elephants, and you'll like it?"
"I'll love it. I love it now but I just can't think about it. You
know how I get when I worry."
"If I do it you won't ever worry?"
"I won't worry about that because it's perfectly simple."
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"Then I'll do it. Because I don't care about me."
"What do you mean?"
"I don't care about me."
"Well, I care about you."
"Oh, yes. But I don't care about me. And I'll do it and then
everything will be fine."
"I don’t want you to do it if you feel that way." (213)

Smiley calls Jig’s style in this passage a "direct attack [that] is very uncharacteristic of
feminine speech" (294-95). Her questions are uncharacteristic because they do not invite
what Tannen calls "rapport talk," conversation in which the discussion of similar
experiences establishes the groundwork for mutual support. Instead, she invites simple
yes/no responses or "report talk." Jig's use of repetition is likewise uncharacteristic. If
the conversational objective of feminine speech is to establish and maintain intimacy,
repetition should ratify listenership; by incorporating her companion's words into her
own talk, Jig typically would encourage him to continue participating ( That's Not What I
Meant 62). Instead, she turns his responses into conditions, forcing him to agree or
disagree. Repetition allows her to distill from his responses the source of his despair,
which he finally admits: his "worry." The implication of "If I do it you won't ever
worry?" is that a woman should accommodate a man's happiness, regardless of the
sacrifice involved. But when Jig makes this the actual message ("I don't care about me"),
challenging the American to confirm what she infers, the admission is too direct for him.
He must deny the implications of Jig's statement by resorting to his presentational
strategy to insist that the decision really is hers. Jig knows now what she suspected. He
may indeed care about her, but his concerns define the relationship.
This passage marks the turning point in the conversation when Jig defers the
caretaking to the American. Recognizing his selfishness, her lack o f choice, she
abandons face-to-face contact, leaving the table to walk to the other end of the station:
"Across, on the other side, were fields of grain and trees along the banks of the Ebro.
Far away, beyond the river, were mountains. The shadow of a cloud moved across the
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field of grain and she saw the river through the trees." What the gesture means to each of
them further marks the asymmetry of the conversation. As Tannen argues, women
typically anchor their gaze on a conversant's face to show support, while men regard such
a gesture as a threat or challenge to be employed only when challenging authority (Thai's
Not What I Meant 83). In this case, Jig tries to focus his gaze away from her immediate
condition, her pregnancy, to make him recognize an alternative future. The landscape
represents the life that they could choose: "And we could have all this," she tells him.
"And we could have everything and every day we make it more impossible." Unlike the
brown, barren hills, the fields of grain and the Ebro River promise cyclical regeneration,
an escape from the emotional waste land in which they are trapped. But for the American,
her movement poses the greatest threat yet to his control of the conversation. The
intensity of his gaze is part of his presentational strategy; it forces Jig to look away
toward the table legs or the beaded curtain. But Jig's body language now signals
disengagement to him. Repetition is no longer a means of persuasion: it must keep her
involved in the conversation. Suddenly, the companion is in the position of maintaining
the talk. Unable to understand what she means by "making it more impossible," he asks
"What did you say?" But Jig interprets the question as a sign of his indifference to her
feelings, and she abandons any elaboration:
"I said we could have everything."
"We can have everything."
"No, we can't."
"We can have the whole world."
"No, we can’t. It isn't ours anymore." (213)

Jig adopts the presentational strategy, repeating words to re-frame the conversation in her
favor, making the American deal with her dissatisfaction. But the companion always
imposes his superior judgment, sending messages that reinforce her inferiority: "Come
back in the shade," he says. "You mustn't feel that way." No longer allowing him to
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dominate, she challenges his authority by interrupting him, mocking his faith in his own
knowledge. The aggression does not satisfy her, however. When she finally returns to
the table, she recognizes that he will choose death over life. She now looks at the dry
side of the valley, leaving him anchoring his gaze on her:
"Doesn't it mean anything to you? We could get along." [said Jig.J
"Of course it does. But I don't want anybody but you. I don't want
any one else. And I know it's perfectly simple."
"Yes, you know it's perfectly simple."
"It's all right for you to say that, but I do know it." (214)

Frustrated by his presumptions, she mocks the affective force of his repetition strategy in
order to halt the conversation completely: "Would you please please please please please
please please stop talking?" But not even this dampens the companion's need to
persuade. He insists again that he wants only what she does, and Jig makes her point
even more emphatically: "I'll scream," she promises. The lengths that Jig must go to free
herself from the companion's conversational frame only traps her deeper within it:
threatening to scream, she becomes the woman without an argument, without language.
As if recognizing this predicament, she adopts an artificial economy o f emotion. Rather
than reveal the mixed shade of her confusion, she speaks in primary colors. "Do you feel
better?" the companion asks after carrying their bags to meet the oncoming train. "I feel
fine," Jig replies. "There's nothing wrong with me. I feel fine."
As my reading suggests, the linear flow of the story gears our sympathy toward
Jig by dramatizing her disadvantage in the asymmetry of the conversation. The
companion's empty repetition impedes the give-and-take of dialogue by effecting an
emotional stutter he says again and again what he wants Jig to believe. At two curious
points in the narrative, however, Hemingway employs this same presentational repetition
strategy that his story attacks. Both instances center on exchanges between the couple
and the Spanish woman tending bar at the train station:
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"We want two Anis del Toro." [he tells the bartender]
"With water?"
"Do you want it with water?"
"I don't know," the girl said. "Is it good with water?"
"It's all right."
"You want them with water?" asked the woman.
"Yes, with water."

In the fictional world, the words "with water" are not repeated four times. The comp
anion and the woman speak in Spanish, which Jig does not understand. The storyteller
translates the passage into the narrative style. The repetition, "audible" only in the reading
and not in the fictional conversation itself, cues the audience to the elemental significance
of water in the "dry" valley. A similar (if less exaggerated) incident occurs toward the
end of the story, after Jig promises to scream if the American does not stop talking.
The woman came out through the curtains with two glasses of beer and
put them down on the damp felt pads. "The train comes in five minutes," she
said.
"What did she say?" asked the girl.
"That the train is coming in five minutes."

Again, the storyteller translates the language of the figural voice into English; as a result,
a pattern of repetition is created on the narrative plane that is not heard in the fictional
world. What does this contribute to the story? One might suggest that it dramatizes Jig's
dependence on the companion, yet we recognize that point without sharing the
experience. Only if the passages were written in the "original" Spanish would the
audience (at least those not fluent in the language) feel Jig's isolation. Accounting for the
translation breaks the identification with Jig. It momentarily relocates us from the sensory
immediacy of the fictional world to the upper atmosphere of its telling. As a device,
repetition here illustrates a central theme of the story: the death of communication.
Consciously or not, Hemingway "raises" his voice at these two moments to heighten
recognition of the theme.
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This, in fact, is the common perception o f Hemingway's career: that his "presen
tational" strategy became increasingly prominent so that repetition and other devices
degenerated into mannerisms. In these arguments, Men Without Women commonly
marks the point where the style failed to mature. Significantly, it was during this period
(the late 1920s) that the publicity press promoted the link between Hemingway's authorial
ethos and his style. (The most famous example is Dorothy Parker's 1929 New Yorker
profile, in which the code of "grace under pressure" receives its fullest and most sincere
analysis). Just how loudly Hemingway's voice speaks in the reading act depends upon
more than simple knowledge o f his public identity, however. Frank O'Connor, for
example, traces several patterns of repetition in "Hills," concluding that their pros and
cons cancel out each other. On the one hand, the strategy produces a "hypnotic effect,"
yet (echoing Virginia Wolfe's criticism) it flattens the drama within the character's talk:
"Dialogue, the autonomous element of drama, begins to blur, and the conversation
becomes more like the conversation of alcoholics, drug addicts, or experts in Basic
English" (161-63). O’Connor's argument contrasts sharply with Dwight Macdonald’s;
writing a year earlier (1962), MacDonald argues that the repetitive dialogue contributes to
the overall effect: Jig's seven pleases inspire "a tightening of the scalp that tells one an
artist has made his point" (173). His appreciation for "Hills" is all the more curious since
his essay (a vituperative postmortem on Hemingway's heroic code in the wake of his
1961 suicide) is unremittingly negative. Much of the piece, in fact, parodies
Hemingway's style: "It was a kind of inspired baby-talk when he was going good.
When he was not going good, it was just baby talk" (167; recall that Stein's style was
also dismissed as "baby talk"). Whereas O'Connor is writing specifically on the short
story, Macdonald claims that the style in "Hills" is effective by comparison with A
Farewell to Arms (1929). According to Macdonald, Hemingway was a good story writer
but not a good novelist, and therefore an incomplete artist. The two assessments illustrate
the lack of an easy equation for measuring the effect of the author function. A greater
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distaste for the authorial persona does not necessarily mean that the voice will "sound"
louder in the reading act.
The relationship between the values associated with the authorial persona and their
stylistic expression can be measured in another way. A famous pair of stories from the
mid-1930s, "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" and "The Snows o f Kiliman
jaro" depart radically from the stereotyped Hemingway style. Rather than omit, they
absorb; rather than develop centripetally, they expand centrifugally. "Macomber" breaks
the tradition of narratorial effacement that "Hills" embodies with shifts to the perspectives
of its three major characters (not to mention a lion as it is shot to death); "Snows"
contains long, interpolated passages, staged in combined discourse, in which the dying
writer remembers all the stories that he failed to get onto paper. This narratorial expan
siveness dilutes the intermixed patterns of repetition and dialogue typical in Men Without
Women. Yet the change in style went unnoticed in the late 1930s (and remains relatively
unexplored today) because the authorial ethos is so ingrained in the thematic and symbolic
planes of the stories. Both "Macomber" and "Snows" manifest an obsessive concern
with masculinity in the face of death, ritual violence and sport, an open hostility toward
"rich bitch" wives—in short, they court an identification with Hemingway's public image
that blinds many audiences to the stylistic transformations. The author himself seems to
have recognized this. As he and Scribner's editor Max Perkins prepared The First Fortynine Stories for publication in 1938, he predicted a "gang-up" by reviewers: "I don’t
think it is persecution mania or egotism if I say that there are a lot of critics who really
seem to hate me very much and would like to put me out of business" {Selected Letters
470). The defensiveness permeates the introduction to the collection as he seems to admit
that his style has dulled: "In going where you have to go, and doing what you have to
do, and seeing what you have to see, you dull and blunt the instrument you write with.
But I would rather have it bent and dull and know I had to put it on the grindstone again
and hammer it into shape and put a whetstone to it, and know that I had something to
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write about, than to have it bright and shining and nothing to say, or smooth and welloiled in the closet, but unused" (Complete Short Stories 3-4). It is vintage Hemingway:
the portrait of the artist as a craftsman. But this is a particularly modernized version of the
stoiyteller, for, unlike Benjamin's nostalgic vision of community and counsel, the final
product does not lend itself to mutual experience. What Hemingway puts to the
grindstone as he sharpens his style is, quite simply, his own public image.

Djuna Barnes:

Combined Discourse and Parody

The same newspaper that celebrated Men Without Women as "naked" art had, five
years earlier, dismissed Djuna Barnes's A Book as decadent "cesspool literature."
Another reviewer suggested that "after finishing this book, one finds it necessaiy to stick
pins in oneself.. .to see if there is anything real and normal in the world" (qtd. in Messerli
Bibliography, 91-92). Forty years later, still another critic complained that Spillway, a
collection of radically revised stories from the 1920s, manifests "egoism and emptiness,"
full of moments that "reveal little in themselves, dealing as they do, with attitudinising
[i/c], oddly clad, unreal figures like nineteenth-century fashion plates" (qtd. in Messerli
Bibliography, 118). 23 The criticism is not atypical of commentaiy on Barnes's stories;
for many readers, past and present, there is too much "rhetoric," too many flat characters,
and the plots are too bizarre to stomach. Perhaps Julian Symons, perceiving Poe's
influence in the combination of macabre scenario and erudite language, puts it most kindly
when he says that "nothing may be reasonable, but everything is explained" (192-93).
While Hemingway's narratorial reticence complemented a "hard-boiled" public persona,
Barnes's lyrical, idiomatic style suggested a haughty, aloof bohemian, far more interested
in affectation than audience appeal. 24 Such charges overlook the influence of the
sensational New York dailies on her writing (just as the straight-arrow Toronto Star
shaped Hemingway’s telegraphic prose), not to mention her freelance writing for massmarket magazines like McCalls, Harper's, Vanity Fair, and Smart Set. Still, her
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"manner" inspired jokes as derisive as the "baby talk" jibe levelled at Stein. Ezra Pound,
whose appreciation for Barnes's work dimmed when she declined to sleep with him (she
"weren't too cuddly," he complained), wrote a scurrilous invective announcing that "her
blubbery prose had no fingers or toes" (qtd. in Field Djuna, 108).
Accusations of "blubbeiy prose" presuppose an artificial distinction between
content and expression in which words veil or obscure the clarity of meaning. Feminist
critics locate a barely disguised misogyny in this interpretive stance. As Shari Benstock
suggests, "The text [is] likened to a woman's body whose envelope (style or code) must
be broken in order for the substance to be recovered and explained. Reading is rape, a
submission of the text (woman) to patriarchal (critical) priorities" (Women 246).
Barnes's stories are more vulnerable to this abuse than her longer works. The novel
arises from a tradition of rhetorical luxuriance; encyclopedic forms even demand what is
derogatorily called "digression." If one reads Ryder and Nightwood as anatomies
(Burton's Anatomy o f Melancholy was one of her favorite books, and Nightwood was
originally subtitled "Anatomy of Night"), accusations of rhetorical excess are misin
formed and misogynistic. The compact space of the short story, on the other hand,
enhances the illusory split between style and subject. 25 This leads to oversimplified
readings in which Barnes's lyricism robs characters of mimetic life: they are never more
than gimmicky, "attitudinising" phrases. Her use of combined discourse should clue us
to the faultiness of such judgment. The commingling o f authorial and figural voices
reveals that style itself is composed of the particular speech patterns that give characters
their mimetic resonance.
To put it another way, Barnes's narrative voice is a mosaic of what Bakhtin calls
"character zones," those "fragments of character speech... from scattered words, sayings,
and verbal ties belonging to someone else's speech [to] those invasions into authorial
speech of others' expressive indicators (ellipses, questions, exclamations)" (Discourse
316). Idioms are more than "verbal ties” and "expressive indicators," of course; they
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resonate with ideologies that reflect their place in a culture's hierarchy of social discourse.
In this sense, combined discourse challenges us to recognize the expressive independence
of these voices while insisting on their social interdependence. The text must "school'1its
audience "to organize its semantic continuum into the appropriate voices" (McHale 273).
At first glance, this interpretive task is not daunting. Because "Run Girls, Run" is set
against medieval and Renaissance backdrops, archaic words and rhythmic syntax (whole
paragraphs are written in unbroken iambic pentameter) should indicate immersion into the
figural voices. The problem complicates, however, when one realizes that Bames
parodies these voices. Passages of Elizabethan and Jacobean vernacular ring with ironic,
modem inflections. As a series of vignettes that lampoons historical stereotypes of
women, the text stages a dialogue between a female perspective and patriarchal language.
Combined discourse allows Bames to replicate in the audience's reading a woman's
experience within "man-made" language: we become "embroiled in the hopeless task of
trying to decode or decipher a strange and incomprehensible reality... [which we
experience] as an immense hieroglyph, needing to be deciphered" (Kolodny "Some
Notes," 44). 26 The paradox is that while Bames parodies the authoritative voices that
delimit womanhood, the audience must ascribe a greater amount of narrative authority to
her in order to decode the text. Because the substance of a parody arises from how one
voice exaggerates another, the author function by necessity plays a more overt role in the
interpretive process. We cannot infer irony without ascribing an intent. 27 In "Hills Like
White Elephants," stylized repetition suggests that we may sense an author speaking
louder than his characters, drowning them out. Parody in "Run Girls, Run," by contrast,
implies that the author speaks under her breath.
The influence of the author function on reading is problematic here because the
story is relatively obscure. Published in March 1936 in a two-issue periodical called
Caravel.(as if foreseeing the magazine's imminent demise, the editors did not bother to
number its pages), "Run Girls, Run" was virtually lost before Frank Hallman reprinted it
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with "Vagaries Malicieux" in 1974. (As Hank O'Neal mentions in his "informal" memoir
of Barnes's later years, this edition was pirated; Bames herself claimed that she never
saw a copy of it [21]). Despite its recent availability, no biography or scholarly article has
ever discussed the story. Without the typical interpretive accoutrements (critical
commentary, letters, journals) that shape an audience's awareness of the storyteller's
relationship to his/her text, "Run Girls, Run" is as "authorless" a text as one can find by a
canonical modernist. An explanation for this obscurity may reside within the story itself.
Originally a chapter of Nightwood, the stoiy makes constant intertextual references that,
without its broader context, are as elusive as they are allusive. 28 Reading "Run Girls,
Run" without some knowledge of the themes and rhetorical strategies of the novel is not
unlike hearing a joke in a foreign language: one senses from the rhythm and intonation
that something humorous is being said, but the punch line is funny more for the sound
than the sense. Alongside the novel, however, the story becomes one of the many
extended discourses on history and sexuality delivered by Matthew O'Connor, the crossdressing gynecologist-philosopher who stands at the center of Barnes's narrative
maelstrom. My approach then is to draw an extended contrast between the textual clues
that signal parody within the story and the meanings that develop and accrue when a
reader looks outside the text. The matrix of mythological and Renaissance allusions at the
core of the story strikes me as fundamentally ambivalent when it comes to prompting an
interpretive stance. On the one hand, their significance is broadly cultural, and, like many
modernists, Bames might be said to adapt them as a structure for "giving shape and
significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary
histoiy," as T. S. Eliot wrote of Ulysses. Yet the ambivalence toward history manifest in
Nightwood suggests that she resists that "shape and significance." The relationship
between the short story and the novel, a dialectic of internal and external meaning, is
paradigmatic of the relationship between the marginal individual and history that both
dramatize. Julie L. Abraham points to an important sentence in Nightwood in which
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Felix Volkbein, a dispossessed Jew, feels that "the great past might mend a little if he
bowed low enough, if he succumbed and gave homage" (9). The chapter title, "Bow
Down" (originally the title of the novel), implies that liminal individuals must "abase"
themselves, succumbing to stereotype, to be absorbed into history. According to
Abraham, Barnes's narrative strategy plays off this tension between how history is told
and how it really happens (258). "Tell the story of the world to the world!" demands Dr.
O’Connor (161); this is precisely what the parodic voice does in "Run Girls, Run."
Within the text itself, the "double-voicing" of the narration arises from a formal
clash between oral and written strands. Charles Jones has argued that the ironic effect of
combined discourse arises from a juxtaposition of informal and formal styles. Because
direct speech evokes oral conversation, colloquialisms typically distinguish figural voices
from the narrator's "literary" voice; the sudden air of informality within formal narration
creates a satiric dissonance. Hypothetically, the greater the juxtaposition, the more
obvious the "register of irony" (73). By associating speech exclusively with the
colloquial, Jones ignores formal oral discourses: epic poetry, opera, oratory, all dramatic
genres that fascinated Bames. Once a playwright and actress with the Provincetown
Playhouse, her work draws from "ritual folk music-theatre in which characters give
disconnected recitatifs (sometimes in mime, sometimes playing instruments, speaking,
singing)" (Field Djuna, 183). Both Ryder and Nightwood incorporate oral discourses
like the lullaby, the sermon, and the riddle into their sui-generis textures (Ponsot 95). In
the early 1930s, Bames supported herself as a critic for Theatre Guild Magazine. One
essay from the era, "Hamlet's Custard Pie," even calls for a return to the verbal richness
of Elizabethan language. Significantly, only two fragments of direct speech appear in
"Run Girls, Run," and both are soliloquies, perhaps the quintessential "disconnected
recitatif." The juxtaposition that Jones posits does operate in the story, but the parody
arises when typographic devices (parentheses, capitalization, and spelling) interject irony
into the oracular style.
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The opening lines reveal the "double-voiced" nature of the narration: "In the days
when three sorts of nature but made a man; when the Marquis had no Seningalt, and the
Chevalier d'Eon had yet to raise his petticoat to posterity; when...the night covered all for
the gossips of daw n... we had this story—the first o f its kind, though those that followed
were as like as the links in the ankle chain of a convict" (31). The epic register speaks
with the authority of tradition; the oral formula that defines the scope of history ("in the
days...") minimalizes the "unmanliness" o f the Marquis and the Chevalier by consigning
them to the "night" (i.e. out of history, where they are the subject of gossip). The
second voice speaks for those excluded, revealing how history perpetuates itself by
repeating narratives until they become myth, lore, and other "links" that shackle identity.
The first voice is masculine: tradition is defined as "the days of our fathers." The sec
ondary voice identifies the "convicts" as those women, mothers and wives, who become
the subject of (or are subjected to) history. The adulteress, the ingenue, the prostitute, the
hag, the libertine, and the jealous wife all embody female desire in male narratives. One
by one, the dialogue instigated by the second voice rewrites these stories.
The first scenario, the adulteiy narrative, introduces a pattern o f recurring print
inflections. The first father is identified with Christ by a capitalized "He," but any air of
divinity is quickly undercut by a parenthetical insertion that links him to Othello: he has
"a bit of a Moor" in him, and his nightshirt is "bespattered with the wine o f thanks
giving." The equation of masculine sexuality and divine right is further undermined by
the husband's name, "Don Juan B.C.," which is at once an anachronism (dating from the
17th-century, long after Christ) and an anomaly: this Don is neither dandy nor seducer
but an impotent cuckold. His wife "had borne him no sons but a thundering head brace
o f thorns, having diddled and homed him on every one of his fleecy temples..." The
subtle substitution of "thorns" for "horns" links crucifixion with adulteiy. With his
"fleecy" temples, Don is the lamb of God, his pride martyred in the name of monogamy.
An epic catalogue lists the wife's adulterous liaisons: a soldier, a senator, a huntsman, a

170
headsman, a carpenter, a bishop, and "the power behind the Throne," to name just a few.
The severity of her "sin" is deflated both by the exaggerated length of the list (at least
eleven lovers, not including an unspecified number of "stew boys") and mock-judgmental
aphorisms offered in parenthetical asides: "women love the stoop in conquer," "a woman
will sidle up to a climax." The first phrase echoes both Goldsmith's play and Eliot’s The
Waste Land, in which the typist "stoops to folly" with a "carbuncular" lover. In those
scenarios, the women are seduced, but here the wife is the aggressor. The lover with
whom she stoops is a "galley-slave without an oar," his phallic inadequacy symbolic of
his social inferiority. For Don Juan, it is bad enough that his wife is unfaithful; she
sleeps across the very class boundaries that define his status as a "gentleman." Adultery
doubly insults his authority. The "climax" judgment alludes to the traditional duplicity
ascribed to female desire, the idea that if a woman enjoys sex she must have more than
pleasure in mind. Here, the wife colludes with "the power behind the Throne," the
ultimate threat to Don Juan's domestic authority. But "climax" also refers to the
conclusion of the catalogue itself; patterned on the rhythm of male sexuality ("tumescence
and detumescence...tension and resolution...intensification [and] consummation"
[Scholes 26]), the oral formula incorporates and assimilates, lists property and
possession, all the while structuring its constituent parts into a hierarchy. A catalogue of
adulterous conquests is inherently oxymoronic; the content mocks the heroic rhythm of
the mode. The parody intensifies as Barnes places these judgments within parentheses, a
marginal space symbolic of the marginality of women's culture. From this textual site,
the ironic voice comments upon the action, ridiculing and revising the narration.
Throughout the story, these parenthetical asides signal what might be called
"phallic deflations." Another lover, a priest, is "nowhere to blame had his breviary been
bigger." The thinness of his hymnal not only fails to prevent his seduction; it alludes to
his sexual inadequacy, much as the absent oar handicapped the galley-slave. As Don
sneaks upon his wife's bed chamber, he doffs his "ton of Toledo cod-work (protecting
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what she had never respected)," the aside asserting and lampooning his supremacy.
Without his cod piece attached, Don's masculinity literally withers. He transforms into
Richard the Lion-hearted, "crying like a gosling," but his self-pity is self-serving: his
wife's sexuality threatens his identity, but "his man's eye," as another parenthesis
reveals, "was embroidered all over with vestal lace making his grief slightly dubious"
(33). Draped suddenly in women's clothing (the vestal lace), he is less than a cuckold:
her adultery reduces him to a state of virginity. Don knows that killing his wife with an
Othello-like smother is part of a long tradition, "a bolster from Stratford": "Jump back
into folk-lore, that old rhyme-makers may toughen their teeth on you," he cries as he
suffocates her. "The sooner I'm done with you, that sooner will you be sung of!" (33).
But even murder cannot assuage Don's lost power; he breaks down "in the classic
manner" and begins a long soliloquy meant to justify his crime as a preservation of
tradition. His speech is notable for its declamatory style: nearly every utterance ends
with an exclamation point. "Hey nonnie, I weep like a tiger in stripes for a whelp crying
'Mother!' high on a spear’s end, in doing away with your habits, which were, God
knows, o f the w orst!... right or wrong, payment of sin always finds a head-under-pillow!
So, when I marry again at ninety, my other daughter will be a fin from another fish, blind
o f an eye for the generation's sake. And will she fore-fear the blood! She will, when she
learns that you were cooled with a pillow!" (34).
Barnes parodies here the long tradition in Elizabethan theater o f the ars moriendi,
the art of dying well, through which heroines from Ophelia and Desdemona to the titular
character of Webster's The Duchess ofMalfi maintain heavenly virtue in the midst of
their violent death. This "poor slut," however, literally goes kicking and screaming, and
even after a long round of suffocation is "not dead yet by a damned sight." Only after she
strikes a series of tragic poses, her voice reduced to "Nay! Nay! Nay!" does she
succumb: "her hands went as high as her crown, and her hands went as high as her eyes,
and her hands went as high as her mouth...and with that her hands had no more ways,
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and her soul roared from the portal." Exaggerating the iconography of death, the ironic
voice transforms tragedy into physical comedy. If deathbed scenes in the Elizabethan
theater were cathartic spectacles, Barnes turns them into sheer farce. 29 The gestures of
the dying adulteress are no more exaggerated than Don's exclamatory speech; his anxiety
for his heroic status manifests hysteria. The corpse of the adulteress becomes a spectacle
for public catharsis as the "many faced populace" tosses "shock-blossoms" upon her
funeral procession, "never so pleasantly pleased as when pelting history new made in its
own courtyard." Don accompanies the casket, still striking wounded poses so he now
resembles Little Lord Fauntleroy, "shaken with a lad's grief, though of course a man
among MEN" (34). Capitalization asserts and deflates titular status; Don's minions
include the "Lord of the Breeches" and the "Lady of the Hose."
The description of the corpse is a bitterly ironic passage that introduces another
parodic touchstone. Susan Snaider Lanser has noted the presence in Barnes's writing of
a "gynocentric sexual rhetoric...[in which] terms for the female body—furrow, nook,
path, keyhole, whorl, crevice, conch shell...are clearly designed to counteract emerging
Freudian notions of phallic supremacy and clitoral insufficiency" ("Speaking" 162).
Similar imagery pervades "Run Girls, Run," but with a less obvious "gynocentric"
revision. Because the narratorial voice assumes the tenor of history, vaginal imagery, on
the surface, evokes fear of the unknown: "They snatched her up and sealed her with wax
(better for her had it been done in her lifetime)." The custom of sealing the corpse's
orifices provides a startling metaphor for cultural strictures on female sexuality. The
parenthetical utterance has two meanings: according to the primary voice, a woman’s
chastity must be enforced by whatever means necessary. But the ironic voice implies that
unexpressed desire results in a death-in-life state. With its sexual sites waxed over and
plugged, the corpse becomes a figurine, evoking the doll imagery prevalent throughout
both Nightwood and the bulk o f Barnes's short stories (Ferguson 29-30). Swathed in
"trumpery satin," the dead wife is "a fright of a gaud," attractive because "a woman packs
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close [draws a crowd] when she has died of suspicion." Here the ironic voice parodies
the lure of a woman's tragedy. "Gaud" is a homonym for "God," again revealing the
punning inversion of meaning that the ironic voice effects on the primary, oral voice.
The second vignette introduces another parodic device, the deliberative question.
In "Life in the Iron Mills," interrogatives allow Davis's narrator to posit a moral standard
against which the reader's sympathy for the mill workers was measured. As a tool of
reproach, it fashions a superior rhetorical footing, a key component of the "distancing"
strategy. Its function in "Run Girls, Run" is slightly different: as in oral literatures, the
tone is deliberative, not challenging. It voices the mystery of nature, here associated with
female sexuality through fertility myths. The "next [convict] in line" is Nancy, who,
despite her family's best efforts, loses her virginity. She is impregnated without her
knowledge. For the primary voice, the ambiguous borderline between the asexual girl
and the sexual woman is a mystery of cultivation: "What had been up to her nines that
controversy roved her marrow at such an early age? Was she a child, or was she not,
when she first ate her porridge? Was she a woman, when a woman, she split to the
harvest?.. .Or was it ignorance, plain and simple, that reaped her eye-sockets of trouble?"
(34-35). The ironic voice subtly answers the mystery by alluding to pseudo-incest
narratives, from Greek mythology (Zeus’ numerous seductions) to Christian doctrine (the
immaculate conception). Nancy's troubles begin when she discovers a plover's egg; the
parenthetical voice underscores the persistence of the seduction narrative by admitting that
"I may have the wrong egg." As the father/seducer figure goes unaccused, his identity
unknown, the moral weight of the illegitimate birth falls upon the woman's shoulders. If
Don Juan recovered his threatened masculinity through blustery exclamations, Nancy's
soliloquy is marked by deliberative questions. Each night she asks herself: "'Now how
was it? And why was it? And who was it, by damn?" (35). According to the primary
voice, a man regards female sexuality as a devious, subversive force; for a woman
herself, however, it is not even a conscious power.
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If the funeral fineries draped upon the murdered adulteress transform her into a
child-like doll, Nancy's costume is meant to ensure her chastity. The mystery of the
pregnancy rests on how the unknown father was able to "plough up the borders of (herj
caution" while she harvests the family fields. Her clothes are meant to be a protection
against such a fate, but "tucked up as neat as a hen’s pinions," they are a form of
imprisonment, "pinioning" her. Moral traditions established by patriarchal rule should
curtail illicit passions; at Nancy's home, however, "every fire in the house," the passions
of the family romance, are "kept burning and roaring away with leaves snatched from the
Bible and The Book of Creation, the Zend Avista, and the Zohar." Her mother "dam[s]
maxims...into hosen," weaving a moral chastity belt. Yet the very "thou-shalt-nots"
sewn into the "family crotch work" provoke the threat of incest that controls women's
sexuality. Nothing enforces a taboo like a broken one. The sense that female sexuality
should serve only reproductive ends is both asserted and ridiculed: "Was she perhaps
noosed in a caul?" The narrator alludes to the superstition that the caul, the membrane that
covers the head of a fetus, is a sign o f good luck. Here, however, as a "noose," the
phrase is less prophetic than fateful: Nancy has no power to question it (35). Incest is a
disturbing subtext throughout Barnes's writings; here she dramatizes the victim's
awareness that silence turns her into the criminal: "'I'll be called a witch at the weather,
be tarred for a warning and feathered for fear's sake, be burned in the market, or ducked
in a pond'" (36).
The third tale makes the strongest connection with Nightwood by drawing an
extended analogy between women's cultural marginality and the Jewish diaspora. Nell
assumes the identity of a Saxon, with a "saxe-blue bonnet" and a "breastful of bosoms
strapped into a keel-shaped corset from old Spitzburgen." Here orthography marks the
irony: the name of the Norwegian Islands (Spitsbergen) is Germanized, alluding to the
Nazi propaganda of Aryan beauty and purity circulating through post-Weimar Germany, a
subtext of Nightwood as well. 30 Despite the disguises, Nell remains "a wandering
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Jewess, ladled up handsomely from the vat of the Hebrew," with gloves of "plausible
suede from Mount Sinai" and "ten good yards of Ghetto taffeta" for a dress (36).
Homeless, Nell becomes a "heathen," her tragedy another spectacle, worthy of Thomas
Gainsborough, the English painter: "Observe her poses. Impressive!" The ironic voice
parodies fascination with the prostitute who stands with "her hand on her hip, her hip on
a tilt, on her arm at the full, a reticule bulging with scraps swept from Parliament Street up
Sinister Lane" (37). The bulging purse becomes the synecdoche o f her social identity,
dramatizing the connection between her sexuality and economic survival. Stuffed with
remnants of her subsistence living, its "bulging" evokes masculine genitalia as well, so
the reticule symbolizes the occupation of the vagina, the penetration that Nell must
promise the "sailors closing in on her from all seas' life" if she is to stay alive.
Parenthetical insertions again signal a parodic undercurrent as Nell sings "in falsetto (the
voice we all come to) 'Only A Bird In A Gilded Cage' (God, what a voice!), changing
from largo to largo retardo as she breaks into the strains of'You Would Not Dare To
Insult Me If My Brother Were Here.'" The pun on "come" foregrounds and exaggerates
the erotic attraction of a "fallen" woman.
A deliberative question voices the voyeurism o f that attraction: "So did she,
holding on to the hand of her illegitimate daughter, on the instant of passing a beautiful
deep-seated cistern, throw herself in by mistake?.. .She did and was a wet sighing seawork in less than a month." The suicide passes unnoticed; Nell's body decomposes,
absorbed in vapor and sent down in rain. In the most surreal vignette, her daughter gains
celebrity as "the ugliest woman in history (dating about the Voltaire period)," the
parenthesis parodying the arbitrary dating of tradition. The orphan (whose name is never
given) evokes an older tradition, the female grotesque, which Barnes knew from her
reading of Rabelais. As a "dog-faced Girl" who grows "fat as a pudding" and takes "to
loud barking [like] a beagle pointing herself by the scruff of her neck," she embodies the
paradox of the grotesque body: she transgresses the idealized feminine beauty that her
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mother embodied, yet that indifference is itself idealized and appropriated into a masculine
tradition of rebellion (Russo 218-19): "Men hunted her in the spring like hounds; they
plunged through the snow, sleet, rain, all for a word with her about it., .in the end she
was traced back into Perugia by fools-cap and urine, all the way out of Egypt and over the
Andes into Peru" (28). In a scene that evokes the "ambivalent" imagery of "pregnant
death" from Ryder (Ponsot 108), she gives birth not to a child but to "the Bird of her
Soul, which pecking on a long seam came out at her navel, and on flat wings flew straight
into the Face of Convention." The "bird" or child astonishes "the Elders" of heaven by
rewriting mythology: she becomes "large o f Leda, who [turns] out to be a boy with a
Greek face." The gender roles are reversed: the bird is a woman whose Zeus-like
sexuality astonishes the gods. Stunned to discover the shape and contours of his own
body, Leda contorts himself into a mock-erotic position, "never having heard there’s
nothing much on the back" (38). By reversing roles in the rape scene, the ironic voice
transforms death into liberty. Free from the body, the androgynous soul obtains a fuller
identity.
The final vignette offers two visions of the bestial woman: Hazel the sexual
libertine and Frampucca the jealous, devious virago. We first see Hazel fainting at the
"milk-white knob" of her father's house. A parenthetical aside distinguishes her from the
other women: "no babe whimpered at the breast bone nor was there snow in the air."
Hazel has been "hot-footing it down the paternal ivy facing Main Street" with her
boyfriend. Her father accuses her of "setting her chin out from the family" and promptly
tosses her out, but not before ”beard[ing] her night trick," again, an ambiguous reference
to incest. The Lord offers her to Frampucca's frazzled butcher-husband, Gonzales, as an
extramarital gift for "having taken in marriage a Christ day resenter, a terrible creature
who walked on her two feet as if they were four, whose one eye was dour for the sake of
the other" (39). To hide their liaison, Hazel dresses as a boy in galligaskins and calls
herself Gavin, but the body cannot be hidden beneath clothes: Frampucca recognizes that
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she "was no more girl than the pout of her breeks [breeches] would suggest" (39). But
Gonzales and Hazel are hardly discrete. They take to "sweet kissing" under a "mythically
roving moon" in "gall-spotted pastures," their audacity transforming the landscape.
"Could matters so stand?"
The jealous wife murders Hazel because "lore must be served; tragedy must come
from all points of the compass. The Hellenic gesture, Epic injustice, were in those days,
things that did not see the the brains of scholars alone; oftimes the exceeding small inch
of damnation called a feminine skull could catch out scorpions, and such an inch had
Frampucca" (39-40). Bames dramatizes the murder as a parodic aggression against
female sexuality. Unlike Don Juan B.C., whose revenge is spontaneous, a momentary
but justifiable loss of control (a crime of passion, in other words), Frampucca concocts a
grotesque, premeditated demise for her rival: Hazel is roasted alive "like a queen in her
chamber" in the belly o f Gonzales' best white ox.
Frampucca’s bestial nature is an affront to Gonzales's masculinity. "Scattered and
harried by the hell in his wife," he recalls Don Juan B.C. with his head of "fleecy thorns"
(40). He hardly seems worthy of the bull, "the hero of the herd," whose fertility is
figured into the arch of its horns. While the ox models "a gibbus [a rounded bulge] of
plenty against the night sky," Gonzales scurries about in an apron, his tapes "stiff as the
switch in the tail of an ass, what with hurrying hither and yon at her bidding." Yet
Hazel’s murder, far from further diminishing his phallic power, confers on Gonzales a
tragic status. No longer an ass, he assumes the imagery of a soldier "Who was it gave
out that long wailing cry like a bell tom from the arms of the hour? Gonzales going head
forward, headlong, at battle alone" (41). While the murder bears an obvious negative
effect on the two women, it catalyzes the masculinity Gonzales has long lacked, much as
the funeral possession confers on Don Juan B.C. the solemnness that he lacks in
marriage. The transformation is the most egregious display of the bias of history: if the
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primary voice is masculine, as the opening invocation suggests, Barnes implies that,
whatever its truth, history is told to the advantage of its authors.
She caps the point by ending the story with a one-line memorial to these victims:
"Farewell, Ladies, farewell! farewell!" (41). The phrase implies less concern with the
tragedy of the women than their value as tragic figures. An inversion of the title, it brings
the text to an ironic full circle. The title urges women to escape history, but the farewell
suggests that, simply for their lives to make the official record, they must submit to the
historical patterns of identity established by myth and legend. In the section of the novel
from which "Run Girls, Run" was most likely excised (the "Watchman, What of the
Night?" chapter), Matthew O'Connor declares that "man makes history with the one hand
and ’holds it up' with the other" (90). He uses the word "man" generically here, but his
long "tirade” against history clearly identifies its authors as male. They control the day
and exile all others to the night, an exile specifically dramatized in the opening lines of
"Run Girls, Run." In the novel, the characterization of O'Connor is a tourde force of
androgynous layerings: a woman trapped in the body of a man wearing a woman's
flannel nightgown and wig. Even disembodied in the short story, the acidic humor of this
doubled voice bums through the body of history that it sets forth.

Richard Wright:

Combined Discourse and Empathy

Barnes and Richard Wright both reviewed Stein's last work, Wars I Have Seen
(1945). Barnes, who had long cultivated a personal antipathy for the matriarch of Paris
exile, dismissed the book as an aesthetic exercise. Writing in Contemporary Jewish
Record (the forerunner of Commentary), she found Stein's language predictably selfcentered, insulated, oblivious to the moral devastation of fascism and Nazism ("Primer”
342-43). By contrast, Wright was so enthusiastic that the resulting autobiographical
reminiscence, which compares Stein to his grandmother, had to be cut to fit the bookreview format of P. M. Magazine. The published fragment, roughly one-third of the
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original essay, describes his discovery of "Melanctha," the centerpiece of Three Lives, in
the early 1930s: "My ears were opened for the first time to the magic of the spoken word.
1 began to hear the speech of my grandmother, who spoke a deep, pure Negro dialect.
All of my life I had been only half hearing, but Miss Stein's struggling words made the
speech of the people around me vivid. From that moment on, in my attempts at writing, 1
was able to tap at will the vast pool of living words that swirled around me" (247). He
admits having worried about "worshipping decadence" by admiring a writer who, accord
ing to fellow left-wing critics, was "tainted with the spirit of the counter-revolution," so
he concocted an "experiment" to test the accuracy of her prose: "I gathered a group of
semi-literate Negro stockyard workers...into a Black Belt basement and read Melanctha'
aloud to them....Enthralled, they slapped their thighs, howled, laughed, stomped and
interrupted me constantly to comment upon the characters" (248).
Both reviews are deeply persona] and political; both are surrounded by historical
ironies. Not long after Barnes accused Stein of political apathy, her own work came
under similar attack. 31 Wright's affection for "Melanctha," meanwhile, is intriguing in
light of his criticism of several Afro-American writers for "curtsying" to white
expectations of black speech. The unpublished essay, "Memories of My Grandmother,"
links Stein's vernacular to rhythms in jazz and scat, bridging her modernist surrealism
with Afro-American oral traditions. As Gayl Jones notes, several writers o f color have
found in "Melanctha" echoes of "the incremental repetition and syntactical details of blues
balladry, and in the fragmentations and juxtapositions the effect of African American jazz"
(75). For Wright, however, minority-culture folklore lacks the authority that he hopes to
establish for his voice. While advocating an awareness of these traditions, he more
typically describes his art as an appropriation o f the dominant culture's literary styles: "I
took these techniques [of "white writers"], these ways of seeing and feeling, and twisted
them, bent them, adapted them, until they became my ways of apprehending the locked-in
life of the Black Belt Areas" ("How 'Bigger' Was Bom" xvi). The claim is illustrated in
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another autobiographical writing where he describes spending "hours and days pounding
out disconnected sentences for the sheer love of words" in homage to Three Lives
(,American Hunger 21-22). The results hardly evoke "Melanctha," reflecting instead
Wright’s burgeoning naturalism, his belief that social context determines character.
According to Eugene Miller, the attraction of Stein's prose was the "emphatic exagger
ation" that she invested in words (33), an effect that Wright, in the review, describes as
"insistent" (perhaps recalling her own language in "Portraits and Repetition"). Exagger
ation ostensibly allows him to foreground the music of language, much as Stein's style,
as I argued in my reading of "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene," foregrounds sonic texture
over semantics. But while Stein refrains from establishing "a" meaning, Wright equates
"insistence" with emphatic force. Rather than fashion an ambiguous story line, he
frequently overdetermines symbols and images, forcing the audience to ground its
interpretation in his "way of apprehending."
Wright's ambivalence toward dialect is illustrated by his distaste for Zora Neale
Hurston, who perpetuated the "minstrel technique that makes 'white folks' laugh....Iby]
exploit[ing] that phase of Negro life which is 'quaint,' the phase which evokes a piteous
smile on the lips of the 'superior' race" ("Between Laughter" 251). In The Signifying
Monkey, Henry Louis Gates analyzes the attitude toward narrative authority that
distinguishes Hurston from Wright. She achieves an "authentic narrative voice that
echoes and aspires to the status of the impersonality, anonymity, and authority of the
black vernacular tradition, a nameless, selfless tradition, at once collective and
compelling" (183). Combined discourse is a central device of this project: the narrative
voice in Their Eyes Were Watching God, first represented in standard English, gradually
absorbs Janie's idiom as it expresses her thoughts. Eventually it speaks for an entire
community by mingling multiple perspectives in the figural idiom. Wright's style, by
contrast, displays an inveterate individualism; he defines himself against his race, his
"humanity achieved only at the expense of his fellow blacks, pitiable victims of the
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pathology of slavery and racial segregation who surround and suffocate him....W right
wills the especial self into being through the agency of contrast: the sensitive, healthy part
is foregrounded against a determined, defeated black whole” (182). If combined
discourse allows Hurston to dissolve conventional narrative authority into a "nameless,
selfless tradition," Wright refuses to relinquish "what Roland Barthes calls the
'proprietary consciousness,' the constant sign of his presence and of some larger context,
which the third-person voice inevitably entails" (184). Wright occasionally employs
combined discourse, but the figural voices are transcribed into standard English, not
Afro-American vernacular. Dialect appears only in direct speech. 32
Gates uses Native Son as his proof text, positing a triangular influence between
Hurston, Wright, and Ralph Ellison. The reading of Hurston's "speakerly text" is
intriguing, but one wishes a deeper analysis of what compelled Wright to establish a
"proprietary" voice. His early short stories reveal a long period of experimentation with
dialect and discourse. Unlike Native Son, the narrative style in "Almos' a Man" does
absorb minority idiom: "Dave struck out across the fields, looking homeward through
paling light. Whuts the usa talkin wid em niggers in the field?" (356). 33 The many
manuscript drafts located in the Bienecke Library at Yale, including an early version
rejected by Story Magazine in 1936, reveal Wright's dissatisfaction with the technique.
Originally conceived as a chapter of an unpublished novel entitled Tarbaby's Sunrise,
"Almos1a Man" was briefly considered for inclusion in Uncle Tom's Children (1939),
his first story collection. It appeared in Harper's Bazaar two months before Native Son
was published, but when editor George Davis solicited a contribution in the fall of 1939,
Wright was so busy with his novel that he asked a friend, Marie Mencken, to cull a
complete submission from the Tarbaby manuscript (Fabre Ordeal, 194). (The extent of
Mencken’s editorial emendations has yet to be gauged). He subsequently revised the
story before his death in late 1960, adding a new title, "The Man Who Was Almost a
Man," for publication in Eight Men (1961). 34 If Wright thought little of the piece (it
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goes unmentioned in his autobiographies), it quickly became his best-known short
fiction, anthologized more than a half-dozen times throughout the 1940s alone.
Currently, it remains the work most often chosen to represent his career in college
readers. 35
Wright's struggle to find a voice in the late 1930s is rooted in the pragmatic aim of
his fiction. Hurston and other Harlem Renaissance artists were "counter-revolutionaiy"
because they failed to confront the racial iniquities of white America. Concentrating on
life within minority communities, they perpetuated a "petty bourgeoisie" that pacified
black audiences and entertained white culture by showing that "the Negro was not
[socially] inferior...that he had a life comparable to that of other people." Wright defined
his own literaiy project as radical, confrontational, disruptive. The existing AfroAmerican literary tradition, he argued, was too "humble" and "decorous," which was
why he turned to "Eliot, Stein, Joyce, Proust, Hemingway, and Anderson" as his
models. Their techniques promised expression of "a deep, informed, and complex
consciousness" heretofore absent in black writing. Modernist devices would solve "the
problem of perspective" by establishing in the audience's mind "a relationship between a
Negro woman hoeing cotton in the South and the men who loll in swivel chairs in Wall
Street and take the fruits of her toil" ("Blueprint" 45-46). If Barnes manipulated double
voiced discourse to create a parodic dissonance, Wright aims to engineer empathy.
The opening passage of "Almos’ a Man" illustrates Wright's reaction to the
"problem of perspective": "Whuts the usa talkin wid em niggers in the field? Anyhow,
his mother was putting supper on the table. Them niggers can't understan nothing. One
of these days he was going to get a gun and practice shooting, then they can't talk to him
as though he were a little boy. He slowed, looking at the ground. Shucks, Ah ain
scareda them even ef they are biggem me!" (356). Three modes of representation appear
here: the narrative voice that records exterior actions and events ("he slowed"); combined
discourse, in which Dave's thoughts are expressed in the narrative style ("one of these
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days"); and interior monologue, in which Dave's thoughts are expressed in his own
idiom and register ("Ah ain scareda"). The juxtaposition of the last two is curious.
Interior monologue is a more mimetic form of combined discourse, typically used to
represent a character's unspoken thoughts. Distinguished by first-person pronouns and
the present tense, it resembles direct speech "shorn of its conventional orthographic
cues," namely quotation marks (McHale 259), Because it conveys less narratorial
mediation, submerging us deeper in the character's consciousness, interior monologue is
the device par excellence of empathy. In "Almos' a Man," however, the juxtaposed
sentences of combined discourse diminish this immediacy. Side by side, the two modes
create a perspectival uncertainty: the storyteller allows certain thoughts to be heard in
Dave’s voice but assumes responsibility for articulating others.
The juxtaposition of dialect and standard English highlights a matrix of opposi
tions built into the thematic layers o f the story: not only black vs. white, but child vs.
parent, interior vs. exterior, psychology vs. sociology, and, most important, man vs.
boy, all of which illustrate how the socialization of language restricts the formation o f the
individual consciousness. "Boy," for example, has two obvious meanings: it marks
Dave as an adolescent and a black male. When whites like Joe the store owner and Jim
Hawkins, his boss, speak of Dave as "nuthin' but a boy" both meanings are inevitably
invoked. Achieving manhood thus requires redefining the pejorative terms of white
culture. For Gates, the opposition between the black individual and white society
represents a wholesale rejection of the intermediary minority community and its traditions,
which offer a less self-aggrandizing space in which a mature sense of self might be
cultivated. In "Almos' a Man," however, these traditions are compromised by the
absorption of white language, for racial markers distribute power within the AfroAmerican community. Dave thinks of the other field hands as "niggers." When he asks
his mother if he can buy a gun, she says, "Nigger, is yuh gone plumb crazy?" Regard
less of who speaks, language is a force of deception and manipulation. When Dave
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reminds his mother that she promised him a gun, she disowns her own words: "Ah don
care whut Ah promised! Yuh ain nothing but a boy yit!" 36 Dave himself resorts to
lying: he tells his mother that he has been talking with other boys when he was actually
borrowing Joe’s catalogue. He tells his father that he threw the gun into the creek when
he actually buried it beside a tree. His most egregious lie comes when he claims that
Jenny, Jim Hawkins’ mule, impaled itself on the plow when, in fact, Dave accidentally
shot it while test firing his new gun. Knowing that the lie will fail, he realizes that the
truth is too humiliating: "He could not tell Jim Hawkins he had shot his mule. But he
had to tell something. Yeah, Ahll tell em Jenny started gittin wil n fell on the joint of the
plow.... But that would hardly happen to a mule. He walked across the field slowly, head
down" (365).
The scene in which Dave confesses the truth of Jenny’s death is the most dramatic
rendering of the thematic oppositions, illustrating why he must ultimately jump a
northbound train to that ambiguous "somewhere" where he can be a man. Unlike "Big
Boy Leaves Home," in which the hero also escapes by train, the Afro-American
community offers no support or encouragement. The crowd that gathers to gawk at the
dead beast, anonymous except for Dave's parents and Jim Hawkins, is biracial. Dave,
reduced to tears, ”see[s] blurred white and black faces," the color line blended by his
humiliation. The individual voices in the crowd are not distinguished by variations in
dialect: the community acts uniformly in ridiculing Dave's attempt to lie. Indeed, it is
Dave's mother who first reveals that he owns a gun. The scene, staged solely with
dialogue and a minimum of narrative commentary, includes an ironic echo of the verbal
games that, as Gates argues, are a central mode of interaction in Afro-American commun
ities. Here, however, the verbal play further alienates Dave:
Somebody in the crowd laughed. Jim Hawkins walked close to Dave
and looked into his face.
"Well, looks like you have bought you a mule, Dave."
"Ah swear fo Gawd, Ah didn't go t kill the mule, Mistah Hawkins!"
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"But you killed her!"
All the crowd was laughing now. They stood on tiptoe and
poked heads over one another's shoulders.
"Well, boy, looks like yuh done bought a dead mule! Hahaha!"
"Ain tha ershame.’
"Hohohohoho.'
Dave stood, head down, twisting his feet in the dirt. (367)

In debt to "Mistah Hawkins" for two more years, Dave is reduced again to a "boy," the
"hot anger" bubbling within him the only sure sign that, to himself, he can still be a man.
As in "A White Heron," the gun is a symbol o f the power to silence. In Jewett's
story, the sharp report of the hunter's weapon offers a punning clue to the narrative
strategy: the storyteller avoids "hushing" the reader with a pure reportage by calling
attention to gaps in the presentation. In "Almos' a Man," however, "hushing" other
voices is precisely what Dave hopes to achieve. The gun is a substitute for the voice that
he lacks within his community. He associates its power with manhood: "And if he were
holding his gun in his hand nobody could run over him; they would have to respect him"
(362). To gain this respect, he must master the weapon. The first time he fires it,
accidentally killing the mule, the report is deafening, knocking him to the ground. Its
force frightens him: "He stood up and stared at the gun as though it were a live thing. He
gritted his teeth and kicked the gun. Yuh almos broke mah arm!" (364). After the crowd
humiliates him, however, the gun becomes an even more attractive object of desire. He
sneaks back to retrieve it, convinced that "ef other men kin shoota gun, by Gawd, Ah
kin!" As Dave empties the chambers, the storyteller repeats the line in standard English:
"With effort he held his eyes open; then he squeezed....Bloooom! Bloooom! Click,
click! There! It was empty. If anybody could shoot a gun, he could. He put the gun into
his hip pocket and started across the fields" (369). A s with the opening passage o f the
story, Wright mixes three representational modes, modulating between figural idiom and
the narrative style. The repetition o f the sentence in standard English establishes Dave's
passage into manhood.
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Houston A. Baker offers an evocative metaphor for understanding the relationship
between the Dave's transformation and the shifts in perspective. W hat prompts Dave to
retrieve the gun and re-fire it is an intense awareness of his place in the community: "Dam
em all! Nobody ever gave him anything. All he did was work. They treat me lika
m ule....N then they beat m e,...H e gritted his teeth. N Ma had t tell on me" (368).
Baker, borrowing from Carolyn Fowler, describes such moments as the black selfs
sudden awareness of his/her "zero image" in the "perceptual schemes of the white,
dominant culture." The realization prompts the first stage of the "rites of the black
(w)hole," a ritual passage into a self-defined identity. Baker illustrates this passage with
the metaphor of the black hole, the collapsed star whose intense concentration of mass
reverses gravitational fields, drawing all light to its core. "Almos' a Man" is wholly
compatible with this ritualistic passage since, as the title suggests, what Dave desires is an
escape from the liminal status of adolescence, defined by its dependence on elders, to a
self-sufficient manhood. "The trope of the black hole," writes Baker, "suggests a
'squeezing' of matter of zero sum." That is, the individual, having absorbed the "zero
image" that s/he embodies in the dominant culture, appropriates and compresses it to a
zero mass by the sheer force of desire. This moment of compression is symbolically
illustrated as Dave squeezes the gun's trigger. Both shooting scenes mark the pulling of
the trigger as the pivotal moment of transformation, the line that Dave momentarily
hesitates to cross. In the first scene, when he fatally wounds Jenny, the firing knocks
Dave to the ground, where he finds "himself on his knees, squeezing his fingers hard
between his legs" (363). The image confirms any suspicions that the gun symbolizes the
phallic power of manhood. In the second shooting scene, the squeezing marks the
halfway point between "Ef other men kin shoota gun" and its transcription into standard
English. In the first scene, Dave accidentally kills Jim Hawkins' mule; in the second, he
intentionally kills the community’s image of himself as a beast of burden: "They treat me
lika mule."
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By jumping the Illinois Central, Dave enters the first stage o f his quest for "black
(w)holeness": a self-conscious retreat from the dominant culture where "the act of
withdrawal is equivalent to a conflagrational retreat in which the mass of old edicts is
reduced to a light that can be dispensed (with)" (Baker 141-42). Dave's escape is not
quite the "strategy of retreat" upon which Big Boy or even Bigger Thomas embark; there
is no white mob pursuing him. Nor does "Almos* a Man" concern the second and third
stages of the rites. There is no "period of instruction" in which he establishes contact
with the "mythic images of experiences internalized by active black culture bearers" or a
return to society distinguished by a "black difference" that "(w)rites a new order of
discourse" by replacing traditional perceptual modes (Baker 142-43). Wright's notes on
the Tarbaby's Sunrise manuscript suggest how these stages might have been dramatized
had the project not been aborted: Dave escapes to Chicago where he becomes a
professional boxer, his anger finding symbolic expression in the pummeling of white
culture. Yet "Almos* a Man" does contain a symbolic rejection of the "light" of the
dominant community. On his way to the train tracks, Dave passes Jim Hawkins's home,
a "big white house," that, even in the dark night, glows: "Lawd, if Ah had jus one mo
bullet Ahd taka shot at tha house. Ahd like t scare ol man Hawkins jusa little....Jussa
enough t let im know Dave Saunders is a man" (369).
Delineating the discovery of potential "black (w)holeness" in the face of
oppressive modes of socialization, "Almos’ a Man" illuminates the spark of desire that
transforms the singular consciousness. The interior struggle of this formation suggests
why Wright experimented with the more experientially immediate mode o f interior
monologue: direct access to Dave's thought signals what Baker calls the "code of desire"
whose energy traps and collapses cultural stereotypes. Yet the very dialect in which
Dave's desire finds its voice is itself a social discourse subject to stereotyping, namely the
minstrel-show versions of black vernacular to which Wright linked Hurston's style. As a
literaiy convention, dialect can perpetuate the same distribution of authority to which the

Afro-American community in "Almos1a Man" has fallen prey. The shifts between
interior monologue and combined discourse mark Wright’s effort to capture the interior
intensity o f Dave's struggle for expression without allowing his own language to evoke
conventionalized styles of Afro-American dialect. As Baker illustrates in his reading of
Black Boy (1945), Wright thought of perspective as a pre-verbal realm, an intuitive mode
of identification in which "words are, finally, objects annulled by a desirous
consciousness in order to achieve the communality of 'point o f view1" (137). Wright's
description of his own youthful reading illustrates how language is merely "fuel" to feed
the "black (w)hole." Rather than identify with "plots and stories," he reads for the
perspective that books reveal, drawing from them what Baker calls "correlative
structures" of desire whose affectivity feeds the absence of a vague "something" denied
by his experience in the segregated south. As he becomes a writer, Wright identifies this
desire as the moment of self-consciousness. His literary project, in turn, rests on
provoking in the audience the same recognition of the absent "something" that he
perceived in his reading. Baker links Wright's goal here to Barthes's vision of "zerodegree writing": by universalizing perspective as a quest for the "trace of desire," he
inverts and nullifies the "fixed discursive norms" that define a particular moment in
literary history. As Baker writes, "A beautifying, 'literary' language is a restrictive array
of conventions preserving class division, maintaining the status quo surfaces of life,
creating desire rather than elaborating its transcendence" (137-39). The shifts in
representational modes mark then an implicit identification between the figural and
authorial consciousness, an aligning of perspectives focused on the expression of
frustrated desire that is meant, finally, to solicit an identification from the audience. The
argument allows Wright's style to be recuperated from the pejorative connotations of
individuality that Gates attaches to it. Hurston fashions a "speakerly" style of narration
by evoking oral discourse without identifying a speaker as the origin of the utterances.
Wright creates a "thinkerly" style in which the linking o f perspectives, the creation of
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empathy, (ostensibly) transcends its medium of expression. Again, the difference rests
on the attitude toward the social function of language. Hurston explicitly describes the
communal interchange dramatized through combined discourse as "words walking
without masters." For Wright, however, narration must "master words" and then "make
them disappear" to establish empathy (American Hunger 22).
The pattern of perspectival shifts illustrates how Wright attempts to re-write the
"code of desire" into an anti-literary language. Combined discourse functions as a rhetor
ical hedge, qualifying the interior monologue to extinguish lingering stereotypes of black
vernacular by transmuting Dave's desire into "structures" of vision and feeling. As is
common with passages of interior monologue, Dave's directly rendered thoughts "sound"
like direct speech; again, the only difference is the lack of quotation marks. The
conceptual paradox of the style (it gives voice to unvoiced thoughts) enhances its
suitability to the thematic and rhetorical concerns of "Almos1a Man." As a liminal mode
of representation, it conveys the Iiminality of Dave's identity. Predominantly cast in the
form of exclamatory utterances, interior monologue dramatizes the intensity of Dave's
desire: "Ahma git some money from Ma n buy me a gun! Only two dollahs!" But com
bined discourse revises this desire, shifting the narrative perspective away from its
expression to its perception. As Dave stares at Joe's catalogue, for example, the "feeling"
of desire moves from the cognitive to the tactile realm: "Lawd, ef Ah only had tha pretty
one! He could almost feel the slickness of the weapon with his fingers. If he had a gun
like that he would polish and keep it shining so it would never rust. N Ah'd keep it
loaded, by Gawd!" (360). Desire takes shape as a prayer-like invocation (many of these
fragments, in fact, either begin with "Lawd," "by Gawd," or some variation of the two),
which is then "answered" by the narrative voice that expresses the self-consciousness of
this longing. Even when Dave shoots the mule and the interior monologue conveys his
fear and shock ("Ah wuznt shootin at tha mule"), the narrative voice lends its authority to
the expression of feeling: "He knew he had to stop that blood..." After Dave's
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humiliation, however, the pattern of shifts reverses, moving from combined discourse to
interior monologue to express the growth in his perception: "Well, if he had to, he would
take old man Hawkins that two dollars. But that meant selling the gun. And he wanted to
keep that gun. Fifty dollahs fer a dead mule" (368). Here the direct transcription of
Dave's thought dramatizes the transformation out of the liminal realm of the "almost." It
is a moment when he recognizes that to be a man, he must separate himself from the
system of exchange that threatens to enslave him for another two years.
One of the minor revisions that Wright made shortly before his death in 1960
further illuminates the unfolding pattern of shifts. In the 1940 version, Dave awakens the
morning after he buys the gun: "In the gray light of dawn he held it loosely, feeling a
sense of power. Could killa man wida gun like this. Kill anybody, black er white"
(362). In the Eight Men version, however, the line is cast in standard English. In the
first case, the desire to murder dramatizes the lengths Dave is willing to go to "squeeze"
the community's image of him to zero mass. In the second case, however, the "propri
etary" voice endorses the impulse, ostensibly universalizing it. The revision lifts the
desire out of Dave's individual perspective to the non-linguistic realm of a "pure" or
communal feeling. The newer title likewise suggests a revisionary staging of the quest
for "black (w)holeness." "Almos' a Man" is a direct quotation of Dave's longing, but
"The Man Who Was Almost a Man" renders that desire tautological; Dave need only
realize that he is already a man to be one.
There are several explanations for why Wright stopped incorporating dialect into
the narrative voice. In "How Bigger Was Bom," he describes his dissatisfaction with the
reception of Uncle Tom's Children as his own failure to render the rebellion of its
protagonists without provoking pity: "I found that I had written a book in which even
bankers' daughters could read and weep over and feel good about. 1 swore to myself that
if I ever wrote another book, no one would weep over it; that it would be so hard and
deep that they would have to face it without the consolation of tears" (ii). To re-phrase
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this in Baker's terms, Wright finds that his stories "create" desire rather than "elaborate
[its] transcendence." The result is a cathartic sympathy, not empathy. To ensure this
effect, he must resist blending other voices with his own. As he admits while describing
the composition o f Native Son, trying to "render, depict, [and] not merely tell the stoiy"
without imposing his "way of apprehending" is a difficult task: "Sometimes I'd find it
necessary to use a stream of consciousness technique, then rise to an interior monologue,
descend to a direct rendering of a dream state, then to a matter-of-fact depiction of what
Bigger was saying, doing, and feeling. Then I'd find it impossible to say what I wanted
to say without stepping in and speaking outright on my own" (xxii). As Gates argues,
the absence of dialect in the combined discourse reveals that Wright exerts his authorial
propriety more than he admits.
The reception histoiy of "Almos' a Man" illustrates how authorial propriety is not
always successful in delimiting the meaning of a text. The greatest concentration of
critical commentary, in fact, ignores aesthetic manifestoes like "Blueprint for Negro
Writing" and "How Bigger Was Bom" and grounds its interpretation wholly in internal
evidence. In many of the teacher's guides to the college readers that anthologize the
story, Dave's quest for manhood is treated ironically. The interplay of interior
monologue and combined discourse, rather than persuade us to identify with Dave,
distances us from him. 37 This interpretation arises because, as McHale suggests, the
absence of narrative authority inherent in combined discourse renders its reception
dangerously equivocal: whether an audience perceives irony or empathy reflects its
opinion of the subject rendered (275). In this case, the temptation to view Dave's desire
as ironic seems to reflect a cultural discomfort with equation of manhood and violence that
the story otherwise endorses. I am not suggesting that ironic interpretations are wrong;
they illustrate how the author function can be ignored as well as employed.
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Toward the Minimalist Short Story
Though typically regarded as a naturalist, Wright occupies a curious place in the
evolution of modernist styles. With techniques learned from Stein and Hemingway, he
delineates the complexity of the black consciousness that (he felt) the Afro-American
literary tradition failed to convey. Yet this consciousness is always in conflict with the
surrounding social environment. The function of W right’s technique is subsequently split
down the middle: while he strives to transcend language by crafting a style that prompts
intuitive identification, he must fall back upon realistic modes of representation to portray
the social realm that stifles the development of the individual. As previously mentioned,
Baker compares Wright's project to Barthes's vision of "zero-degree" language. Apropos
of Gates’s argument that Wright defines himself against his race, it is ironic to note that
Barthes's translators describe le degre zero as "colourless writing." For Barthes, such a
style inevitably degenerates into a social discourse so that "a mode of writing appears
afresh in lieu of an indefinite language" (Writing 78). Wright's career spans the same
period in which the academy absorbs and institutionalizes the aesthetic values of
modernism. However radical his aim, his manner embodies the predominant stylistic
trend in short fiction between 1940 and 1980: rather than fragment reality, techniques like
combined discourse allow a storyteller to claim a mimetic representation o f a deep,
complex modem consciousness.
The effect of this institutionalization on the short story can also be measured in the
vast expansion of the "little-magazine" market. For modernists, smal 1-circulation
periodicals offered a relatively low-stakes arena for radical experimentation. Stein,
Hemingway, and Barnes published their work in The Little Review, This Quarter, and
transatlantic, to name but three, because they were personal acquaintances of Margaret
Anderson and Jane Heap, Ernest Walsh, and Ford Madox Ford, their respective editors.
With the exception of The Little Review, which folded because, as Anderson wrote in her
1930 memoirs, its "mission was complete" and anything afterward would only be
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repetitious, most of these publications were shoestring operations dependent on the
largesse of patrons like John Quinn. They came and went without much fanfare,
discovered only later by literary historians. For every Barnes or Stein that they
published, there was a Baroness Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, Abraham Lincoln
Gillespie, and H any Crosby, mainstays of the Paris milieu that Julian Symons describes
as "fantastic freaks" and "genuine phoneys" (206), writers better known for their personal
peculiarities (or their wealth) than their talent. To be sure, the absorption of the little
magazines into the University has not eliminated mediocrity, but it has, according to many
critics, eliminated the peculiarities.
The expansion of small-circulation quarterlies and biannuals is directly linked to
the contraction of the large-circulation magazine. In his 1964 book, William Peden notes
that "big slicks" like Collier's, the Saturday Evening Post, and This Week reached "a
combined audience of upwards of sixty million readers," the formidable size of their
audience allowing them to conduct "recruiting raids as zealously as did the talent scouts
for Hollywood and bigtime football" (13-14). Within six years, however, all three of
these magazines had ceased publication (though The Post would later emerge as a
monthly rather than weekly). Other prestigious outlets, including The Atlantic Monthly,
Harper's, and Esquire, drastically reduced the number of short stories published per
issue. In 1972, John W. Aldridge would complain that the institutionalization of
modernism had created a "new fabricated literary mass culture" of academic writers
"infected with a specious literariness through the study of writing" ("Gray Middle" 229).
Twenty years later, he would claim that this fabricated culture had infected the few
surviving large-circulation periodicals ("Empty Blue" 18). The culprit was a mode
closely identified with The New Yorker labeled minimalism by its detractors. According
to Aldridge and other critics, the minimalist style pandered to a mass audience by
appropriating the language of television writing.
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The next chapter begins with a survey o f these complaints, then suggests how
minimalism might be considered a return to storytelling. Both Raymond Carver and
Bobbie Ann Mason foreground the narrative frame much like the bachelor narrators
discussed in the first chapter. Their conversational styles are not a nostalgic evocation of
orality, however. Minimalism bears the influence of electronic communication by
projecting an isolated and intense perpetual present whose immediacy radically alters the
negotiation of narrative authority. By eliding the temporal gap that traditionally separates
a story from its narration, minimalists fuse the two into a single performative event.

N otes
1Huyssen's After the Great Divide explores these contradictions, detailing how
modernists defined themselves against mass culture at the same time that they
appropriated its forms (see Chapter Three, especially 53-55). Literary celebrity was not
invented in the 20th century, of course. Yet technology obviously amplified the reach of
publicity far beyond anything previously possible. Shickel's Intimate Strangers offers a
detailed pop-culture perspective on celebrity, including a penetrating analysis of
Fitzgerald's career.
2Bender makes intriguing analogies between the organization of the penitentiary
in the 18th and 19th centuries to the narrative authority assumed by a stoiyteller in
realism. His comments on combined discourse are especially provocative. See 242-43.
3To understand how "anti-social" Stein's conception of the sentence is, one need
only compare it to Bakhtin's argument that, as communication, words must be considered
not as grammatical constructions but as utterances, their meaning shaped by
"extralinguistic" or contextual influences (Problems 1-43). The most exhaustive account
of Steinian narrative is Bush (381-408).
4Several recent books and essays explore Stein’s revision of generic traditions,
especially those defining the novel. See Chessman (137-66); Ruddick; Berry; andFifer.
5 Many of these short-prose pieces are collected in Reflection on the Atomic
Bomb.
6This is not Stein's first appearance in the magazine; her work had been featured
semi-regularly since 1917. In fact, Vanity Fair published more of her material than The
Little Review ever would.
7 For accounts of Stein's early years in Paris, see Mellow (50-78). For an
account of the Stein-Toklas relationship and its influence on Stein's writing, see Benstock
(143-93).
8Elsewhere, Perloff reminds us that the "difficulty" of Stein’s style varies from
text to text. She identifies six general types; "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" occupies a
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midpoint between the hermetic Tender Buttons and the more accessible autobiographical
writings ("Six Styles").
‘-Mt remains unclear whether Stein knew of the homosexual connotations of "gay"
when she composed the piece. Perloff traces the word's etymology, showing that in the
early 1900s its most subversive meaning was synonymous with "lascivious." The
homosexual meaning first arose among Parisian gays in the 1920s, but did not become
widely known until the late 1960s. See "Ninety Percent Rotarian," note 14 (675-76). As
Vanity Fair's parody of "Miss Furr and Miss Skeene" implies (discussed below), the
erotic connotations of "gay" may have been more widely recognized (at least by New
York magazine editors) than previously assumed.
10 Bridgman suggests that Miss Furr and Miss Skeene are singers, although
nothing in the text beyond the words "cultivating voices" implies musical performance.
His interpretation illustrates Perloffs argument that the story contains a number of
potential narratives, though he does not concede that others might be read into the text
(158).
11 In many of these stories, the artists are also exiled from a heterosexist
language. See Benstock's "Expatriate Sapphic Modernism: Entering Literary History"
(183-203).
]2 McHale’s description of the form is indebted to Page (31-38).
13 This is the definition of Bakhtin's heteroglossia that Emerson and Holquist
offer in the glossary of The Dialogic Imagination (428).
141 borrow both "evocalization" and "reading voices" from Stewart, who
explores how the phonemic quality of puns, rhymes, and homophones inspires an aural
style of reading in which listening is speaking. Significantly for my purposes, the site
where reading gives voice to language is the receiving body, the audience, where "silent
reading processes a text as the continuous inhibition of the oral" (6).
15 For an interesting study of the link between voice and body, see O'Donnell,
who explores how modernists like Joyce, Malcolm Lowry, and Faulkner (among others)
"face, as a narratological problem, how that which is heard but not seen (voice) will be
framed, staged, and produced in narrative discourse—how it will be written down" (10).
By "figuring voices," these writers inevitably disfigure the body of the character so it no
longer represents a unified identity, thereby challenging claims of authorial mastery.
O'Donnell's approach is predominantly psychoanalytic; as such, his book illustrates the
differences between mainstream modernism and Stein, who insists on an even more
exaggerated separation between voice and body that renders psychoanalytic models
obsolete.
16 Bakhtin is often credited as the author of this text; I retain the original
attribution.
17 If so, Stein presciently forecasts the relationship that she and Alice would
maintain for some thirty-five years. For an interpretation of sex roles in the Stein-Toklas
marriage, see Benstock (161-68). Stimpson offers a more benign view in
"Gertrice/Altrude" (123-39).
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181 borrow this term from the translation o f Irigaray's "Women on the Market."
"Specularity" refers to the "socially valued, exchangeable body" of women as wives or
daughters—the value of the feminine as a commodity, in other words. As Irigaray
argues, the "specular" body is distinct from a woman's natural body: it is "a particularly
mimetic expression of masculine values" that defines and delimits the social construction
of femininity (180). I do not mean to suggest that Stein embarks on a specific feminist
project by splitting voice from body; Stimpson links the gap between the body and
consciousness manifest in Stein's work to the educational opportunities available to
women at the end of the 19th century. Opportunity created a gulf between "what
| women] might do with their minds and what they might do with their bodies." For
Stimpson, this gap allowed Stein the freedom to craft a masculine identity and transcend
the socially constructed limits of the feminine. See "The Mind, the Body, and Gertrude
Stein" (490).
19 See, for example, his letter of 29 July 1948 to W.G. Rogers (Selected Letters
649) and A Moveable Feast (15).
20The obvious exception, Three Lives, was published before Hemingway was
ten years old.
21 The two are "The Undefeated" and "Banal Story," written respectively in late
1924 and early 1925, between the composition of "Big Two-Hearted River" and "The
Battler," the last two stories completed for In Our Time. The pieces that rely
predominantly on dialogue, including "The Killers," "Hills," "A Simple Enquiry" and
"Ten Indians" were completed from mid-1926 to spring 1927, more than a year and a half
later.
22 Purists will quibble with my interpretation of stylization, for Bakhtin uses the
term to suggest the appropriation of "another person's referential (artistically referential)
intention" (189). I am applying the concept to the reader's awareness of Hemingway's
style, so what I mean is perhaps better represented by the term "self-stylization." At any
rate, public recognition of a specific Hemingway style demands some biographical
explanation as to why he did not revise out repetitions that somehow punctured the
fictional illusion. I would suggest that the stories in Men Without Women show
Hemingway struggling with the limitations of his public persona. Renza has shown how,
in his first collection, In Our Time, Hemingway struggled to establish his "vocational
integrity" against the stifling expectations of paternal literary influences, including Twain,
Thoreau, and Sherwood Anderson ("Importance" 661-90). Having won that battle by
late 1925, he now faced another formidable foe: himself.
23 Like Stein, Bames is not associated primarily with the short story, though
(unlike Stein) she wrote more than three dozen. Of these, only a few titles are
recognizable even to those familiar with her biography. "Aller et Retour," "A Night
Among Horses," and "Spillway" have generated some comment, including Ferguson's
breakthrough article, the first devoted solely to the stories. The essay is still valuable for
pointing to the consistency of Barnes’s doll and beast imagery. The thesis, however,
argues that the rhetorical "pyrotechnics" for which Bames was criticized throughout the
1960s is less prevalent in the short stories. Unfortunately, Ferguson overlooks many
stories (including "Run Girls, Run") that are as lyrically complex as the novels. Kannestine includes a chapter on the short stories, but his reading is marred by insistent
aesthetic judgment. Allen analyzes a lesser-known trio of tales ("A Little Girls Tells a
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Story to a Lady," "The Little Girl Continues," and "Dusie") as precursors of the lesbian
erotic in Nightwood (Silence and Power 54-66). O f course, Barnes’s stories were not
unanimously dismissed by reviewers. Messerli's bibliography reveals a variety of praise
from numerous quarters, from The Dial to the Detroit Free Press Magazine. The shortstory reviews complement what Jane Marcus has written of the Nightwood reviews:
Barnes's writing "was given the kind o f press coverage which only cookbooks gets
today, from serious intellectuals who took reviewing seriously and wrote elegant, if often
malicious, essays for an enormous reading public" ("Mousemeat" 195).
24 Lost-generation memoirs typically portray Bames as pretentious and selfimportant. Anderson claims she was unwilling to even talk with her or Jane Heap
(editors o f The Little Review): "For us there was no way of establishing a communi
cation with her" (181-83). McAlmon describes her as "wise-cracking...overdoing the
grande dame manner [while] talking soul and ideals" (167-68). Guggenheim's "informal
memoirs" are undoubtedly tinged by her own ambivalence as Barnes’s patron. Flanner’s
portrait is the most balanced (vii-xxiv). Held's often superficial biography includes little
analysis of personality. Benstock, on the other hand, places the putative haughtiness in
the context of Barnes's anxiety over her social and economic inferiority (230-42). Only
when her correspondence is collected and published will a balanced view emerge.
^ R e lev a n t here is Frank's reading of Nightwood, in which he argues that style
allows Bames to disrupt the narrative sequence so the novel builds upon a spatial rather
than temporal progression (2549). Frank does not take gender into consideration; his
reading should be reconsidered in light of Friedman's work on narrative "spatialization,"
which incorporates the reader's participation in the effect of atemporal narrative (12-23).
26 Feminist critics have long noted Bakhtin's failure to account for gender in his
theories of textual voices. Both of Dale Bauer's books, the full-length study Feminist
Dialogics and the edited collection Bakhtin, Feminism, and the Dialogic, map the place of
gender in heteroglossia.
27 Hutcheon explores this "pragmatic" limitation of parody, both from the position
of the reading audience, who recognizes the "position and power" that the inferred author
sways, as well as the producer of parody, who must infer an audience with sufficient
cultural background to decode the allusions (84-99).
28 The Bames collection housed at the University of Maryland includes a
typescript of the story that clearly identifies it as a "fragment" o f the novel.
29 See Coppelia Kahn’s "The Absent Mother in King Lear" (33-34).
30 Bames lived in Berlin in both the early 1920s and 30s. See Held Djuna.
31 She was infuriated when, in 1966, Kenneth Burke suggested that her "rhetoric
of lament" was aimed at Jews. Benstock's reading of the fascist subtext of Nightwood is
the best critical account of the controversy. See Women 355-63.
32 For background on the ambivalence of early 20th-century Afro-American
writers toward dialect, see Gates's Figures in Black.
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33 Another, more famous example is the opening passages o f "Big Boy Leaves
Home" (1935), where Wright intersperses narrative commentary within a game of the
dozens. See Uncle Tom's Children (17).
34 Unless otherwise noted, 1 quote from the 1940 version, collected in O'Brien's
The Best Short Stories 1941 (356-70).
35 See the index to Kinnamon's bibliography (779). Oddly enough, while the
story is Wright's most frequently anthologized short story, critical commentary is
relatively sparse. Part of the reason, I would suggest, is that the violence in the Uncle
Tom's Children stories better complements the prevailing critical attitude toward Wright,
which takes Native Son as totemic of his entire corpus.
36 Wright added an even more acid sign of Dave's status in the community in his
1961 revision. In the original, he mother spies Joe's catalogue and says, "We kin use it
around the house" (358). In the rewrite, she says "We kin use it in the outhouse" (II).
37 Vanessa Haley’s commentary in the instructor's manual to Fictions, a popular
college reader, offers a general illustration of these ironic interpretations. "So accustomed
is Dave to the invisibility of his race (that is, blacks are disregarded as men, as legitimate
human beings with full rights) that he inadvertently undermines his own credibility when
he acts irresponsibly, hiding the gun and shooting it...From a psychological point of
view, one could regard this scene | Jenny's death] as symbolic of Dave's fear o f his own
manhood...Dave's limited self-perception results from a combination of immaturity and
the low self-esteem he struggles to rid himself of, primarily through a misconception of
the power of violence" (191-92; emphasis added).

CHAPTER4
THE TALKING HEADS:
TIME, TENSE, AND THE MINIMALIST TEXT
IN TH E 1980S

In July 1984, Harper's launched what became a decade-long assault on its closest
rival in the periodical fiction market by publishing "The New Yorker Story," by Martha
Bayles. A writer identified only as William, "striving for an atmosphere of depthless
banality," invents a character named Betty who works at J. C. Penney, owns a Pioneer
stereo system, and consumes copious quantities of Diet Coke. A tenured professor at a
midwestem university, William is at home describing the brand-name obsessions and
anxieties of American consumer culture; it is this "heartland without a heart to which his
imagination keeps returning." His previous story, "Fred," about the owner of a 76 truck
stop, proved very popular with the editors of the New Yorker. But no sooner does
William begin delineating this suburban ennui than Betty takes on airs: she wears dia
monds, demands fancy liqueurs, and converses like a heroine from a Fitzgerald story.
Shocked, William tries to remind her just who created whom, but Betty complains of the
drab existence that she has been bequeathed. "I merely describe. I don't judge," William
offers as a defence. "You can appreciate that." Betty has a more complex story that she
wants told: an abusive boyfriend, an indifferent local community, an escape to a new life.
"Please!" shouts William. 'Tm a postmodernist writer! No epiphanies, no romanticism!
You have to realize, I've accepted the void!" The story ends in a stalemate, Betty pining
for a fuller future, William insisting that she return to her cash register. Without
recognizing the irony, he rebukes her upper-class pretensions: "Maybe someday you’ll
figure out that a character is more than a collection of possessions.... People are more
than the sum total of their commercial surroundings" (69-71).
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Though not as vituperative as "When Harold Moos Got Gay with Helen Furr,"
the Vanity Fair parody of Stein, the sketch satirizes the most identifiable traits o f the
minimalist style: an intense, almost suffocating immediacy fostered by the use of the
present tense; clipped, brittle sentences that convey a sense of alienation; a
preoccupation with surface detail, including brand names; a lack of growth or
development that justifies the telling of the story. O f the many detractors of minimalism,
Harper's pursued it with an almost Ahabic commitment. 1 Two years after the Bayles
story, it printed an essay by Madison Smartt Bell, a fiction writer himself, lamenting the
"diminishing landscape of the American short story." Like Bayles, Bell criticizes Carver
and Mason (among others) for creating "people.. .as facelessly uniform as the people on
television" and proliferating a "studiedly deterministic, at times nihilistic, vision of the
world." He quotes a blurb on the cover of Mason's first collection, Shiloh & Other
Stories (1982), to illustrate minimalism's chief fault: "Like O Blood, Bobbie Ann
Mason’s stories can be given to almost anyone." For Bell, this is a sales pitch
masquerading as faux populism (64-69). His essay is one of many written in the 1980s
that derides minimalism as a better marketing strategy than aesthetic mode, a selfconscious effort to appeal to a mass audience distracted by oral forms of entertainment
like television, radio, and the cinema. If minimalism was indeed a capitalist venture,
minimalist bashing quickly became its cottage-industry counterpart, with critics as diverse
as John W. Aldridge, Joseph Epstein, William Gass, and Mark Helprin contributing
increasingly virulent attacks on the mode, its artists, and even the short story itself. If
modernists (ostensibly) reject mass culture so that the aesthetic medium can transcend
history and exist in an eternal present, minimalists seize the day by appealing to the
momentary consumer consciousness. The result, according to these critics, is a timebound style bereft of craft, depth, scope, and, worst o f all, the signature o f individuality
that makes a text "literary."
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William O'Rourke, whose "exoskeletal metaphor" was discussed in the intro
duction, implicitly summarizes much o f the critical dissatisfaction with minimalism and
the marketplace in his discussion of the "special economics of the short story form." A
short story, he claims, is "capital intensive" because the time invested in its composition is
greater than the time required to consume it. The novel, by contrast, is "labor intensive"
because the investment ratio between production and consumption is more proportional
(though hardly equal). What makes the short story fashionable in an age of instant
gratification is the quicker return on the investment. He quotes from a 1985 interview
with Roger Angell, Mason and Carver's editor at New Yorker, to cap his argument:
"There's a great national factory out there. If you open the windows, you can
hear the sound of typewriters driven by people writing stories all over the country.
It may tell something about the state of die novel that this seems to be a
particularly good time for the short stoiy." What the sound of typewriters should
tell Angell is that the writing of novels in the "national factories"—serious, literary
(written, rather than oral) novels, macro-form, labor-intensive, vertebrate as they
are—is an unprofitable enterprise, a fact which the newest generation of writers
has (unconsciously, at least) assimilated, and that is why all those typewriters are
pounding out micro-form, capital-intensive, exoskeletal short stories. (205)

In a market-oriented society, the novel, as "serious" literature, is a long-term investment.
The short story, by contrast, tempts with the possibility of instant gains. The lure of easy
money and inflated reputation cripples the growth of the fiction economy by opening the
market to get-rich-quick schemes. From this perspective, minimalism, requiring even
less capital than most styles (because it is presumably easy to write), is the literary
equivalent of a junk bond. But to reverse the metaphor, the collateral that finances many
anti-minimalist arguments is the same portfolio o f critical prejudices against which Poe
defined the tale: namely, that bulk is totemic of aesthetic value. Poe reacted against a
contemporary sense that American literature had to be culturally "bigger" than its British
competition. Anti-minimalists, meanwhile, typically invoke the values of institutionalized
modernism (depth of characterization, ambiguity of language, resistance to consumption)
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to dismiss the mode on aesthetic grounds. Many lament the sudden popularity of the
short story that minimalism inspired, as though its renascence threatened the very
existence of the "serious, literary" novel. (To recognize how repetitive these arguments
become, one need only look for some play on the minimalist credo "less is more." "Less
is less," for example, is a near-obligatory jibe). By mid-decade, "minimalism" became
such a pejorative term that Mason and Carver, not to mention the majority of their
contemporaries, refused to be associated with it. "I don't like the term 'minimalism,’"
Carver told one interviewer. "I don't like that term at all. Like a lot of other things in life,
this too will pass. A few years from now all the writers being labeled 'minimalist' will be
labeled something else, or not" (qtd. in Gentry and Stull 153). Mason's disdain is
equally laconic: "I'm not sure what's meant by minimalism. I'm not sure if it means
something that is just so spare that there is hardly anything there. ..or if it's just a
misnomer for what happens in any good short story, which is economy" (qtd. in Lyons
and Oliver 458). John Barth defended the style in The New York Times Book Review in
1986, and Frederick Barthleme volleyed back at critics with an essay glibly subtitled
"Convicted Minimalist Spills Bean." Most writers associated with Carver and Mason,
however, placed themselves squarely in the realist tradition, leaving academic critics to
develop Mason's suggestion that minimalism is a "misnomer" for an element universal in
all short stories (and all narratives): economy. 2
The prevailing strategy for resuscitating minimalist fiction after the initial flood of
critical opprobrium has been to describe its affinities with the canonical postmodernism of
Barth, Robert Coover, and Thomas Pynchon. Thus Carver and Mason, like post
modernists, "are suspicious of'depth,' seeing that the (by now) traditional models of
depth are unsupportable; instead they present a play of surfaces"; they "accept the effacement of the border between 'high' culture and 'popular' or 'commercial' culture, and they
use the merging o f the two for establishing wider cultural possibilities" (Herzinger7677); their style manifests a "highly self-conscious response to the postmodern critique of
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representation, one which knowingly simulates a 'return' to plain style while remaining
properly ironic about the discredited representational conventions on which plain style
rests"; finally, the "debate surrounding minimalist fiction has served much the same
function within the writers' community" that the debate surrounding post-structuralism
within "academic scholarly circles" prompted: its draws attention to the contradictions
and paradoxes of all representational strategies (Simmons 51,53). These arguments are
certainly convincing, but as the last quotation implies, the aim to date has been to justify
minimalist fiction as a valid area for research within the academy. They do not explain
minimalism’s attraction to a non-academic audience. Reading Carver and Mason
alongside Benjamin's "The Storyteller," one can suggest that minimalism's radical
economy represents a "return to storytelling" after the open contempt with which
modernism regarded it. Carver often cites Hemingway as an influence, but the general
principle of economy operating in their stories strikes me as wildly divergent. Hem
ingway identifies himself as a consummate modernist by minimalizing traces of his
authorial agency so that his narratives are (ostensibly) self-contained. Carver and Mason,
by contrast, often efface everything but the narration. The surface upon which their
stories glide is often the moment of performance, which imbues the text with a confes
sional aura. Depth in modernist stories is similar to what Benjamin calls "information,"
the psychological analysis and explanation that must justify a text as newsworthy. He
traces their introduction into storytelling to the novel, arguing that they block creative
reception by filling the audience with information that must be digested. "It is half the art
of storytelling to keep a story free from explanation as one reproduces it," Benjamin
writes (89). Minimalist narrators take this imperative to heart, and the resulting texts, far
from being easy to read, require what Karl Kroeber calls "contributory feedback" through
which we "create something out o f the telling" (67). Despite what aesthetic critics claim,
many minimalist stories are not easy to read; the "slice of life" that they offer may be
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profoundly depressing or even nihilistic, but their sparsity is a reticence not unlike
Jewett's silence in "A White Heron."
The emphasis given storytelling in minimalism is most visible in the narrator's
temporal orientation toward his/her material. Both Bayles and Bell name the Joycean
epiphany as the missing structural element in these stories. As "Araby" (the quintessential
epiphany story) suggests, the most common temporal stance in written narrative is
retrospective: a remembrance of things past in which a stoiy and its telling are separated
by some degree of time. The traditional past tense conveys the authority of experience,
endowing discourse with the authenticity o f history so the narrative voice assumes a
testimonial function. Retrospection and testimony in turn influence structure. Because
most Western cultures measure time linearly, the traditional narrative norm is a chrono
logical sequence. Though the order of presentation may not replicate this chronology,
time's one-way movement implies the "logic" of cause and effect. Poe’s theory of the
single effect, Freytag’s dramatic pyramid, Bakhtin’s chronotope and Barthes’s "kernel
action," to name just a few theories of narrative development, all model structure on the
forward flow of linear time.
Yet time's influence on structure is itself subject to time and place. The rise of
alternative temporal modalities promotes strategies that challenge the conception of a story
line as a causal chain. Stephen Kern shows how innovations like the wireless telegraph,
the telephone, and the cinema redefined perceptions of time between 1880 and 1918,
raising two important issues that influenced modernist styles: whether the present was "a
sequence of single local events or a simultaneity of multiple distant events, and whether [it
was] an infinitesimal slice of time between the past and future or of more extended
duration" (68). Amid this debate, Stein began writing in the "continuous present"
(known to grammarians as the habitual or iterative present tense), which expresses
repetition and cycles. Non-traditional tenses of this sort have a revolutionary effect on
narrative time: a "moment" is no longer an event in a sequence but an experience in and
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of itself. But if Stein and other modernists write during an age when technology
thickened cultural perceptions of time, minimalists bear witness to its virtual evaporation.
Fredric Jameson describes the postmodern age as "the disappearance of a sense of
hi story...our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity
to retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change
that obliterates traditions of the kind which all earlier social formations have had in one
way or another sought to preserve" (125). In many minimalist stories, the aura o f the
perpetual present arises from the use of the punctual or instant present tense, the register
of momentary experience. The opening lines of Mason's "Shiloh" convey the transitory
nature of the tense: "Leroy Moffitt's wife, Noima Jean, is working on her pectorals. She
lifts three-pound dumbbells to warm up, then progresses to a twenty-pound barbell" (1).
As Mason remarks in at least one interview, the static, episodic world that the
present tense projects "obviously came from television" (qtd. in Lyons and Oliver 459),
For many critics, television's influence is destructive because it promotes surface over
substance, technique over texture, the visual over the visceral. 3 Yet the medium
illustrates two positive revisionary facets of narrative authority in minimalism, one
structural and the other rhetorical. Raymond Williams has argued that broadcast media
transform the "structure of feeling" that a sequence invokes. Whereas "a book or
pamphlet was [once] taken and read as a specific item," broadcasting overwhelms the
idiosyncrasy of the single event by assimilating it into a continuous "flow" in which one
program bears no more emphasis than what follows (86-90). In present-tense narratives,
the effect of this structural "flow" is unsettling. Time passes, but nothing much seems to
happen. Sequences no longer progress toward a concluding point (an epiphany, for
example) but "pulse" as a montage of overlapping, intermingling images and moods.
Scenes come and go, but the boundaries between them are fluid and imperceptible, like
the borders between TV images that are lost in the blink of an eye.
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William Gass, who gives contemporary writers a "failing grade" for their use of
the present tense, is thus correct to say that, like television, minimalist stories lack
dimension. The absence of depth is readily observed in the repetitive sentence structures:
“Kept simple, short, direct, like a punch, the sentences avoid subordination, qualification,
subtlety. Subordination requires judgment, evaluation; it creates complexity, demands
definition” ("Failing Grade" 35). Judgment, evaluation, and definition also require time.
By closing the temporal gap that typically separates the story and its telling, the present
tense negates retrospection and limits omniscience to perception, making these evaluative
acts impossible. As a result, minimalist stories project a narrative vulnerability in their
presentation. As Mason remarks, "If the author is writing in present tense then you get
the impression he [s/c ] doesn't know any more than you do about what's happening"
(qtd. in Lyons and Oliver 460). 4 This "impression" is manifest in the texturing of the
text, the evaluation of narrative components that linguists call "grounding" (Fleischman
170). Again, because the Western narrative norm is sequential, events that move story
time forward are typically more important than the description and commentary that
enhance them. 5 In most narratives, tense variations distinguish events from
commentary. In the present tense, however, the difference is often unclear. As a result,
individual reading acts texture the story as the audience decides, privately, what details
should bear more emphasis than others. By not creating complexity, as Gass complains,
minimalists invite it by deferring gestures like grounding to us.
Gass is also correct in noting that the minimalist style avoids subordination; as
Philip E. Simmons points out, the predominant syntactical formula is parataxis, which
"establishes the primacy of sequence [in the "flowing" sense] over consequence" (48).
The structural organization points to the second major transformation in narrative
authority, namely an oral strand that bears the imprint of electronic media. Subordination
is a written style, while parataxis is a common feature of oral conversation. Similarly,
while the present tense is comparatively rare in written narratives, it is the predominant
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tense in oral storytelling where it serves an interpersonal function: it emphasizes the text
as a performance. The present tense is a form of direct address, not one that dramatizes
reader participation, as you in “Life in the Iron Mills” does, but a metalinguistic reminder
of the storyteller's presence (Fleischman 264). If Irving embeds the "oral residue" of
'The Legend o f Sleepy Hollow" within multiple scribal acts, Mason and Carver go to the
opposite extreme: through the present tense, they hide writing in favor of conversational
spontaneity.
The oral strand in minimalism is not an evocation of the immediacy that, as I
suggested in the first chapter, romanticists employed to undermine the authority of the
written word. This is a particularly technologized style of address, for much as television
broadcasts sound and image, minimalism appeals to the visual and aural faculties.
Televisual" here means "to tell a visual," for the narration unfolds simultaneously with
the events that it narrates, creating an uncertain perspectival relationship between the
audience and the drama. On the one hand, as Jameson suggests, the lack of "temporal
continuity" in postmodern styles breaks down the connections between words;
experienced in isolation, outside their sequential ordering, they become more "material" or
"literal...ever more vivid in sensory ways." Because of the perpetual present, "the world
comes before [us] with heightened intensity, bearing a mysterious and oppressive charge
of affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy... reorient[ing] the subject or speaker to a
more literalizing attention toward those words" (120). Yet the metalinguistic emphasis on
the stoiyteller's presence that the present tense creates reminds us constantly that these
"images" are indeed narrated. The effect here is analogous to a cinematic "voice over" in
which a visual event is simultaneously narrated, or, in the case of a first-person narrator,
a "talking head" who announces his actions as s/he performs them. The resulting
perspective on the drama is not unlike what Hawthorne achieves in "Wakefield," which is
also narrated in the present tense. We experience the drama second-handed, always
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aware that the actions that seem utterly immediate and vivid are filtering through the
narrative perception.
The stories discussed in this chapter, Mason's "Shiloh" and Carver's "Where I'm
Calling From," illustrate, thematically and rhetorically, the effect of the perpetual present
on temporal consciousness. In "Shiloh," the drama centers on the relationship between
public and private history. It explores the sense of progression lost or denied when a
character feels disconnected from the realm of linear time and becomes aware, instead, of
repetitive, circular experiences. In "Where I'm Calling From," storytelling is the drama:
two recovering alcoholics share their stories, the act of narrating memory becoming a
therapeutic form for reconciling the failures of their past with the sobering responsibilities
that they must face outside the clinic. 6

Bobbie Ann Mason and the Insides of History
The structural flow and conversational spontaneity created by the present tense
allow Mason to locate her story in a "narrative meantime," in which conventional
temporality is no longer the ultimate authority for explaining the progression of events.
The point is particularly relevant to the theme of "Shiloh." In the final scene, Leroy
Moffitt recognizes that he has ignored the "insides of history," those private pulses of
relevance that, in the context of linear temporality, seem insignificant and meaningless.
Leroy makes this recognition only when his marriage falls apart, after he comes to fear the
force of change that his wife Norma Jean represents when their history as a couple no
longer matters to her. The temporal displacement that Mason's present tense effects on
the reader thus has a gender-linked dramatic corollary: linear time, as numerous feminist
studies argue, is governed by patriarchal values. It can exclude women from history by
devaluing private temporal modalities. 7 The televisual nature of minimalism is central to
conveying this theme. By assuming Leroy's perspective, Mason's storyteller holds
Norma Jean in a gaze. She is the object of the narrative eye, and to make sense of her
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marital dissatisfaction in the absence of more pronounced authorial clues, we must avoid
relying on cause and effect sequentiality. This interpretive struggle parallels Norma
Jean's: we must free ourselves from the same linear time scheme that binds her.
This tension between historical time and its "insides" in "Shiloh" is manifest in the
juxtaposition between theme and style. On the one hand, Mason supplies enough clues
(the characters' ages, references to Dr. Strangelove and Star Trek) so one may identify a
specific historical frame for the story: roughly 1980. Yet within this frame, moments are
connected by ambiguous temporal adverbs: always, sometimes, fo r a long time,today, in
the morning, the next day, four months ago, now, fo r three months, years ago, all the
time, for the past few years, at the moment. Obviously, just about any story will contain
adverbs like these, but Mason employs them so frequently, often bunching them two and
three at a time in a single sentence that they lose their specific reference, creating instead a
frustrating sense of "in-betweenness" or alienation from the security of conventional time.
This alienation is precisely the source of Leroy's frustration when a trucking accident
suddenly makes him homebound: "He has begun to realize that in all the years he was on
the road he never took time to examine anything. He was always flying past scenery."
For Leroy, time is a "departure, progression and arrival—in other words, time as
history," as Julia Kristeva describes linear temporality (191). As long as highway miles
provide the satisfying illusion of "flying" toward a particular destination, Leroy feels both
movement and, paradoxically, stability. Progressive temporality feeds what Kristeva
calls "monumental time," a register that "has so little to do with linear time (which passes)
that the very word 'temporality' hardly fits" (191). Monumental time is infinite like
space; within this realm, Leroy's flight finds its structure. The repetition of the
intransitive verb to be ("Leroy is a truck driver") reveals a durative, fixed concept of
identity shoring the ruin of his punctual-present reality. But with his rig now abandoned
in the backyard "like a gigantic bird that has flown home to roost," monumental time
becomes arrested motion, and he must find "something to kill time" to free him from this
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uncomfortably static existence. He toys with various craft kits, but his master plan is to
build a log cabin, "soon as I get time." With his fall from the masculine realm of linear
time, Leroy's homebound life assumes feminine characteristics. As his mother-in-law
says when she discovers his needlework, "That's what a woman would do. ..Great day in
the morning!" (6).
Leroy recognizes another temporal register associated with female subjectivity.
Kristeva calls it cyclical time, which measures not progression but return and repetition.
On the road, Leroy often recounted his life story to hitchhikers. "He would end with a
question: 'Well, what do you think?' It was just a rhetorical question. In time, he had
the feeling that he'd been telling the same story over and over to the same hitchhikers"
(9). At home, the disturbing sense o f repetition without progress grows more persistent
as Norma Jean's unhappiness becomes obvious. Again and again, she stares toward the
kitchen comer while cooking, "as if she can't bear to look," and she feeds the goldfinches
that repeatedly swoop past the window. For Leroy, the repetition of the birds is empty
motion because they never get anywhere. In this movement, he sees an image of his own
spiralling marriage: "They close their wings, then fall, then spread their wings to catch
and lift themselves. [Leroy] wonders if they close their eyes when they fall. Norma Jean
closes her eyes when they are in bed. She wants the lights turned out. Even then, he is
sure she closes her eyes" (7).
Leroy believes that they can save the marriage if they simply "start afresh," but his
memories perpetuate his immobility. In particular, he remembers the scene from Dr.
Strangelove playing at the drive-in when his infant son died: "The President was talking
in a folksy voice on the hot line to the Soviet premier about the bomber accidentally
headed toward Russia. He was in the War Room, and the world map was lit up" (5).
The peculiar shift to the preterite (the present tense typically expresses cinematic time)
emphasizes the lack of motion: Leroy's memories are arrested images, frozen in time.
Aware that he merely counts passing hours, waiting for some reassurance from his wife,
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his alienation erupts into a distinctly masculine anxiety: "Am I still king around here?" he
asks, afraid that Norma Jean is having an affair (13).
Leroy believes that history is cruise-control motion: present and past are regulated
by the consistent rhythm of monumental time. He judges his wife against this linear
model of progress. In his eyes, her self-improvement projects are ill planned and
perfunctorily executed. She has no log cabin, no final goal, no arrival point. She
graduates from body-building class and enrolls in an adult-education composition course;
she toys with an organ that Leroy purchases for Christmas, then abandons it to cook
ethnic dishes like Bombay chicken. But for Norma Jean, the present is an isolated spot of
time, without connection to history. More than self-improvement, her spontaneity is a
form of improvisation, as when she augments "Sunshine Superman" on the organ with
Latin rhythms. Norma Jean (whose name is specifically linked to the tragic unhappiness
of Marilyn Monroe) recognizes that the past can never be recouped into the present; a
second honeymoon would only perpetuate her entrapment in cyclical time. "You and me
could start all over again," Leroy says when she announces that she wants to leave him.
'"Right back at the beginning.' 'We have started all over again,1" she responds. "And
this is how it turned out" (15).
What prompts Norma Jean's "improvised" identity is Leroy's need to idolize her
as a symbol of cyclical and monumental time, thereby confining her to a fixed identity that
is "small and helpless." As Kristeva argues, the "cycles, gestation, [and] eternal
recurrence of a biological rhythm" that engender cyclical time can stereotype women into a
single sex role: motherhood (191). Leroy still views her this way, though their child
died fifteen years earlier. Her identity is as static as his memories: "She is still pretty," he
decides, as if time had not touched her. She is no longer a teenager, but both her husband
and her mother treat her that way: "She won't leave me alone —you won't leave me
alone," Norma Jean complains. "I feel eighteen again. I can't face that all over again"
(15), As this passage suggests, Leroy's attitude is only half of Norma Jean's dilemma.
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Her mother, Mabel, is equally intent on restricting her to the past. Mabel wants the
Moffitts to visit Shiloh because she honeymooned there years earlier, "the only real trip
she ever took": "I always thought Shiloh was the prettiest place, so full of history," she
says. History offers a secure retreat from the anxieties of the present by projecting the
illusion that events can be explained as a progression of causes and effects. Leroy and
Mabel share the same passivity. The past is their only hope for the future, and the present
is simply time that they must endure. Leroy's identification with his mother-in-law
further dramatizes his alienation from linear time and the masculine values associated with
it: "Like Mabel, [Leroy] is just waiting for time to pass" (11).
But unlike Mabel, Leroy does finally recognize that he is a prisoner of history.
When the Moffitts visit Shiloh, they discover the battlefield is not as they imagined it;
there is no direct statement of its meaning, no direct path to its significance. Instead,
monuments are scattered around bluffs and ravines. Norma Jean "drives aimlessly
through the park," her lack of direction a vivid counterpoint to the image of Leroy flying
through time in his big rig. Realizing that the battleground "looks like a subdivision site,"
he glimpses the hollowness of linear time:
General Grant, drunk and furious, shoved the Southerners back to Corinth, where
Mabel and Jet Beasley were married years later, when Mabel was still thin and
good looking. The next day, Mabel and Jet visited the battleground, and then
Norma Jean was bom, and then she married Leroy and they had a baby, which
they lost, and now Leroy and Norma Jean are here at the same battleground.
Leroy knows he is leaving out a lot. He is leaving out the insides of history.
History was always just names and dates to him. It occurs to him that building a
house o f logs is similarly empty—too simple. And the real inner workings of a
marriage, like most of history, have escaped him. (15-16)

History in Leroy's mind is a cumulative progression o f events. His life, however, is
complicated by moments that cannot be explained in a sequence. Ignoring the "insides of
history," he overlooks the most vital part of human interaction: the experience itself. As
he thinks, he watches Norma Jean walk through the cemetery on "a serpentine brick
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path." She moves away, but not straight away, and the story ends with this ambiguous
image, a symbol both of Leroy’s newfound awareness and Norma Jean's independent
self-expression. 8
The indirection of the walkway is also a fitting metaphor for the temporal
development of the action. The influence of the present tense on this ambiguous
movement permeates three planes of narrative time: chronology, duration, and pace. In
terms of chronology, tense variations typically segment a story into scenes with specific
temporal references that allow one to collate a time scheme from an non-sequential
arrangement. In "Shiloh," however, tense shifts do not always establish clear boundaries
between scenes. Nor do they return to the moment suspended in story time. As a result,
the audience constructs the chronology by deciding where these pieces fit; we also have
to decide whether they occur once or whether they are composite representations.
Finally, Mason’s tense play often prevents us from deciding the simple issue of who
speaks.
One sign o f the temporal ambiguity in the opening of the story (quoted previously)
is the past perfect tense. The first scene dissolves after a few lines of dialogue between
Leroy and Norma Jean into expository material, narrated in the past perfect ("Leroy has
been collecting temporary disability"). Though classified as a past tense, the perfect
expresses ongoing conditions and incomplete processes. Talmy Givon argues that it is
not conducive to representing sequences and thus rarely appears in narrative (qtd. in
Fleischman 37). When the storyteller says that "Leroy has begun to realize" his
insensitivity toward time, the audience cannot fix that realization to a specific moment in
the chronology. Its dramatic potential is muted because nothing in the context suggests a
progression toward that recognition.
Temporal ambiguity becomes even more disconcerting when entire scenes take
place in this "meantime." When the description o f Leroy's accident concludes and we
return to Leroy and Norma Jean, nothing in the context connects it to the opening scene.
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There is no mention of weight lifting, nor does the dialogue continue where their
conversation was interrupted. Instead, Norma Jean tells Leroy that his log cabin will be
out of place in the subdivision, though the log cabin is first mentioned in the summary
and not in the dialogue. In fact, another descriptive block cast in the perfect tense
commences, again ambiguously modulating between the past, present and future: Leroy
has been promising his wife "ever since they were married" that "one day" they would
buy their own home instead of renting, as they have "always" done. The small section
ends with one final adverb: "It does not even feel like a home, Leroy realizes now."
Again, if this exchange continues the first scene that introduced Leroy and Norma Jean,
that now refers to a specific moment, and Leroy's realization becomes a narrative event
with dramatic weight: it marks a sudden awareness of the distance that separates him and
Norma Jean. But if the scene is a composite representation or a summary, that now refers
to a broader time frame, and the drama loses its punctual force: Leroy has known for
"some time" that the marriage is not healthy. The audience decides the value of now ; in
doing so, it determines how each sentence functions in the text. Elizabeth Deeds Ermath
describes these texturing responsibilities as the "new acts of attention" that postmodern
writing demands (33).
Similar ambiguities arise even between scenes linked by temporal adverbs. When
Leroy meets his marijuana dealer in a parking lot, the narrator interpolates information that
should fix events in historical time: Leroy is thirty-four. He and Norma Jean were
married at eighteen because Norma Jean was pregnant. Leroy’s dealer, Stevie Hamilton,
is roughly the same age as Randy would be had he not died at four months. Yet the
temporal orientation and sentence function soon turn ambiguous:
Leroy remembers handing Randy to a nurse at the emergency room, as
though he were offering her a large doll as a present. A dead baby feels like a
sack of flour. 'It just happens sometimes,' said the doctor, in what Leroy always
recalls as a nonchalant tone. Leroy can hardly remember the child anymore, but
he still sees vividly a scene from Dr. Strangelove ...Leroy remembers Norma
Jean standing catatonically beside him in the hospital and himself thinking: Who
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is this strange girl? Now scientists are saying that crib death is caused by a virus.
Nobody knows anything anymore, Leroy thinks. The answers are always
changing. (5)

Adverbs like always and still imply that this memory repeatedly haunts Leroy: the vision
of Norma Jean in the hospital is an arrested image like the scene from Dr. Strangelove.
Yet the tag in the final sentence suggests that Leroy thinks at a specific moment. Again,
that act would be an action that significantly dramatizes his displacement. The clause that
introduces the following scene ("when Leroy gets home from the shopping center")
further implies that while the particulars of his trip home have been elided, his
remembering nonetheless occurs during this interval. Once more, in the absence of a
more specific temporal framework, the audience places the scene in the chronology.
The thematic tension between temporal registers enhances the interpretive
dilemmas that the audience faces. After Leroy and Norma Jean stare at the goldfinches
for an unspecified "long time," the storyteller introduces a scene with a hint of impending
action: "Something is happening." But instead of a dramatic event, the storyteller
provides more exposition: "Norma Jean is going to night school. She has graduated
from her six-week body-building course and now she is taking an adult-education course
in composition at Paducah Community College. She spends her evenings outlining
paragraphs" (11). Nothing here ties this "now" to the previous scene; exactly how many
evenings Norma Jean has spent outlining paragraphs is unclear. That information may
not be vital for understanding the conflict, yet its absence points to our displacement from
time. Mason herself has suggested that the present tense by necessity precludes this type
of temporal hopscotch: "You can't say [a character] answers the phone today and then
say it is three weeks later. How did that consciousness skip all that time? Who’s doing
the plotting? Who's behind the camera?" (460). Yet, as "Shiloh" demonstrates, her
storyteller does skip time, moving from now to now without regard for the distance
separating them. As a result, the expectation that time, by structuring cause and effect,
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explains psychological motivation is disappointed. Leroy feels the loss of causation as he
struggles to understand why Norma Jean changes hobbies: "What are you doing this for
anyhow?" he asks. Her response is ambivalent, and the drama erodes into still more
exposition: "Norma Jean used to say, 'If I lose ten minutes' sleep, I just drag all day.'
Now she stays up late, writing compositions. She got a B on her first paper—a how-to
theme on soup-based casseroles. Recently Norma Jean has been cooking unusual foods
—tacos, lasagna, Bombay chicken. She doesn’t play the organ anymore, though her
second paper was called 'Why Music Is Important to Me.'" Just how recently relates to
this unspecified now is unclear, and a cause/effect relation between her composition
writing and experimental cooking is impossible to determine, either for Leroy or for us.
Did her cooking lead her to write on the subject of soup-based casseroles, or did the B
that she received on the paper encourage her to experiment with Bombay chicken? This
ambiguity further obscures anymore, which is a dependent adverb that typically
references a cause/effect relationship, though it remains unclear whether the writing or the
cooking or both interests have caused her to stop playing the organ. Norma Jean's
motivations cannot be reconstructed in sequence; as I suggested earlier, her selfimprovement is self-improvisation in which the process of experimentation is more
important than its final product. The contrast between her indifference to sequence and
Leroy's obsession with it is nicely highlighted: while she writes, he spends night after
night constructing a model cabin out of Lincoln Logs because "the thought of getting a
truckload of notched, numbered logs scares him," and he wants to be sure that he can put
it together in order. The image is a metaphor for the audience's struggle to construct the
text linearly. But just as Norma Jean's actions elude chronology, the significance that one
seeks lies outside the concatenation of narrative events.
Mason's storyteller also renders time ambiguous by playing with frequency, the
ratio between the narrating act and the events narrated. She employs what Gerard Genette
calls "iterative" narrative or summary: events that occur repeatedly are narrated once
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(116). Traditionally, summaiy provides background. Rather than advance the plot, it
enhances the consistency of the fictional world, repetition and routine fleshing out the
structural skeleton of dramatic events that happen once. Summary can be distinguished
by verb type (in present tense, the progressive present and the past perfect being the most
common) and adverbs that signify spans of time rather than specific points (for a while,
sometimes as opposed to suddenly). Again, the traditional difference in aesthetic value
that distinguishes one-time events and those that occur repeatedly is founded on an
assumption that actions are more important than commentary. But Mason’s storyteller
confounds these distinctions, exploiting frequency to dramatize the Moffitts' entrapment
in cyclical time.
The image of the goldfinches, for example, first appears in a block of summary.
Adverbs signify the repetition of action: "In the mornings, Norma Jean disappears...
When she chops onions...She puts on her house slippers almost precisely at nine o'clock
every evening." As the focus shifts from Norma Jean to Leroy, however, the adverbs
disappear, and the scene shifts to that ambiguous ''meantime" that might signify either
punctual or cyclical temporality: "Norma Jean closes her eyes when they are in bed. She
wants the lights turned out. Even then, he is sure she closes her eyes" (7). Does Leroy
make this association each time he watches the birds or only once? Whether the symbol is
background information or an event that signifies his growing awareness is the audience’s
decision. 9 The storyteller thus de-emphasizes action in favor of description, often using
summary to supply the drama that the order o f events fails to produce. When Mabel first
visits the couple, for example, nothing in the scene suggests conflict: she gives them a
dust ruffle, rolls her eyes at Leroy's needlepoint, recommends that they go to Shiloh, and
promptly disappears. Her influence on the marriage is described in an aside: "Until this
year, Leroy has not realized how much time she spends with Norma Jean. When she
visits, she inspects the closets and the plants. ..She always notices if Norma Jean's
laundry is piling up" (5). When Mabel first mentions Shiloh, the storyteller stops the
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action to explain the reference: "Mabel is talking about Shiloh, Tennessee, For the past
few years, she has been urging Leroy and Norma Jean to visit the Civil War battleground
there." Summary here conveys Norma Jean's entrapment in cyclical time, the adverb
{alw ays) and tense {has been urging) marking the repetition. Her mother's routine is the
conflict; to communicate its import via a dramatic confrontation between them would
undermine the presentation of Norma Jean's entrapment.
The present tense clouds our perception of order and frequency so that time is an
undependable interpretive frame. But tense switches have an even more basic effect: they
impede our ability to distinguish shifts in what Genette calls focalization, movements in
which the voice remains the same but the center of consciousness changes. During the
course of the story, we face sentences that can be attributed to either the storyteller (as
interpolated commentaiy) or to the character (as combined discourse). What we discover
is a near fusion of the narrative and figural voices (specifically Leroy's) that creates the
"tell-a-visual" nature of the style.
Any number of examples reveal the fusion between narrative and figural
perspective. Even in blocks of summary, evaluative speech acts convey the simultaneous
perception of narrator and character: "Norma Jean works at the Rexall drugstore, and she
has acquired an amazing amount of information about cosmetics. When she explains the
stages of complexion care, involving creams, toners, and moisturizers, he thinks happily
of other petroleum products—axle grease, diesel fuel. This is a connection between him
and Norma Jean " (2; emphasis added). Is this Leroy's thought or the storyteller's? The
decision is ours, and, once more, any answer influences the perception of the structure.
If one assumes that the storyteller comments directly to the audience, the sentence is a
description that orients us to Leroy's state of mind. But if it is combined discourse, the
sentence suggests that Leroy recognizes his own need to connect with his wife; such
recognition implies an awareness that gives the sentence more dramatic weight. In such
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examples, the present-tense closes the gap between the narrator and the characters,
obliterating one device for distinguishing representation from description.
This televisual effect arises most forcefully, however, from the third temporal
register, the pace o f the narrating. Rhythm is the most subjective form of temporal play
because its perception is a function of reading time, which will obviously vary throughout
an audience. Still, as Genette argues, tempo can illuminate the relationship between the
narration and the story at two levels: first, simply in terms of movement, which refers to
the quantity of text that represents blocks of story time, and second, as the duration that
various verb types and tense forms convey (93-94). Tempo is important in present-tense
narratives because one expects that the rhythm will mimic the flow of the story. If a
narrator synchronizes the two temporal planes, the story will contain no ellipses between
scenes and no evaluative interpolations that would arrest forward motion. Story time will
equal narration time. The noveau roman exploits this effect: details seem to pass
indiscriminately before the narrative eye. Without a retrospective consciousness sifting
and arranging materials, reading time supplies the tempo. Temporal play in "Shiloh" is
less extreme but in many ways more exciting than the avant-garde novel. Rather than
synchronize the two temporal planes, the narrator exploits the drag between them that
signals her presence as an evaluative filter.
This drag is most detectable in descriptive passages that syncopate dramatic
scenes. As Genette suggests, the tempo of a scene is modeled on exchanges of dialogue
where call and response evokes the flow of oral conversation. But in "Shiloh" dialogue
rarely runs uninterrupted by exposition. Conversational exchanges are themselves
undramatic and tend to begin and end with indifferent abruptness. The burden of drama
falls upon description, which slows the tempo o f the exchanges. When Leroy meets
Stevie Hamilton for a marijuana buy, for example, the scene, at first glance, seems to
have minimal relevance:
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"Where do you get this stuff?" asks Leroy. "From your pappy?"
"That's for me to know and you to find out," Stevie says. He is slit-eyed
and skinny.
"What else you got?"
"What else you interested in?"
"Nothing special. Just wondered." (4)

Leroy recognizes in Stevie the ghost of his own son Randy, but this recognition is
inferable only through the abundance of descriptive detail, which suggests that Leroy is
staring studiously at the boy. The narrator notes the color of his shoes, the logo on his Tshirt, remarks on his father's occupation, and even comments on the fact that, in the local
phone book, the Hamiltons have a second number listed under "Teenagers." These
details may seem gratuitous for a character who says exactly three sentences and
disappears. Their value, however, rests on their perception: passages of description
imply the act of observation. In reporting details, the storyteller transforms narrative
commentary into a story about the activity of perception. In structural terms, the relative
absence of dramatic events is deceptive: the act of orienting oneself to the scene is the
drama, both for the characters and the audience. Just as Leroy attempts to register what
passes before him, so, too, the storyteller acts less as an organizing force than a screen
whose background and foreground can be differentiated only by the audience.
The point becomes clearer when we examine the function of the scene in
storytelling. In granting the illusion of unmediated access to events, the scene marks the
highest degree of mimetic fidelity possible. The source of fidelity is our ability to imagine
ourselves present, to be invisible amid the action. Like theater patrons, we witness a
staged spectacle; but unlike a literal audience, we witness this action in our imagination.
The scene thus presupposes what Alexander Gelley calls a "specular investment." It asks
us to transfer language into image, to fantasize within the limitations of the frames that the
description imposes. As a result, "the reader becomes an unstable subject, seeking to
survey and master what is being shown, but continually thwarted by the frame or
'spectacle' that provides [the] means of access" (171). Scenes in "Shiloh" implicate us in
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this act of visualization at a metarhetorical level. Rather than directly reveal herself,
Mason's storyteller subtly relocates the drama outside the scenic frame into the activity of
narration itself. One clue to the "spectacle" of visualization is the abundance of perceptual
verbs: Leroy notices how the town has changed; Mabel notices the dirty laundry. Leroy
watches the birds and looks at his rig in the backyard. He sees traces o f Norma Jean's
features in Mabel. Even the most dramatic scene, what seems to be the couple's break
up, is a drama of observation, not action: Norma Jean, herself looking at the Tennessee
River, waves her arms at Leroy: "Is she beckoning to him? She seems to be doing an
exercise for her chest muscles" (16). The modal dramatizes not only Leroy's inability to
make sense of Norma Jean's actions, but the storyteller's commitment to dramatizing the
subjectivity of all specular investments, including her own. The action always orients the
audience back to the source of its perception.
Pace is not merely a matter of rhythm, however: a sense of movement also
depends on the duration or temporal length that verbs convey. Not surprisingly, duration
plays a part in the visualization of events in "Shiloh." In particular, Mason's use of the
progressive present enhances our sense of an asynchrony between story and narration.
The progressive typically complements ongoing processes of some length: "Rain is
falling." The distinction between the progressive and punctual present is rarely
maintained in storytelling, precisely because the duration that it conveys is antagonistic to
the spontaneous drama that moves the story forward. As a result, events are frequently
cast into the punctual present "to override the inherent duration of these situations, giving
them the appearance of instantaneous achievements" (Fleischman 37). Instead of saying
"Rain is falling," narrators often say "Rain falls." Tense type thus becomes another
criterion by which the audience grounds information: the progressive distinguishes
commentary while the punctual present conveys actions. The opening sentences of
"Shiloh" illustrate this distinction: "Leroy Moffitt's wife, Norma Jean, is working on her
pectorals. She lifts three-pound dumbbells to warm up, then progresses to a twenty-
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pound barbell. Standing with her legs apart, she reminds Leroy of Wonder Woman."
The progressive ("is working") suggests that the workout has been going on some time
before the story begins. The action verbs (lifts, progresses, reminds), meanwhile, mark
the commencing drama.
But Mason often uses the progressive tense in sentences that one might classify as
actions: "At that moment Norma Jean is holding on to the kitchen counter, raising her
knees one at a time as she talks. She is wearing two-pound ankle weights.. .under her
breath, she is counting. Now she is marching through the kitchen. She is doing goose
steps" (7). Maintaining the duration of Norma Jean’s activity has two effects: first, it
creates the drag of narrative rhythm. The moment that Norma Jean holds the counter has
no fixed conclusion. The audience ascribes an experiential value to the temporal adverb
(.moment) according to the rhythm of its own reading time. Second, the progressive
present marks the visualization rather than dramatization of scenes. According to Suzanne
Fleischman, one of the few modes of discourse in which the progressive present is
consistently employed is the "current report," as when sportscasters "announce" a game
(31). "The runner is rounding third" describes an event occurring simultaneously with
the speaker's perception of it (38). Likewise, events in "Shiloh" do not simply happen;
they are simultaneously observed and reported. This point is important because the
progressive present is used most frequently to describe Norma Jean's actions. She is the
object of a narrative gaze. The duration conveyed by the progressive present emphasizes
Leroy's need to keep her out of linear time. But for the audience, the progressive present
slows the forward motion of the narrative sequence, re-orienting us away from the drama
of actions to the drama of visualizing them.
"Shiloh" is only one of the many stories by Mason in which tense play resists
what Kristeva calls "the inherent linearity of language" (192). It is significant that when
Mason does write in the present tense, she consistently employs a third-person
perspective. The drama of the gaze that unfolds between Leroy's need to discover a cause
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of her unhappiness, one that can be explained in terms of cause and effect, and the
audience's effort to interpret and account for this conflict results from the peculiar
temporal drag in the representation. Again, the storyteller functions here not as an
organizing presence but as a reflective surface, always amorphous but always perceptible.
The translucence of such a narrative stance is particular to the undramatized narrator,
however. New and different ambiguities develop when the storyteller is a character in the
narrative, as is more frequently the case in Carver's stories.

Raymond Carver: Memory and Performance
The Carver brand of minimalism often evokes Hemingway's tough-guy reticence:
"We all go into the dining room. Frank Martin cuts the cake. 1 sit next to J. P. J. P.
eats two pieces and drinks a Coke. 1 eat a piece and wrap another piece in a napkin,
thinking of later" (217). Emphasizing the event in lieu of the emotion, Carver shuns
depth by omitting traces of a reflecting consciousness so that his stories often seem "more
transcribed than told" (Stull 1). 10 Like Hemingway, Carver learned the value of stark,
staccato sentences and strategic, Steinian repetition. The two writers differ, however, in
the type of utterance that they omit. As I suggested in the last chapter, Hemingway at his
most economical (circa Men Without Women) elides all but the most embedded signals of
narratorial presence, leaving only the mannerism of his style as a clue to his agency. In
later stories (especially those collected in Cathedral [1984]), Carver's narrators openly
grapple with communication; their fumbling attempts to make contact expose a
humanistic countercurrent to the mute, existential bleakness that typically stereotypes
their author. This humanism surfaces most visibly in certain linguistic gestures that
Barthes, remarking on the different interpersonal orientations that the spoken and written
word evoke, describes as the "scraps of language," those "appeals [and] modulations...
through which a body seeks another body" (Grain 4). In "Where I'm Calling From,"
these scraps mark a self-consciousness about the unfolding story, a willingness to shape
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and revise the narrative in process: "It's eleven o'clock in the morning—an hour and a
half until lunch. Neither one of us is hungry. But just the same we look forward to
going inside and sitting down at the table. What's J. P. talking about, anyway? He's
saying how when he was twelve years old he fell into a well in the vicinity of the farm he
grew up on" (129-30). 11 The interrogative effects a perspectival transition from interior
moods and feelings to the surrounding environment; it momentarily pinpoints the place of
storytelling, not its physical location or scene, but the perceptual space from which the
speaker observes and listens while he narrates. Hemingway would pencil through it
without blinking. But Carver frequently employs these devices, using questions
("What's to say?" "But so what?"), emphatics {"Sure, once in a while he drank the hard
s tu ff) and self-repairs {"I mean, his won't keep still") to register the relationship between
his narrators and their stories. However "transcribed" the sparsity of the style may strike
us, ample clues indicate that it is indeed "told."
This confusion between the transcribed and the told is indicative of the ambiguous
televisual stance in minimalist fiction. On the one hand, the objective report of external
details implies a narrator who coolly and laconically records the scene in stark black and
white by filtering out all emotional coloring; the interior monologue, as Wright's use of it
in "Almos' a Man" suggests, first and foremost conveys the intensity of a subjective
cognitive realm where unspoken thoughts burst and explode with Technicolor
exaggeration. In the first-person present tense, the perceptual borders that typically
distinguish these two stances disappear. At its simplest, the style begs a question: how
can one tell and take part in a story at the same instant? But a closer glance at "Where I’m
Calling From" reveals a complicating problem. Events from the past are rewritten into a
metaphorical present, creating the illusion of simultaneous narration and action. The
boundaries between the two types of present tense are likewise ambiguous. As scenes
bleed into one another and temporal grounding erodes, it becomes increasingly difficult to
tell where the storyteller does call from.
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The effect here, much as in "Shiloh," is a dissolving of temporal continuity as an
authority, or better yet, an excuse for explaining and justifying dramatic events. Scenes
in Carver's fiction are montages of experience. Whereas a modernist aesthetic would find
in montage a symbolic expression of content, the fragmentation of the medium reflecting
the fragmentation of the perceptual act, these scenes do not hint at meaning but leave us
with what Dana Polan calls "the evacuation of sense," an emptying-out of traditional
narrative motifs. In Carver’s case, the obvious narrative tradition "evacuated" is the
American success story. His protagonists are inarticulate and ineffectual, but unlike
Hugh Wolfe in "Life in the Iron Mills," they would never fancy themselves as artists or
seek in art transcendence from the social riddle. Anti-minimalists often dismiss the
peculiar apathy that haunts Carver’s characters as the middle-class writer's (or worse, the
middle-class academic writer's) romantic view of a "noble savage" blue-collar class.
What Carver el usively calls the "dis-ease" of contemporary life corresponds to what Polan
describes as the recognition in mass culture of the loss of "meaningful models of
behavior": narrative forms, both "high" and "popular" culture, offer "no models
whatsoever, preferring instead a situation in which there are no stable values, in which
there are no effective roles that one could follow through from beginning to end." The
individual's "will ceases to matter. ..Iso] one can come to luxuriate in one's own loss of
will"; what would have been "a negative situation" becomes, for the audience, "a source
of pleasure" (181-83). In Carver’s minimalism, the source of this pleasure typically
centers on what he refers to as "sentiment": "Any right-thinking reader or writer abjures
sentimentality. But there's a difference between sentiment and sentimentality. I'm all for
sentiment. I'm interested in the personal, intimate relationships in life" (qtd. in Gentry
and Stull 180). In "Where I’m Calling From," storytelling offers a ritual, however
subtle, for establishing these intimacies.
The peculiar organization of "Where I'm Calling From" results then from the
relationship that the storyteller attempts to strike with audiences within the story itself and
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with the narrative exchange. While Carver dramatizes storytelling as a postmodern mode
of communication, he focuses on memory as the thematic fiber. The narrator meets
J. P., a former chimney sweep, and listens to his confession because "it's taking me
away from my own situation" (213). He does not reproduce J. P.'s story in extended
quotes but re-tells it, performing it as he performs his own stoiy. Both characters recall
Leroy Moffitt in "Shiloh": they do not know how their life got off track, how the
happiness of home eroded into discontent. If Leroy's anxiety drives him to a relatively
pathetic form of self-delusion (planning to build a log cabin in the Kentucky suburbs)
these men are far more destructive. They have become alcoholics. "Who knows why we
do what we do?" the narrator asks us when J. P. admits that he had everything he could
want. But unlike Leroy, whose memories are frozen in time, Carver's recovering
alcoholics remember to come to terms with their loss. Toward the end of the story, while
J. P.'s wife Roxy visits, the narrator sits on the clinic steps, trying not to think about how
badly he wants a drink: "I'm thinking about chimney sweeps—all that stuff I heard from
J. P.—when for some reason I start to think about a house my wife and I once lived in.
The house didn't have a chimney, so I don’t know what makes me remember it now. But
1 remember the house and how we'd only been in there a few weeks when I heard a noise
outside one morning" (220). The memory leads to a humorous story: he discovers his
landlord peeping into his bedroom window; he cannot figure out why the old man is
laughing at him until he realizes that he is naked. The memory does not offer a key or
answer for why things went wrong. In fact, uncertain about what even sparked it, he is
content to dismiss the answer with an inconclusive "some reason." It is the plenitude of
his loss that inspires him to phone his girlfriend and ex-wife.
Oddly enough, the non-chronological retrospection that these characters perform
may be more "realistic" than the typical retrospective stance, in which memory is a simple
transcription of events. As Gayle Greene writes, memory "revises, reorders, refigures,
resignifies.. .far from being a trustworthy transcriber of 'reality,' it is a shaper and shape
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shifter that takes liberties with the past...memory is a creative writer, Mother of the Muses
(Mnemosyne in Greek mythology), maker of stories—the stories by which we construct
meaning through temporality and assure ourselves that time past is not time lost." These
"ennabling fictions" are distinct from nostalgia, a longing that more properly describes
Leroy's need to think of Norma Jean as a "still pretty" teenager. Nostalgia is the desire to
"return to home., .to return to the state of things in which woman keeps the home and in
which she awaits, like Penelope, the return of her wandering Odysseus" (294). Vivian
Gomick has accused Carver of being nostalgic in this manner; in stories like "Are These
Actual Miles?" or the notorious "Tell the Women We're Going," the locus of male anxiety
is a woman's freedom to philander or assume an autonomous sexual identity once the sole
privilege of men (1). The accusation does not apply to "Where I'm Calling From," or,
for that matter, stories like "What We Talk About When We Talk About Love" in which
conversational stoiytelling is also the centra] drama. Roxy is not trapped in the past.
When she visits her husband on New Year's Day, the narrator admits that J. P. told him
the story of how they fell in love:
'I've heard about you,' I say. 'J.P. told me how you got acquainted.
Something about a chimney, J.P. said.'
'Yes, a chimney,' she says. There’s probably a lot else he didn't tell
you,’ she says. 'I bet he didn’t tell you everything,' she says, and laughs. (219)

Her memories tell another story; however intensely the narrator has listened to J. P., he
has not heard "everything." But J. P. does not tiy to contain his wife in the past as Leroy
does. He seems to understand that after the arguments and infidelities, the broken noses
and dislocated shoulders that he and Roxy have inflicted upon each other, the two people
who first met by trading innocuous kisses no longer exist, not even in memory. To even
complete his story is to come to terms with this loss: "Now J. P. gets real quiet again. I
say, 'I want to hear the rest of this, J. P. You better keep talking.' 'I just don't know,'
he says. He shrugs" (213). The narrator's attitude toward memory is more complex.
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When Roxy visits, he asks her for a kiss, just as J. P. asked for a kiss years earlier. "I'm
not a sweep anymore," Roxy tells him. "Not for years...But sure, I'll kiss you, sure"
(219). When her kiss fails to have that same effect that it had on J. P., he silently
understands the loss, and leaves the couple alone. Sitting by himself, he expresses no
intention of obliging either his wife or his girlfriend to take him back: "I won’t say
anything about New Year's resolutions," he decides when he thinks of calling them
(221). All he wants is to reach them on the phone, to hear a voice respond, even if he
does not know what to say.
As a contrast, Carver describes two other characters who believe that the past does
exist independent of perspective. One is Frank Martin himself, owner o f the clinic, who
points out Jack London’s estate across the Sonoma valley and says, "Alcohol killed him.
Let that be a lesson to you. He was a better man than any of us. But he couldn't handle
the stuff, either" (215). For him, Jack London's life is a parable; the writer is a public
figure with a purely didactic value. He tells his patients to read The Call o f the Wild to
understand the high stakes of survival, then announces "End of sermon." In his brief
appearance in the story, Frank Martin hardly seems like a comforting counselor. The
narrator describes him as a "prizefighter, like somebody who knows the score." J. P. is
even more direct: "I feel like a bug when he's around," he confesses (215).
Another alcoholic in the clinic refuses to remember at all, taking pride in his
blackouts: "He doesn't have any idea why he's here at Frank Martin's. But he doesn't
remember getting here. He laughs about it, about his not remembering" (217). Here the
blackout is a form of denial. Unable to accept the loss of the past, the alcoholic refuses to
acknowledge it at all. Though he claims that his drinking is not a problem, he still has a
story to tell, and the other clinic patients respect it: "He’s not a drunk—he tells us this
and we listen." They listen because they remember a time in their life when they told the
same story.
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Significantly, in our final glimpse of him, the narrator does think of Jack London,
but not The Call o f the Wild. Instead, he remembers a story called "To Build a Fire,"
which he read in high school: "This guy in the Yukon is freezing. Imagine it—he's
actually going to freeze to death if he can't get a fire going. With a fire, he can dry his
socks and things and warm himself." As he recalls it, the man does start his fire, but a
branchful of tumbling snow extinguishes it. The story ends without resolution:
"Meanwhile, it’s getting colder. Night is coming on" (221). Like Leroy, who sees an
image of his stagnating marriage in the repetition o f the flying birds, the narrator seems to
recognize something of himself in this story. But here the analogy is left unexpressed; its
resonance is silent. Unlike Frank Martin or his fellow alcoholic, the narrator implies that
the content of memories and the experience of relating them are inseparable. Much like
Tiny, the alcoholic who entertains the patients with elaborate stories of his binges, the
narrator offers the memory and waits "for a sign of recognition" (209).
As in "Shiloh," temporal interruptions obscure the chronology of "Where I'm
Calling From." But whereas Mason uses the present tense to convey a sense of
sequential "flow," Carver structures his text around three interlocking temporal spheres,
each contained within the other like concentric circles. The first might be called "honest
present," the New Year's Day when the narrator re-tells his and J. P.'s stories. Carver's
"scraps," the interrogatives, self-repairs, and other interpersonal markers, help track this
scene even during segments cast in the fictional present: "She tried to explain to her son
that she was going to be gone for a while and he'd have to get his own food...H e
screamed, T he hell with you! hope you never come back. I hope you kill yourselves!'
Imagine this k id !" (216; emphasis added). This sphere includes the long, concluding
scene in which Roxy visits J. P., when the narrator thinks of the Jack London story and
decides to call his wife and girlfriend.
The second sphere is the "just present," which includes scenes from New Year's
Eve. The most important takes place on the clinic's front porch where J. P. tells his
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story. The narrator signals the realm in different ways: either with unexpected tense
shifts that evoke the first sphere ("But he told me that being at the bottom of that well had
made a lasting impression"; "I was interested. But I would have listened if he'd been
going on about how one day he decided to start pitching horseshoes") or with specific
time references ("A day and a half later J. P. and I meet up on the front porch...That's
when J. P. gets going with his story"). The final circle includes scenes from the distant
past that reveal how the men came to the clinic. Though these flashbacks begin in the
preterite ("When he was eighteen or nineteen years o ld ..."), the tense often shifts in and
out of the metaphorical present: "Then the doorbell rings ...This young woman chimney
sweep is there with her cleaning things...She was all-right-looking, too, J. P. said " (131;
emphasis added). Here the switches ostensibly guide the audience from circle to circle:
the metaphoric present conveys the mini-story as if it were ongoing. J. P.'s comment
about Roxy's looks, meanwhile, evokes the scene in which he narrates it.
But the subsequent paragraph introduces a more arbitrary, beguiling type of
switch: "When she'd finished her work, she rolled her things up in the blanket. From
J. P.'s friend, she took a check that had been made out to her by his parents. And then
she asks the friend if he wants to kiss her. 'It's supposed to bring good luck,' she says.
That does it for J. P. The friend rolls his eyes. He clowns some more. Then, probably
blushing, he kisses her on the cheek. At this minute, J. P. made his mind up about
something" (131; emphasis added). Clearly, in this case, tense changes do not divide
episodes but fragment them into even smaller units. Accounting for their function is
difficult, however, for the arbitrary pattern seems almost calculated. In print, these
switches are visually striking precisely because the conceptual subordination by which
written narratives are organized necessitates a "logic" of tense usage, which is typically
grounded in the authority of linear temporality. In oral storytelling, however, tense may
have nothing to do with marking time. Instead, the switches serve as an internal

231
evaluative device, a type of aural italics that "comments" metarhetorically upon the action,
cueing the audience to the importance of the forthcoming events.
It is a sign of Carver's ear for oral conversation that he uses tense shifts rather
than written conventions like italics. Their effect, I would suggest, is particular to the
"tell-a-visual" nature of minimalist storytelling in which the action is always the subject of
an implicit running commentary by the performance. Rick Altman has described the aural
appeal of television as a "sound hermeneutic" that draws a non-attentive viewer to the
screen: "the sound asks the question 'Where?' to which the image, upon identifying the
source, eventually responds 'Here!'" Similarly, these tense shifts may "initiate [our]
involvement" by sparking curiosity and challenging us to account for their purpose. They
are key to inspiring the "specular investment" that Alexander Gelley argues is necessary
for the reader's construction of a fictional scene. The story itself includes a subdued
example of the "sound hermeneutic" as the narrator remembers how his girlfriend
dropped him off at the clinic:
'Goodbye,' she said, and she lurched into the doorjamb and then onto the
porch. It's late afternoon. It's raining. I go from the door to the window. I
move the curtain and watch her drive away. She’s in my car. She’s drunk. But
I’m drunk, too, and there's nothing I can do. I make it to a big chair that's close
to the radiator, and I sit down. Some guys look up from their TV. Then they
shift back to what they were watching. I just sit there. Now and again I look up
at something that's happening on the screen. (214)

Whatever the "happening" that draws his attention to the screen, the narrator attempts to
assimilate himself into the scene twice: first as an uneasy participant experiencing it and
then as a storyteller who later recalls the moment. The switch to the present tense
implicitly cues us to the importance of the moment, yet what exactly its import might be is
unclear. The dramatized experience is whittled down to a sense o f "sentiment," in this
case a particularly awkward, alienated feeling enhanced by the other men’s absorption
with the television. The narrator's spectatorship is not a precise metaphor for our reading
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of the story; presumably, Carver assumes that we participate less ambivalently than the
storyteller watches television. Yet the act of trying to assimilate within the scene is
similar.
Frequently, tense shifts dissolve the temporal authority with which we reconstruct
a story line, substituting instead the peculiar postmodern space o f performance. The
narrator's distant past, for example, should be easier to fix in time because in the New
Year's Eve scenes (the middle temporal sphere) he ostensibly functions as J. P.'s
audience: "I say, 'I want to hear the rest of this, J.P. You better keep talking"’ (213).
Yet the interrogatives, self-repairs, and other interpersonal "scraps" often mark a
perceptual ambiguity: "J.P. quits talking. He just clams up. What's going on? Vm
listening" (134). The question can have two temporal anchors: it can refer to his thought
at the moment that J. P. clammed up or it can refer to the moment the narrator evaluates
the situation as he remembers it. This temporal ambiguity encompasses both single
sentences and whole episodes. "My wife brought me up here the first time," he says and
begins a long, past-tense flashback narrated directly to us. He describes how, before his
return to the clinic, he started drinking with his girlfriend on Christmas morning and did
not stop until he decided to make the trip back to the clinic. When the memory concludes,
he thinks: "I guess she got home okay. I think I would have heard something if she
didn't. But she hasn’t called me, and I haven't called her" (215). This appears to be
simultaneous narration, yet no sooner does the confession conclude than the speaker
evokes the second temporal sphere: "They clang an old farm bell here to call you for
mealtime. J. P. and I get out of our chairs and we go inside... We can see our breath
drifting out from us as we talk" (216-17). The unexpected return to the porch suggests
that the narrator has been telling this memory to J.P. In the absence of the typical
attributive tags (/ say, I tell him ) that would mark that moment as a concrete scene, the
audience must determine the boundaries of the event.
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Another sign o f the evaluative function of tense switches is their presence within
sequences of actions. In many cases, they cluster around temporal conjunctions and
adverbs that create a sense of progression: "They played some records. Then the
doorbell rings" (210); "[J. P.'s friend] kisses her on the cheek. At this minute, J. P.
made his mind up about something (211). Here the ambiguous space of the performance
overwhelms the temporality of the event. Rather than emphasize the sequence of actions,
the switches vary the reader's sense of proximity to the action like a zoom lense on a
camera. "Zooming" is apparent as well in Carver's manipulation o f pace. Shifts here
center around coordinate conjunctions, creating unexpected boundaries within sequences
of actions:
From J.P.'s friend, she took a check that had been made out to her
by his parents. And then she asks the friend if he wants to kiss h er...

When J.P. asks for a kiss, a shift to the preterite follows the conjunction:
"Sure," Roxy says. "Why not? I've got some extra kisses."
And she kissed him a good one right on the lips and then turned to go. (211)

Mason's storyteller impedes the linear movement of the text by casting events in the
progressive present, where the rhythm of the reading act gives them a temporal value.
What impedes the forward flow in "Where I'm Calling From" is a contrast between the
completion implied by the past tense and the on-goingness conveyed by the present.
Roxy's actions in the first sentence are accomplished before the sentence concludes. But
the act of asking is accomplished only as the sentence concludes. In the second example,
the sentence conveys an immediacy that suggests the speech act occurs as it is read; the
temporal value is congruent to the length of the sentence. In the second sentence,
however, the action culminates before the sentence concludes, and just how long that kiss
takes will depend on the individual reading act. By switching tenses around coordinating
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conjunctions, Carver alters the rhythm of the experiences dramatized even though the
syntax is relatively similar. Splitting sequences into ambiguous fragments, he toys with
our sense of what a narrative event is: chains of actions are represented as separate and
unconnected, the intensity that they convey creating a "pulse."
The ambiguous space of postmodern performance in the first temporal sphere
recalls Austin's distinction between the performative and constative speech act, which
helped clarify authority issues in "Bartleby," As Austin argues, the difference between
the two utterances is a "distinction between doing and saying" (47). In the performative
utterance, words do something; their issuing is an act. In this sense, they evoke interior
monologue: in a sentence like "I’m thinking about chimney sweeps," the articulation of
the thought is itself the action. The constative, which describes an act in progress, is
similar to the objective report style. "I sit down on the front steps" is a description of an
event. This distinction offers a clue to help ground different sentences by implying
different structural functions. The objective report conveys dramatic events. The interior
monologue, by concentrating on subjective assessments, marks the narrative
commentary. The performative thus indexes moods and feelings, while the constative
foregrounds actions.
At first glance the differences help us gauge the narrator's perceptual distance
from the story. In a sentence like "I remember the house and how we’d only been in
there a few weeks when I heard a noise outside one morning," the act of remembering is
performed as it is articulated. It places the audience in his head. Because the gesture is
not an action, the reader interprets the sentence as commentary: it leads us into the
evocative present in which the narrator discovers his landlord spying on him and his wife
in bed. At other points, however, access to this interior terrain is shut off: the narrating
self of the interior monologue disappears, replaced by the experiencing self, which
dramatizes itself as just one more object in the narrative perspective: "I sit down on the
front steps and light a cigarette. I watch what my hand does, then I blow out the match"
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(144). Much of the story's final episode, the longest block of simultaneous narration, is
composed of constative utterances. Not only are the actions of the experiencing self
rendered from this exterior vantage point, but this section includes more direct dialogue
than any other in the text.
Yet a number of sentences in the first-person present tense can be interpreted
either as performative or constative utterances: "I see this woman stop the car and set the
brake," "I don't see any wedding ring. That's in pieces somewhere, I guess," "I try to
put my mind on something else." As Austin argues, such sentences must be considered
both performative and constative utterances: "there seem to be clear cases where the very
same formula seems to be an explicit performative and sometimes to be a descriptive, and
may even trade on this ambivalence" (78). In fact, the more Austin attempts to move
away from the "explicit performative" (distinguished by the grammatical criteria of the
first person, present tense, active voice, indicative mood) and account for ways in which
language acts, the more categories of "primary" or pseudo-performatives he must
develop. "I guess" would be an "expositive," which "has generally or often the straight
forward form of a 'statement,' but there is an explicit performative verb... which shows
how the 'statement' is to be fitted into the context of the conversation" (85). "I try"
would be a "behabitive. ..concerned roughly with reactions to behaviour and with
behaviour towards others and designed to exhibit attitudes and feelings" (83).
Austin resolves the ambiguity by suggesting that saying is merely one form of
doing; that is, rather than being a special case of language use, the explicit performative is
an extreme articulation of what all language does, namely, create a certain effect. The
function of the constative utterance, stating or describing, is not a category of the speech
act, but a component of every enunciation. Austin calls this the "locutionary act... which
is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference,
which is again roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense" (109). The
performative function, on the other hand, enacts an "illocutionary force," which is its
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effect: a statement may assure or convince us of something, inform us, or warn us.
Significantly, Austin warns against thinking of the illocutionary force as "a consequence
of the locutionary act." Instead, it "is a reference.. .to the conventions of illocutionary
force as bearing on the special circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of the
utterance" (114-15). In other words, utterances possess an internal self-reflexiveness that
refers us to social conventions of interpretation that shape meaning. As I suggested in my
reading of "Bartleby," an excessive focus on the meaning of an utterance (the locutionary
act) diverts attention from the social conventions that shape its interpretation. In effect,
we concentrate on the meaning at the expense of the effect. The first-person present tense
precludes an exclusive focus on the constative. The emphasis that Carver places on
performance dramatizes the peculiar hollowness of the locutionary act. Minimalism
deflects our attention from content to how its creation influences our reading. The
emptiness that we feel in a Carver story, that strange sense that, though characters talk
and talk, they fail to state anything meaningful, compels us to look toward the effects of
talking. In "Where I'm Calling From," those effects are simple, seemingly obvious, but
somehow powerful and profound: they dramatize the hope that in using language, we
will establish a private intimacy.

Beyond Minimalism
The present tense is only one device o f economy in minimalism. By dissolving
the temporal gap that typically separates story from narration, Mason and Carver heighten
the experiential at the expense of the sequential, subordinating content to contact. In
doing so, they expose the high stakes of confessional intimacy by dramatizing the verbal
stutters and stammers that mark language as a production and meaning as improvisation.
Of course, not all minimalist texts are narrated in the present tense. Mason regularly used
the form in her first collection of stories, but in Love Life (1989), she experiments with
the traditional retrospective stance, claiming that she wrote in the present tense "because it

237
seemed right at the time...But I got bored with it. I started seeing it everywhere and it just
made me feel like doing something different" (qtd. in Lyons and Oliver 459). In Carver's
collected stories, the present tense is an exception rather than a habit. Yet even when
employing the standard past tense, these storytellers avoid capitulating to the illusion that
time explains all secrets. Causality is its own breed of fiction. The emphasis on mood
and feeling in minimalism, sometimes understated, sometimes disarmingly blunt, conveys
the spectrum of emotions that occur when linear time's limitations are too obvious to trust
or ignore. Freedom from history may be terrifying and exhilarating, but storytelling
allows us to return again and again to pivotal moments and re-create their significance as
an art of performance.
Unlike modernism, minimalism was never a movement in the sense that its artists
shared a general aesthetic agenda. Defined more by its detractors than its practitioners, its
presence was bound to fade once new techniques, or new combinations of old
techniques, were identified as the succeeding literary fashion. Many critics pinpoint
August 2,1988, the day that Raymond Carver died of cancer, as the official end of
minimalism. In many ways, Carver's final short stories, collected in the last third of
Where I'm Calling From (1988), show him moving away from the postmodern
sensibility that underlines his work in the early 1980s. His last published fiction,
"Errand," about the death of Chekov, is, in Carver's own words, "fuller, more generous"
than anything he had previously written (qtd. in Gentry and Stull 199). Yet while
texturally rich, the stories concern a basic theme that runs throughout Carver’s work, one
which is endemic of much minimalist fiction: the failure of the spoken word. "It's hard
for people to talk and say what they really mean," Carver told one interviewer. "But there
are other ways of communicating. Things do happen, things do get done and said in the
stories, even though sometimes people may be talking at cross-purposes at times, or
seemingly to no good purpose" (qtd. in Gentry and Stull 200). As we gain distance from
minimalism, this preoccupation with communication, not the nihilism or stark simplicity,
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will offer a way to understand what writers like Carver and Mason strive for in their style.
Like the oral storyteller for whom the text is both the story and its telling, their narrators
rely on the ambiguous "other ways of communicating" that give the work a performative
richness only implied on the printed page.

N otes
1 In 1990, the magazine was sued by Gordon Lish, Carver's one-time editor at
Alfred A. Knopf and a New Yorker figurehead, for publishing without permission notes
from his famously exclusive creative-writing seminar.
2 In Halpert's When We Talk About Raymond Carver, writers like Tobias Wolff,
Richard Ford, and Jay Mclnemey reject the term "minimalism" in words that recall
Carver's own dismissal.
3 Given the contempt with which institutional modernism regards mass culture, it
should not be surprising to find television’s influence derailed in anti-minimalist tracts.
Gass, for example, complains that minimalists play "a very temporal tune" (34). (He also
takes a gratuitous swat at Mason when he laments the abundance of "authors each named
Ann [or Anne]"). His comments here should be compared to his essay on Stein,
"Gertrude Stein and the Geography of the Sentence": "Books contained tenses like
closets full of clothes, but the present was the only place we were alive, and the present
was like a painting, "dthout before or after, spread to be sure, but not in time; and
although, as William James had proved, the present was not absolutely flat, it was
nevertheless not much thicker than pigment....Without a past, in the prolonged
narrowness of any 'now,' wasn't everything in a constant condition of commencement?"
(69).
4See also Ermath, who explores how traditional narrators draw their authority
from historical time: they "literally constitute historical time by threading together into
one system and one act of attention a whole series of moments and perspectives. Thus the
continuums of time and of consciousness literally appear inseparable, functioning together
as the medium of events even though this particular mutuality is rarely mentioned because
to do so would be to compromise the whole effect and to locate a vulnerability in the
presentation of objectivity. ..[the omniscient narrator] maintains the communication
between past, present, and future, and thus the possibility of causal sequences from one
to another. Any realistic, that is, representational and historical narrative, has as its
primary cultural effect the inscription of a single, homogeneous time stretching to infinity
(27-28). As she shows, postmodern writers exploit the separability of time and
consciousness by flaunting the very vulnerability in presentation that typical narrators try
to obscure. Tense is a major device of their technique.
51 use "events" and "commentary" as synonyms for William Labov's structural
narrative terminology, the "complicating action" and "orientation" and "evaluation"
repsectively. As Pratt argues, complicating actions are "the core o f the narrative."
Orientation generally provides information on a character or setting, while evaluation
reveals why the story deserves telling. See Speech Act Theory (44-50).

239

6 For an interesting read of Carver’s anti-polyphonic impulse, see Clark's
"Raymond Carver's Monologic Imagination." She argues that Carver "suppresses the
folk energies" of heteroglossia because "the polyphonic never seems far from the
entropic; and in his pluralistic culture, the heteroglossia which is essential to individual
identity is also profoundly threatening to it" (246).
7 See Kristeva’s "Women's Time," For a book-length examination of the topic,
see Forman and Sowton's Taking Our Time (20-36).
8 Many readers argue that our last glimpse of Norma Jean on a cliff above the
Tennessee River is an image of suicide. My own reading has been influenced by
Mason's explicit denial: "You can imagine my surprise when I hear that some students
think Norma Jean is going to jum p because she's standing on the edge of a cliff at the end
of the story. That's so weird. Maybe Leroy would jum p but not Norma Jean. She's a
survivor" (qtd. Lyons and Oliver 56).
9Barbara Henning makes a similar point about this image (692).
10 Stull’s essay was one of the first to reverse the (then) dominant view of Carver
as an chronicler o f existential despair. His work has precipitated a critical revaluation;
many in the academy have begun to address what Arthur A. Brown calls Carver's
"postmodern humanism." See Brown, Nesset, and especially Chdnetier, whose brilliant,
complex "Living On/Off the 'Reserve'" remains the best analysis of the performative
element of Carver's stoiytelling.
11 Nesset notes in an aside that Carver began to abandon the stark style as early as
the late 1970s, when he was preparing What We Talk About When We Talk About Love
for publication. According to his widow, Tess Gallagher, Carver's editor, Gordon Lish,
made serious cuts in the original manuscript to maintain the ambiance of "dis-ease." See
"This Word Love’: Sexual Politics and Silence in the Early Works of Raymond Carver,"
310, n. 28.

CONCLUSION

Charles Baxter introduces a 1990 anthology of "sudden fiction" or short short
stories with the metaphor of "reduced geographies." Unlike the novel, which is an
"estate," the short story "is like an efficiency on the twenty-third floor. As it happens,
more people these days live in efficiencies than on estates. The result may be that we will
start to see a shift in the imperial self of the traditional novel to the we and the they of
communal stories" (21). I have my doubts as to whether sudden fiction will succeed
minimalism as a formidable mode of narrative; in the five years since Raymond Carver's
death, the short story has begun to suffer anew its historical identity crisis. On the one
hand, it remains as popular as ever in the small-press market, and occasionally a
commercial publisher stumbles upon a collection that dents the best-seller lists, prompting
rumors of yet another short-story renascence. But brevity itself seems to have fallen out
of our cultural favor. Precisely because more people must live in efficiencies, estates
have become popular objects of fantasy, even if they are not affordable. The age in which
we live, in which even the optimists speak of "diminished expectations," inspires a desire
for "epic" experiences. While publishers claim that reading audiences abhor length, any
given Sunday edition of The New York Times Book Review reveals that the average best
seller runs more than four hundred pages. The popularity of long-form experience
illustrates the metaphor with which I began this study, Barth’s feeding duck, which I said
dramatizes the intertwining of brevity and desire. It seems an appropriate time to admit
that the image itself is quoted out of context: it appears in an essay on the "maxinovels"
of Proust and Musil, not on the short story. This study has attempted to grant the short
story conceptual autonomy from the novel by defining brevity as an experience rather than
an arbitrary size. Because the metaphor of exchange adds an interpersonal element to
prevailing definitions o f economy, the short story becomes an intriguing space for
exploring the social function of storytelling in different historical periods. My hope is that
240
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the increasing interest in the short story will inspire a deeper appreciation for the implicit
contract between a storyteller and his/her audience, whether in a formal, "literary" context
or in a slice of everyday conversation.
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